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What binds · the bottleneck map

What is holding AI up, and where

Each row is an input AI is made from or a friction that slows it; each column is a stage of its spread; the map opens on what binds now or is expected to.

How to read the map

A bottleneck here is whatever sets the pace, a scarce input upstream or a slow institution downstream; to bind is to be that scarce thing. Each row carries today's reading once; each cell says whether the row acts on that stage, and whether a named writer expects it to bind there.

Each stage of AI's spread: what is scored tight tonight, and what a writer expects to bindA model, not a measurement · tonight's readings placed on it
Stage 1

Capability / invention

19 rows of the map act here; 6 of them carry a tightness score
Scored tight or severe
Expected to bind here
Stage 2

Innovation: products and applications

17 rows of the map act here; 7 of them carry a tightness score
Scored tight or severe
Expected to bind here
Stage 3

Diffusion: early adoption

11 rows of the map act here; 2 of them carry a tightness score
Scored tight or severenone of the scored rows is tight; the rest are not scored
Expected to bind here
Stage 4

Diffusion: adaptation

10 rows of the map act here; 0 of them carry a tightness score
Scored tight or severenot scored: no row here carries a tightness score, so nothing can show as tight
Expected to bind here
a stage where at least one input is scored tight or severe tonighta stage where some rows are scored and none is tighta stage where no row is scored: unmeasured on this scale, which is not the same as freean input scored tight or severea score this site marks as low in confidence, hatched as on the scorecarda row a named writer, or this site, expects to bind at this stage; the name beside it says whose claim it is

AI reaches everyday use in stages, each feeding the next: a model is invented, built into products, taken up by people and firms, and then firms and laws change around it. A stage moves no faster than the scarcest thing it needs, which is what binding means. The boxes are the same width on purpose: nothing on this site measures how much passes through a stage, so the drawing marks where something binds and never how narrow the passage is.

The stage names are the map's. Tight means the input is short of what is wanted, on this site's scorecard, which runs from slack to severe. An input is listed as tight where its score there is tight or severe; a row is listed as expected where a claim on file says it will bind at that stage, with the claim's maker after it, and a claim failing its own test tonight says so. Many rows carry no tightness score at all, and frictions outside the chain never do, so a stage with a grey or an outlined band is not known to be free: most or all of it is not scored. Press a name for the row's entry.

Where AI is held up, and at which stagetoday's reading once per row · a row's name opens why

The stages, numbered: 1 capability / invention, 2 innovation: products and applications, 3 diffusion: early adoption, 4 diffusion: adaptation.

