Changelog

First reading. Menlo's 2023 enterprise survey put multi-model use at 60% (restated January 2024); later waves state the pattern without a share and the 2025 mid-year update gives an 11% vendor-switch rate instead. One numeric point, so not yet measurable.

First reading. CoreWeave's Q2 2026 10-Q states effective rates of 15% (DDTL 1.0), 11% (DDTL 2.0), 9% (DDTL 5.0) and 7% (non-recourse DDTL 4.0), a simple average of 10.5%, on $35.6B of total indebtedness; the August DDTL 5.5 facility prices at Term SOFR plus 5.5%. One quarter-end, so the direction rule cannot run: not yet measurable.

First reading. Amazon's FY2025 10-K states a subset of servers and networking equipment moved from six to five years from 1 January 2025; Meta lengthened to 5.5 years, Alphabet holds six and Microsoft states two to six. One annual point per filer, so the direction rule cannot run yet: not yet measurable.

Evaluator: 10 (CNBC, 2026-09-30) reads concentrating over 4 periods with a dead band of 1. Auto-reason; rule rationale: Four quarters; one event is not a trend. More deals per year concentrate the application layer into the labs.

Evaluator: 5.26 (Budget Lab at Yale labour-market update workbook (dissimilarity index), 2026-03-01) is inside the consistent band (hi=7.5). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = within one and a half times the pre-AI baseline's reading at the same age (the January 2021 baseline sat near 5 pp forty months in); fast = 10 pp or more, twice the pre-AI pace. Between is `emerging`.

First reading. OpenRouter's top table on 9 September 2026 gives an HHI of 0.109 across nineteen listed models (one router, top slice only); the direction rule needs five weekly readings, so not yet measurable.

Evaluator: 5e+05 (TechCrunch, 2026-03-27) is inside the consistent band (hi=1e+06). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = under a million paid rides a week, well under one percent of US ride-hail trips and scaling one city at a time; fast = five million or more, a national-scale substitution. Between is `emerging`.

Evaluator: 4 (Dwarkesh Podcast transcripts, 2026-06-30) is inside the consistent band (hi=6). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = a gap under six months, ordinary red-teaming and productisation; fast = a year or more, a lab running internally on a model the public does not have. Between is `emerging`.

Evaluator: $2.0B (Dealroom news, 2026-06-30) is inside the faster than normal band (lo=$2.0B). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = the largest vendor under one billion gross, the scale the data-labelling leaders reached over a decade; fast = two billion or more at a single vendor, doubling within a year. Between is `emerging`.

First scoring. The AI-skills wage premium reached 62% in 2025 data (PwC 2026 Barometer, 15 Jun 2026; Outsource Accelerator relay), inside the normal band; the measure is a consultancy's own job-ad method (tier 7), so emerging.

Evaluator: -0.052 (CEPR VoxEU columns (via Wayback; cepr.org 403s bots), 2023-12-01) is inside the consistent band (lo=-0.1 hi=0). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = declines under 10% in the most substitutable freelance categories, a tool effect at the margin; fast = a 20% or worse collapse in freelance earnings. Between is `emerging`.

Evaluator: 0 (Humlum working-paper PDFs (author site), 2024-12-31) is inside the consistent band (lo=-0.02 hi=0.02). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = earnings and hours effects within two percent two years in; fast = a decline of five percent or more for exposed workers. Between is `emerging`.

First scoring. 3.3 million US workers are both highly exposed and low in adaptive capacity (Manning and Aguirre, NBER chapter, Jan 2026), inside the normal band; a single tier-6 estimate cannot score under the two-source rule, so emerging.

Evaluator: 0.4904 (arXiv abstract pages, 2026-06-30) is inside the consistent band (hi=0.6). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = under 60% of exposed workers use the tools weekly three years in; fast = 80% or more, the gap closed. Between is `emerging`.

First scoring. 27% of ChatGPT consumer messages were work-related in June 2025 (OpenAI usage paper Table 1; NBER abstract gives non-work above 70%), inside the normal band; the numeric source is the company's own paper (tier 7), so emerging.