What slows it, and today's readingCapability / inventionInnovation: products and applicationsDiffusion: early adoptionDiffusion: adaptation
Inside the chain: Compute & physical
Critical mineralsNot scored: published, but this site does not read it yet.Capability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Electricity generationData-centre developers & power79 · tight (supply; confidence 40, low)Binding nowCapability / invention:acts here, and the site measures itInnovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, and the site measures itacts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
The grid and its hookupsData-centre developers & powerNot scored: nobody publishes a series that would measure it.Predicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (holding so far), Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)Innovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (holding so far), Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
Data-centre buildingsData-centre developers & power78 · tight (supply; confidence 60)Binding now, and predicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site (holding so far), David Cahn (can't be tested yet), Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)Innovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site (holding so far), David Cahn (can't be tested yet), Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)acts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
Chip-making equipmentSemiconductors & AI chip startupsNot scored: the gauge available does not measure what it claims.Capability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Chip foundriesSemiconductors & AI chip startups55 · moderate (supply; confidence 44, low)Capability / invention:acts here, and the site measures itInnovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, and the site measures itacts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
Advanced chip packagingSemiconductors & AI chip startupsNot scored: its readings are too old or too few today.Predicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (can't be tested yet)Innovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (can't be tested yet)acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
MemoryMemory/HBMNot scored: its readings are too old or too few today.Predicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (can't be tested yet)Innovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (can't be tested yet)acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
AI chipsSemiconductors & AI chip startups58 · moderate (supply; confidence 77)Predicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site (tonight's reading fits both sides)Innovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site (tonight's reading fits both sides)acts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
Networking and opticsNot scored: published, but this site does not read it yet.Capability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Capital14 · slack (money; confidence 76)Capability / invention:acts here, and the site measures itInnovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, and the site measures itacts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
Inside the chain: Model
Systems softwareNot scored: published, but this site does not read it yet.Capability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Training infrastructureNot scored: the gauge available does not measure what it claims.Capability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Building frontier modelsFrontier labs25 · easing (know-how; confidence 69)Capability / invention:acts here, and the site measures itInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Inside the chain: Training input
Post-trainingRLaaS / post-training / continual-learning infraNot scored: nobody publishes a series that would measure it.Predicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (failing its test), Sean Cai (holding so far)Innovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (failing its test), Sean Cai (holding so far)acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act here
Continual learningRLaaS / post-training / continual-learning infraNot scored: nobody publishes a series that would measure it.Capability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itInnovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act here
Tests and evaluationsEvalsNot scored: nobody publishes a series that would measure it.Capability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itInnovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act here
Training dataPermissioned data markets & licensingNot scored: nobody publishes a series that would measure it.Predicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (failing its test), Dwarkesh Patel and Jerry Han (can't be tested yet), Sean Cai (can't be tested yet)Innovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by This site (failing its test), Dwarkesh Patel and Jerry Han (can't be tested yet), Sean Cai (can't be tested yet)does not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Inside the chain: Serving & orchestration
Running modelsInference serving28 · easing (supply; confidence 78)Capability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: adaptation:does not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures itacts here, and the site measures itdoes not act here
Routing between modelsRoutingNot scored: the gauge available does not measure what it claims.Capability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: adaptation:does not act heredoes not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act here
Agents and tool useAgent infrastructure20 · easing (know-how; confidence 50)Predicted to bindCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site (can't be tested yet), Byrne Hobart and Nikhil Davar; Soren Larson (can't be tested yet)Diffusion: adaptation:does not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures itacts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site (can't be tested yet), Byrne Hobart and Nikhil Davar; Soren Larson (can't be tested yet)does not act here
Deployment platformsNot scored: nobody publishes a series that would measure it.Capability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itDiffusion: adaptation:does not act heredoes not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itacts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act here
Inside the chain: Deployment & application
ApplicationsNot scored: nobody publishes a series that would measure it.Predicted to bindCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by Byrne Hobart; Sean Cai (can't be tested yet)Diffusion: adaptation:acts here, but nothing the site reads measures itdoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, but nothing the site reads measures it; expected to bind by Byrne Hobart; Sean Cai (can't be tested yet)acts here, but nothing the site reads measures it
Outside the chain: Narayanan and Kapoor's families
From a working model to a product6 indicators: 1 faster than normal, 3 consistent or slower, 2 with other statusesPredicted to bindCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by Rabanser, Kapoor and colleagues (tonight's reading fits both sides)Diffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by Rabanser, Kapoor and colleagues (tonight's reading fits both sides)does not act heredoes not act here
People taking up the products5 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 1 consistent or slower, 4 with other statusesPredicted to bindCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor (tonight's reading fits both sides)Diffusion: adaptation:does not act heredoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor (tonight's reading fits both sides)does not act here
Firms reorganising around the tools9 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 6 consistent or slower, 3 with other statusesCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it
Law, regulation and institutions3 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 2 consistent or slower, 1 with other statusesPredicted to bindCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site; expected to bind by Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)does not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures itacts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site; expected to bind by Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)
The physical world's own speed2 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 0 consistent or slower, 2 with other statusesCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this sitedoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site
Deliberate safety brakes2 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 1 consistent or slower, 1 with other statusesPredicted to bindCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:expected to bind by Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)Diffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this sitedoes not act hereexpected to bind by Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)does not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site
Markets and prices8 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 2 consistent or slower, 6 with other statusesCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this sitedoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site
How science itself moves3 readings with no statusCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this sitedoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site
Limits on AI speeding up its own spread2 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 0 consistent or slower, 2 with other statusesPredicted to bindCapability / invention:acts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site; expected to bind by Benjamin Jones (tonight's reading fits both sides)Innovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:does not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; placed here by this site; expected to bind by Benjamin Jones (tonight's reading fits both sides)does not act heredoes not act heredoes not act here
Outside the chain: Added by the NBER volume
Verification and assurance1 indicator: 0 faster than normal, 0 consistent or slower, 1 with other statuses; 3 readings with no statusPredicted to bindCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew Koh (tonight's reading fits both sides)Diffusion: early adoption:acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew Koh (tonight's reading fits both sides), Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)Diffusion: adaptation:does not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew Koh (tonight's reading fits both sides)acts here, and the site measures it; expected to bind by This site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew Koh (tonight's reading fits both sides), Byrne Hobart (can't be tested yet)does not act here
Measuring the returns4 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 4 consistent or slower, 0 with other statusesCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:acts here, and the site measures itDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures itacts here, and the site measures it
Work and pay2 indicators: 0 faster than normal, 1 consistent or slower, 1 with other statusesCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it
The information ecosystem3 readings with no statusCapability / invention:does not act hereInnovation: products and applications:does not act hereDiffusion: early adoption:does not act hereDiffusion: adaptation:acts here, and the site measures itdoes not act heredoes not act heredoes not act hereacts here, and the site measures it
acts on this stage, and the site measures itacts on it, but nothing the site reads measures ita named writer, or this site, expects it to bind here, one square each+placed at this stage by this site, not by the author

A row acts on a stage when, being short, it would slow that stage; whether it is short today is its reading. Inside the chain, the reading is the input's tightness on this site's scorecard, from slack to severe, with the confidence the score carries; it means something different for supply, know-how and money, so a scored row says which. Outside the chain, the reading is the status of the indicators that read the friction: faster than normal means the barrier is being crossed faster than the normal pace this site allows for; consistent or slower means it is holding. The two scales are never mixed. To bind is to be the scarce thing that sets the pace.