First scoring. AI Futures grades its own 2025 quantitative predictions at roughly 75% of predicted pace (July 2026 update to the Feb 2026 65%), between the normal and fast bands; a self-grade is tier 7 and caps at emerging in any case.

First scoring. The tau-bench leaderboard leader passes 70.2% of tasks once and 56.2% four times running (Automation Anywhere table, 18 May 2026), inside the normal band; the 2026 point is vendor-tabulated (tier 7) so the status is capped at emerging, with the 2024 paper (gpt-4o pass^1 61%, pass^8 under 25%) as the second source.

First scoring. Best frontier model completes 7.1% of Legal Agent Benchmark holdout tasks end to end under the all-pass standard (Harvey, 26 May 2026), inside the normal band, but the only source is the vendor (tier 7), which caps the status at emerging until an independent run exists.

Evaluator: 0.9 (NBER working papers and chapters, 2026-02-28) is inside the consistent band (lo=0.7 ). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = at least 70% of firms report no measurable impact three years in, as with PCs at the same age; fast = a majority reporting impact (no-impact share under 40%). Between is `emerging`.

Evaluator: 0.14 (NBER working papers and chapters, 2023-04-30) is inside the consistent band (hi=0.2). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = an average uplift under 20%, the range prior process tools (CRM, knowledge bases) delivered in the same job; fast = 50% or more, the order of magnitude the fast scenario needs from a single tool. Between is `emerging`.

Evaluator: -0.002 (ADP Research, Canaries Dashboard releases, 2026-06-30) is inside the consistent band (lo=-0.01 hi=0.01). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = within one percent of flat, ordinary occupational churn; fast = a 3% or worse decline in exposed occupations, which is what a broad AI-attributable displacement looks like in payroll data. Between is `emerging`.

Evaluator: 1 (FDA 510(k) premarket notification database, 2025-12-23) is inside the consistent band (hi=3). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = a handful of LLM-based authorisations by end-2026, given a 510(k) path of roughly six months and a first clearance in December 2025; fast = ten or more, the regulatory throughput a fast scenario needs. Between is `emerging`.

First scoring. OpenAI's run-rate ($40B, Epoch/PYMNTS/Yahoo relaying Bloomberg, Aug 2026) over cumulative equity raised gives a ratio still under 1 with three points of history; the direction rule needs more periods, so emerging.

Evaluator: 4e+10 (Epoch AI data hub — AI companies, 2026-08-13) reads concentrating over 4 periods with a dead band of 2e+09. Auto-reason; rule rationale: Four reports; moves under $2B are reporting noise. Rising run-rate concentrates revenue at the two frontier labs.

Highest production rung on record is L3: Trajectory's per-customer LoRA adapters refreshed hourly and A/B-routed behind provenanced endpoints, per Baseten's co-authored post of 27 May 2026; Cursor's Tab model sits at L2 (one online-trained model for all users, 1.5-2 hour checkpoint cycles). L4 (firm knowledge in weights, Engram + Harvey) and L5 (rank-1 LoRA merge, Nested Learning, TTT, self-distillation) exist only as research and do not move the level. L3 is inside the normal band, but every production row is a vendor describing its own system (tier 7), so the status is capped at emerging. Initial seed.

Menlo Ventures' buyer survey: startups earned 36% of enterprise generative-AI application revenue in 2024 and 63% in 2025 (nearly $2 for every $1 earned by incumbents), a 27-point move against a five-point dead band, so the direction reads dispersing away from incumbents. Capped at emerging because Menlo is the only source and a survey is tier 6. Initial seed.

Evaluator: 2.042 (METR time horizons (v1.1), 2026-03-05) is inside the consistent band (lo=1.5 ). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = misfit of 1.5 or more (observed ratios of 5-10x against the constant-hazard 3.1x, the pattern since 2024); fast = within 10% of the constant-hazard prediction, which would mean long-task reliability tracking short-task success. Between is emerging.

Evaluator: 2.507 (SEC EDGAR XBRL company facts, 2026-06-30) reads dispersing over 4 periods with a dead band of 0.3. Auto-reason; rule rationale: Four quarters; a move under 0.3x is run-rate noise. Rising = capex pulling further ahead of revenue (the bet growing); falling = revenue catching the buildout.

rl-list.com's directory (generated 15 Jul 2026) lists 24 active commercial RL-environment vendors of 38 entries, inside the normal band (a few dozen, a specialist market). A single directory maintained by one person, tier 6, so the status is capped at emerging. Initial seed.

NCSL's 2025 legislation tracker holds 1,035 state AI bills, of which 170 carry an enacted or signed status, counted from the published table on 11 Sep 2026. Inside the normal band (500 or more a year: legislatures reacting at their own pace). One tracker, scraped, tier 6, so the status is capped at emerging until a second count (MultiState or the Transparency Coalition) corroborates. Initial seed.

Evaluator: 26.69 (FDA AI-enabled medical device list, 2026-06-30) is inside the consistent band (hi=50). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = the cumulative count growing under 50% a year (the 2019-2024 pace); fast = doubling or faster, which is what an ungated regulated domain would show. Between is emerging.

Epoch's 2024 projection puts full utilisation of public human-generated text in 2028 for compute-optimal training (80% interval 2026-2032), inside the normal band (2028 or later); the 2022 paper had said 2024. One research group's estimate, tier 6 and single-source, so the status is capped at emerging; refreshed when Epoch republishes. Initial seed.

Three announced brakes inside OpenAI in the trailing year, all with a verbatim source via the Internet Archive: internal Astra activity paused pending stronger security controls (7 Aug 2026), a two-week pause in RL training on deployment-bound models after the Hugging Face incident (18 Aug), and Astra judged to meet the Critical cybersecurity threshold with release gated behind safeguards (1 Sep). At or above the normal band (one or more a year), but every row is the lab describing itself (tier 7), so the status is capped at emerging. Initial seed.

Epoch's compilation of external ARC-AGI-2 results: the running best score reached 0.95 with GPT-6 Astra (3 Sep 2026), past the fast band (85%, the ARC Prize bar), from 0.89 in June 2026. Compute-unconstrained submissions compiled from a leaderboard are tier 6 and single-source, so the status is capped at emerging. Initial seed.

Epoch's price-trend series for the GPQA Diamond threshold set by GPT-4-0314: the lowest price per million tokens halves every 68 days (CI 38-317) on six points from 2023 to December 2024, inside the fast band (110 days or less, about 40x a year). Single tier-6 source with six points caps the status at emerging; the series ends in December 2024 and is refreshed when Epoch republishes it. Initial seed.

Evaluator: 1282 (Epoch AI ML hardware, 2025-11-06) is inside the consistent band (lo=500 ). Auto-reason; band rationale: Normal = doubling no faster than every 500 days (roughly the +49% a year Epoch reports); fast = yearly or faster. Between is emerging.

Log-linear fit on 168 notable models' estimated training power draw since 2020: doubling every 506 days (CI 332-1067), inside the normal band (yearly or slower), but the fit explains almost none of the variance (r2 0.08) because the notable set mixes small and frontier models. Single tier-6 source and a weak fit: emerging. Initial seed.

Log-linear fit on Epoch's 38 frontier models published since 2020: training compute doubles every 170 days (95% CI 152-193), inside the fast band (182 days or less, 4x a year or more) and matching Epoch's own 4-5x reading. Single tier-6 source; the estimates are inferred for most closed models, so the status is capped at emerging. Latest frontier model with an estimate: July 2025. Initial seed.

Epoch's chip-sales estimates: non-Nvidia designers (Google TPU, AMD, Amazon, Huawei, Cambricon) held about a third of cumulative H100-equivalent compute shipped through 2025 and 26% at end-March 2026 as Nvidia's Blackwell ramp outpaced them, so the direction reads concentrating in the chip layer. Single tier-6 source with wide estimate ranges caps the status at emerging. Initial seed.

Evaluator: 5.77 (Epoch AI benchmarks and Capabilities Index, 2026-08-20) reads dispersing over 4 periods with a dead band of 2. Auto-reason; rule rationale: Four open-weights releases; a move under two ECI points is inside the index's confidence intervals. Widening gap = rents concentrating in the closed labs.