Narayanan and Kapoor are computer scientists at Princeton who argue that AI will spread slowly, like earlier general-purpose technologies, because of barriers outside the models. The National Bureau of Economic Research is a network of American economists; its 2026 volume on transformative AI adds the last four rows.

The map counted: how many rows act on each stage, and how each reads tonightChart

By stage: what would slow each stage if it ran short

By part of the map: where the rows sit

Deployment & applicationInside the chain

By kind of scarcity, inputs inside the chain only

an input scored tight or severean input scored moderatean input scored easing or slackan input with no scorea friction outside the chain, read by indicators on their own scalea score this site marks as low in confidence, hatched as on the scorecard

One square is one row of the map above; press a square for the row's entry. A row that acts on more than one stage is drawn once at each, so the stage rows add up to more than the map has rows; in the other panels each row is drawn once.

The chain is the run of inputs AI is made from, chips to applications; a friction outside it is anything else that slows AI's spread, such as law or habit. An input inside the chain carries this site's tightness score where published figures support one, and stays an open square where they do not. A friction outside the chain is read by indicators on a different scale, so it is drawn grey and never placed on the orange one: grey does not mean loose. The last panel covers inputs only, because the kind of scarcity is a field of the scorecard that frictions do not have.

The numbers
Rowsan input scored tight or severean input scored moderatean input scored easing or slackan input with no scorea friction outside the chain, read by indicators on their own scaleAll
By stage
Capability / invention22212119
Innovation: products and applications2238217
Diffusion: early adoption0025411
Diffusion: adaptation0001910
By part of the map
Inside the chain: Compute & physical2216011
Inside the chain: Model001203
Inside the chain: Training input000404
Inside the chain: Serving & orchestration002204
Inside the chain: Deployment & application000101
Outside the chain: Narayanan and Kapoor's families000099
Outside the chain: Added by the NBER volume000044
By kind of scarcity
Short of supply: too little of the thing is made2219014
Short of money: too little is paid in001102
Short of know-how: too few people or firms can do it002507
How much of this page rests on a reading, and how much has only a model's judgement behind itChart · hatched is a model's judgement, not a reading
Inputs inside the chain6 of 23 on a firm reading
Frictions outside the chain11 of 13 on an indicator with a status
Narayanan and Kapoor's barriers27 of 89 tied to an indicator
rests on a reading: for an input, a score built from published figures; for a friction, at least one published indicator with a statusrests on a reading this site marks as low in confidencerests only on plain readings with no status: a figure exists, but nothing here says whether it is fast or slowno reading: only a model's judgement, in words, is on file; it is labelled as one wherever it is printedneither a reading nor a judgement

Each bar is the whole of one list. An input counts as read when this site scores it. A friction counts as read when at least one published indicator stands behind its row, and as plainly read when only figures with no status do; neither says the indicator measures the friction well. One of Narayanan and Kapoor's barriers counts as read when an indicator is tied to that barrier itself. Being read says a figure exists, not that the figure is strong.

The judgements were written by an AI model (Anthropic's claude-opus-5-5) on 2026-10-05. The only review on record is by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which changed some words and reasons and withdrew some judgements; no person reviewed each one. Put plainly, a model checked a model, and no person has checked every judgement. They are opinions in words and move no score. For an input with no score the judgement is printed on the tightness scorecard, not on the map above; for a barrier it is printed beside the barrier in the folded list at the foot of this page.

The numbers
ListOn a readingOn a reading marked low in confidenceOn plain readings with no statusOnly a model's judgementOn neitherAll
Inputs inside the chain62013223
Frictions outside the chain11020013
Narayanan and Kapoor's barriers270062089

Why each row sits where it does

For each row: what it is, why it acts on each stage, what reads it, and who expects it to bind. A row's name in the map opens its entry here.

How each expectation placed on the map is faring tonightChart
8
holding so far
1
failing its test
7
tonight's reading fits both sides
21
can't be tested yet
holding so farfailing its testtonight's reading fits both sidescan't be tested yetboxed: this site's own claim, or its extension of an author's

One mark is one claim listed under a row in the entries below: a statement by a named writer, or by this site, about what will happen on that row, with a test this site runs again each night where a published series allows one. Not every claim says the row will bind; some say it will not. A claim that names more than one row is drawn under each row, so there are more marks than claims; the counts above count each claim once.