Epoch's compilation of press-reported rounds and run-rates: the frontier labs' summed post-money over summed run-rate was 33x at end-March 2026, 26x after the April valuations and 28x after Anthropic's May Series H ($965B post-money on a $47-65B run-rate). Three events inside the 3x dead band read stable, but a single tier-5 source caps the status at emerging until a second compilation (or filings) corroborates. Initial seed.

Evaluator: 2.298 (SEC EDGAR Form D (private offerings), 2026-03-31) reads dispersing over 4 periods with a dead band of 0.2. Auto-reason; rule rationale: Four quarters; a move under 0.2x is round timing. Rising = capital concentrating in vertical applications.

Evaluator: 0.9479 (SEC EDGAR Form D (private offerings), 2026-06-30) reads stable over 4 periods with a dead band of 0.05. Auto-reason; rule rationale: Four quarters; a move under five points is a single round's timing. Rising = capital concentrating in the frontier labs.

First price snapshot, 10 Sep 2026: the cheapest METR-measured capability on OpenRouter costs about $0.30 per million prompt tokens per hour of 50% time horizon (16 models present in both datasets). The series records price change-points, so a direction needs four more of them; not yet measurable until then. Initial seed.

Clouded Judgement weekly medians: EV/NTM revenue for public cloud software fell to about 3x in spring 2026 and recovered to 4.4x by 4 Sep 2026 (top five at 31x). Over eight weekly prints the median rose from 3.5x to 4.4x, beyond the 0.3x dead band, so the direction reads concentrating (the market pricing more durable rents into the application layer). Capped at emerging because a single analyst's basket is tier 6 and there is no second source yet. Initial seed.

HHI across AWS, Google Cloud and Microsoft Intelligent Cloud segment revenue: 0.37 (Sep 2024) to 0.354 (Mar 2026), falling by more than the 200-point dead band over four quarters as Google Cloud grows fastest. Dispersing within the covered hyperscalers; Oracle and the neoclouds are outside the index, which would push it lower still. Intelligent Cloud bundles server products with Azure. Initial seed.

HHI between NVIDIA Data Center and AMD Data Center revenue by calendar quarter: 0.79 (Sep 2024), 0.86 (Jun 2025), 0.83 (Sep 2025), 0.85 (Jun 2026). Steps exceed the 200-point dead band in both directions, so the evaluator reads unclear: NVIDIA's share oscillates with its product cycle rather than trending. Two filers only; the level is high by construction. Initial seed.

Menlo Ventures' buyer surveys: applications took $4.6B of $13.8B enterprise generative-AI spend in 2024 (33%) and $19B of $37B in 2025 (51%), an 18-point rise against a five-point dead band, so the direction reads concentrating at the application layer. Capped at emerging because Menlo is the only source and a survey is tier 6; a second, independent layer split would lift the cap. Initial seed.

Same OpenAI post: over half of successful 4-8 hour tasks in the last six months involved at least one human intervention, stored as the floor 0.5. That sits at the edge of the normal band (half or more), and tier 7 caps the status at emerging regardless. Humans still steer most long agent runs. Initial seed.

OpenAI's 'Research acceleration' post (6 Sep 2026, via the Internet Archive snapshot because openai.com blocks the fetcher): 3.1 agent-workdays per human workday as of mid-August 2026, having crossed 1.0 in June. Above the fast band (3 or more), but a lab's statement about itself is tier 7 and caps the status at emerging. METR's modelling note puts Anthropic's researcher uplift from coding agents at over 2x; Anthropic's own system card says overall R&D uplift is well short of a doubling. No independent measurement exists yet. Initial seed.

Every adoption and adaptation indicator with a status sits inside its normal band: Census BTOS firm use 22.4% (normal under a third), BBD hours assisted 6.3% (normal single digits), BLS labour productivity 2.2% and private nonfarm TFP 0.8% (both at trend). The only reading outside a normal band is Ramp's paid-adoption share (56%, emerging on a tech-forward sample). No fast-band breach anywhere; the falsifying pattern (two adoption plus one adaptation indicator in the fast band for four readings) is nowhere near. Initial seed.

No safety-gating series is in the ledger yet: FDA AI device clearances, Waymo paid rides and lab pause events are planned inputs. Not scored until an instrument exists. Initial seed.

OpenAI's self-reported 3.1 agent-workdays per human workday with more than half of 4-8 hour tasks needing intervention (6 Sep 2026) is tier 7 and does not qualify as the independent RSI series the operationalisation requires; the thesis monitor's invention-side warning is untestable for the same reason. Downstream, the diffusion indicators sit in their normal bands. Initial seed.

The 80%/50% horizon ratio is 6.3 (normal is 5 or wider), the 2026 METR RCT found developers 4% slower while the 50% horizon doubles every 108 days, and 5% of enterprise pilots reach production with measurable P&L impact (normal under 10%). All three product-side readings are what the claim predicts; the counter-pattern (ratio toward 2 with uplift above 40%) is absent. Initial seed.

Not testable as a point prediction, as the operationalisation says. Read through cross-tracker concordance, which is 0.0 (all four labour trackers agree on no broad employment effect), consistent with the claim but not a test of it. Initial seed.

OpenAI's 6 Sep 2026 post declares the September 2026 intern milestone met by its own measurements (3.1 agent-workdays per human workday; over half of successful 4-8 hour tasks still needed a human intervention). A lab's self-grade is tier 7 evidence and caps the status at emerging; no independent replication exists. openai.com blocks the tracker's fetcher, so the figures are cited, not in the ledger. Initial seed.

Window closes March 2028; the only resolving evidence would be an external evaluation of autonomous multi-week research, which does not exist. Initial seed.

Mid-window (Jul 2026 to Jan 2027). METR's 80% horizon on the best-measured model is about three hours (Mythos preview, Apr 2026), not a working day; METR's 2026 RCT found experienced developers 4% slower (new recruits) and 18% slower (returning), after 19% slower in 2025. 'Most of what software engineers do end-to-end' is not what the external instruments show. Initial seed.

Window runs to mid-2028; the definition (Nobel-level across fields, autonomous multi-week work) has no instrument today beyond the 80% horizon, which is hours. Initial seed.

Combined OpenAI ($40B, Aug 2026) and Anthropic ($65B, Jul 2026, CNBC-confirmed) run-rates are about $105B annualised, on Amodei's own 'low hundreds of billions by 2028' path. Run-rates are press-reported and annualised, and no stack-wide revenue metric exists yet. Initial seed.

Anthropic's run-rate went from $9B (Dec 2025, Epoch) to $65B at end-July 2026 (Epoch; CNBC confirmed): 7.2x in seven months, where a 10x-a-year pace would give about 3.8x. Two sources; tier 5 run-rate, not booked revenue. Initial seed.

The tracker's log-linear fit of METR's 50% horizon over the 2024-onward window gives a doubling time of 108 days (95% CI 99-119), inside the four-month (122-day) claim; METR's own 2024-onward figure is 89 days. The 2023-onward fit (128.7 days) would read behind, so the reading is window-sensitive. Initial seed.

Six months before the date, the 80% horizon on METR's suite is about three hours (Mythos preview, Apr 2026). A 'years' horizon (about 2,000 working hours) needs roughly ten doublings, about three years at the current 108-day doubling time, and the doubling time is not shortening. The condition 'if the trend continues to speed up' is not met. Initial seed.

Window is calendar 2027. The authors' own December 2025 update moved their medians to 2028 and 2030; recorded, but a claim is not scored before its window opens. Initial seed.

Tracked, not resolved: the stack-wide capex-to-revenue metric is not yet built. Cahn's own July 2026 update restates the gap at $1.5T; realised lab run-rates (about $105B combined) remain far below the implied required revenue. Initial seed.

Same gap measure as the $600B claim; tracked until the capex-to-revenue metric lands. Lab run-rates are growing several-fold a year, which the static arithmetic does not project. Initial seed.

Resolves in 2030 against global AI revenue; no interim reading is decisive. Initial seed.

Mixed evidence. METR's RCTs found no developer speedup (19% slower in 2025; 4% and 18% slower in 2026), consistent with Covello; METR's 50% horizon doubling every 108 days is not. Recoupment metrics stay unpublished until lab cost data exist. Initial seed.

No hyperscaler discloses AI revenue cleanly enough to compute the 12:1 ratio from filings; AWS operating margin held near 39% through the capex surge (cloud_segment_margins) and cloud backlogs are at records. Initial seed.

Per the authors, almost all divergence between the scenarios comes after 2027; the tracker records the path and expects nulls until 2028. Initial seed.

Per the authors, almost all divergence between the scenarios comes after 2027; the tracker records the path and expects nulls until 2028. Initial seed.

Per the authors, almost all divergence comes after 2027. The BLS labour share is already down 3.4% year on year (labor_share_nonfarm, emerging), noted here but not scored against a 2030 path. Initial seed.

A meta-claim about instrument power, scored only if a macro series breaches its fast band before 2028. The labour share (down 3.4% year on year) sits in the emerging band, not the fast band. Initial seed.

Ramp AI Index, August 2026: 56.1% of Ramp business customers paid for AI (TechCrunch, 9 Sep 2026: 56%, +0.4 points month on month). Between the normal band (under 45%) and the fast band (65% or more) set for this tech-forward sample; the Census all-firm rate at the same date is 22%. Ramp's own August letter is titled 'Cracks in the AI thesis'. Initial seed.

Cumulative signed circular commitments (equity, guarantees, take-or-pay, backstops; LOIs, talks and self-reported aggregates excluded): Dec 2025 $641B, Mar 2026 $673B, Jun 2026 $798B, Sep 2026 $903B. Rising by far more than the $20B dead band each quarter; the largest single items are OpenAI's $300B Oracle contract (reported), $250B Azure commitment (Microsoft blog), Nvidia's $105B lease guarantee (10-Q) and Anthropic's $100B+ AWS commitment (Amazon). Initial seed.

Semis' share of filed segment operating income (NVIDIA Compute & Networking + AMD Data Center vs AWS + Google Cloud + Microsoft Intelligent Cloud), by calendar quarter: Mar 2025 51.0%, Jun 2025 46.6%, Sep 2025 50.9%, Mar 2026 56.9%, Jun 2026 57.3%. Up more than the two-point dead band over four quarters, with every step up or flat: the bulge is moving down the stack, not up. Microsoft's fiscal Q4 filled as FY minus three quarters. Initial seed.

AWS operating margin by fiscal quarter (10-Q/10-K segment disclosure): Mar 2025 39.5%, Jun 2025 32.9%, Sep 2025 34.6%, Mar 2026 37.7%, Jun 2026 39.4%. Within the two-point dead band over four quarters despite record capex; Google Cloud and Intelligent Cloud tracked alongside. Initial seed.

BLS nonfarm business labor share index (PRS85006173), year on year: Sep 2025 -0.7%, Dec 2025 -1.3%, Mar 2026 -3.1%, Jun 2026 -3.4%. Below the normal band floor (-2%) but above the fast band (-5%). The index also fell this fast in 2021-23 after the inflation shock, so the reading is `emerging`, not a break. Initial seed.

Anthropic Economic Index, January 2026 report (November 2025 data): 52% of Claude.ai conversations classified as augmentation, 45% automation; the March 2026 report says augmentation rose again but only in figures. Inside the normal band (augmentation >= 50%). Tier 2 provider disclosure. Initial seed.

Zero of four labour trackers past their AI-attributable-break threshold as of July 2026: Canaries y/y -0.2% (threshold -3%), Revelio gap -6% (threshold -10%), CAIT +1.0% (threshold +5%), entry-level shortfall 19% (threshold 25%). The falsification rule needs three concurrent. Initial seed.

NY Fed, The Labor Market for Recent College Graduates, 2026:Q2: unemployment rate for recent graduates about 5.6%, underemployment 42%. Inside the normal band (<=6%), at the top of the 2010s range. Initial seed.

California AI-Unemployment Tracker, July 2026 data (California Policy Lab; identical release on the EDD site): the 3-month moving average of high-AI-exposure initial claims rose about 1.0% month on month (52,300 to 52,800). Inside the normal band (<=2%). Initial seed.

Revelio Labs AI Labor Market Tracker, August 2026 edition (data to July 2026): employment in the most AI-exposed occupations is down ~6% relative to the least exposed since pre-ChatGPT, widened from ~4% in the previous edition. Between the normal band (>= -5%) and the fast band (<= -10%). Single source. Initial seed.

Canaries paper, August 2026 revision: the kept-pace shortfall for 22-25-year-olds in the two most-exposed quintiles is 19% as of June 2026, up from 15% at the July 2025 vintage; in levels, -11% vs +10% for the least exposed since November 2022. Between the normal band (<=10%) and the fast band (>=25%). Initial seed.

Census BTOS, post-November-2025 instrument: 19.8% of firms using AI in any business function as of 3 May 2026 (Census story, 26 May 2026), inside the normal band (<=35%). The National.xlsx cycle ending 9 Aug 2026 shows 22.4%; that value needs the XLSX connector. Initial seed.

Bick-Blandin-Deming RPS, May 2026 wave via FRED: 6.3% of work hours assisted by generative AI, inside the single-digit normal band. Weekly work use is 39.2% and any-use 61.8%, both well above the brief's expectations - broad adoption, shallow intensity. Initial seed.

MIT NANDA (Jul 2025): 5% of integrated pilots extract millions in value, the rest show no measurable P&L impact. Inside the normal band (<=10%). Disputed denominator; Menlo's 47% reach-production figure uses a different definition. Initial seed.

METR's Feb 2026 redesign estimates a -4% speedup for newly recruited developers (CI -15% to +9%; METR calls it very weak evidence); the 2025 RCT found developers 19% slower. Both are far below the 20% ceiling of the normal band. Initial seed.

Nonfarm business labour productivity, year on year (BLS PRS85006091): Sep 2025 2.5%, Dec 2025 2.5%, Mar 2026 2.9%, Jun 2026 2.2%. Latest 2.2% sits inside the normal band (<=2.5%), around the post-war 2.1% trend. Initial seed.

Stanford DEL WTA estimates: $116B (Jul 2025) to $172B (Mar 2026), one step above the $10B dead band; mean WTA $98 to $124.50 per month. Surplus is moving to consumers faster than any layer's revenue grows. Initial seed.

Private nonfarm business TFP index (BLS MPU4910012), year on year: 2023 +1.63%, 2024 +1.53%, 2025 +0.83%. Latest year inside the normal band (<=1.2%). Annual and lagged. Initial seed.

Same 2024-onward window as the 50% horizon: our fit gives 107 days, inside the fast band; the 2023-onward fit is 125 days, in the gap. No confidence interval on our fit; the 80% horizon remains roughly 6x below the 50% horizon.

Band input switched to the most recent window METR reports (2024 onward), per the updated rationale: our log-linear fit on METR's corrected v1.1 data gives a doubling time of 108 days, inside the fast band (<=122). METR's own TH1.1 post (29 Jan 2026) reports 89 days since 2024. On the 2023-onward window the figures are 128.7 (METR) and 125 (ours), which would read emerging; the status is window-sensitive and both are shown on the page.

Oracle remaining performance obligations at quarter end (10-Q/10-K XBRL): May 2025 $138B, Aug 2025 $455B, Nov 2025 $523B, Feb 2026 $553B, May 2026 $638B. Rising every quarter, far above the $10B dead band; Microsoft ($684B at Jun 2026) and CoreWeave ($104B) move the same way. Initial seed.

NVIDIA gross margin by fiscal quarter from 10-K/10-Q XBRL: Apr 2025 60.5%, Jul 2025 72.4%, Oct 2025 73.4%, Apr 2026 74.9%, Jul 2026 75.0%. Four-quarter change exceeds the one-point dead band and every step is up. Whole-company margin; segment margins are not in the company-facts API. Initial seed.

Latest non-disputed model ratio is 6.3x (>= 5 normal band); the Mythos point is excluded as beyond the 16h suite ceiling. Matches the brief's expectation. Initial seed; pending Alex's review.

Log-linear fit over the 80% horizon, 2023 onward, gives a doubling time of 124.7 days, just above the fast band ceiling (122). No CI on our fit. Initial seed; pending Alex's review.

METR's published 2023-onward doubling time is 128.7 days (CI 104-158), between the normal band (>=213 days) and the fast band (<=122 days). Initial seed; the brief expected faster_than_normal. Pending Alex's review.