A boxed mark is this site's own claim, or its extension of a named writer's, so there the site is marking its own work; an unboxed mark is a named writer's claim, tested by this site.

A claim that cannot be tested yet is not a claim that is wrong: no series on file can settle it today. A reading that fits both sides means the claim and its rival both expect what is seen so far. Press a mark for the claim and its test.

The claims, row by row
RowWhoClaimTonight
The grid and its hookupsThis siteData-centre buildings and their power hookups are the bottleneck.holding so far
The grid and its hookupsByrne HobartData centres arrive faster and with less warning than the grid's planners assume, so getting connected holds back new American sites.can't be tested yet
Data-centre buildingsThis siteData-centre buildings and their power hookups are the bottleneck.holding so far
Data-centre buildingsDavid CahnThe cloud companies start storing new chips instead of installing them, the sign Cahn watches for that data centres are running late.can't be tested yet
Data-centre buildingsByrne HobartToo few electricians, welders and other tradespeople hold back the building of data centres, so the largest technology firms keep paying to train them.can't be tested yet
Advanced chip packagingThis siteMemory and chip packaging are short.can't be tested yet
MemoryThis siteMemory and chip packaging are short.can't be tested yet
AI chipsThis siteNVIDIA and AMD take more than 50% of the gross profit they share with Microsoft's cloud arm and the estimates for OpenAI and Anthropic.tonight's reading fits both sides
CapitalThis siteMoney is not what is scarce.holding so far
CapitalDavid CahnThe biggest cloud and platform companies spend more each year on buildings and equipment than AI earns in revenue.tonight's reading fits both sides
Building frontier modelsDan SundheimOnly a handful of labs stay at the frontier, because it costs too much capital for more.holding so far
Post-trainingSean CaiLabs spend more each year with the firms that sell practice tasks, graders and expert data.holding so far
Post-trainingThis sitePractice tasks with automatic graders, and the expert-written data they consume, are where the shortage goes next.failing its test
Training dataThis sitePractice tasks with automatic graders, and the expert-written data they consume, are where the shortage goes next.failing its test
Training dataDwarkesh Patel and Jerry HanBetter data, more than better model designs, drives how much a model learns from its training, so progress comes to rest on finding new data.can't be tested yet
Training dataSean CaiTraining for long work whose results are hard to check, in fields such as biology, security and matters of taste, comes to rest on records of real work inside firms, because tasks staged by contractors stop teaching models.can't be tested yet
Training dataSean CaiLabs buy more of their training data straight from leading app companies and specialists, squeezing the firms that sell general practice environments.can't be tested yet
Training dataSean CaiThe market for training data stays split among many specialist sellers rather than gathering around one or two.can't be tested yet
Training dataSean CaiFirms outside the labs become large buyers of training data and practice tasks, so the labs stop being almost the only customers.can't be tested yet
Running modelsSean CaiWith many agents working on a task at once, most valuable office work comes to turn on the cost of computing and the systems around it, not on whether models are good enough.can't be tested yet
Agents and tool useThis siteProof of what an AI agent (a model that carries out tasks with software tools on a person's behalf) did, and who answers for it, becomes a bottleneck once agents handle money.can't be tested yet
Agents and tool useByrne Hobart and Nikhil Davar; Soren LarsonLarge platforms move to keep outside agents off them more often than they let them in.can't be tested yet
ApplicationsThis siteCompanies selling AI products keep lower gross margins than classic software, because every use costs them the model's price.holding so far
ApplicationsSoren LarsonApps that resell the labs' models see their margins shrink as their use grows.can't be tested yet
ApplicationsByrne Hobart; Sean CaiEngineers who fit AI into each customer's own work stay scarce, so their pay rises or employers settle for weaker hires.can't be tested yet
From a working model to a productRabanser, Kapoor and colleaguesThe agents Princeton's tracker tests grow more dependable far more slowly than they grow more accurate.tonight's reading fits both sides
People taking up the productsArvind Narayanan and Sayash KapoorThe share of American firms using AI stays within the pace this site calls normal, below 35%.tonight's reading fits both sides
Law, regulation and institutionsByrne HobartAI grows more unpopular even as more people use it, giving politicians on both the left and the right reason to campaign against it.can't be tested yet
Deliberate safety brakesByrne HobartA formal pause looks unlikely; instead the biggest labs, loosely in step, slow the public release of their most powerful models.can't be tested yet
Limits on AI speeding up its own spreadBenjamin JonesWhole projects stay far behind single skills, with the best score on real freelance projects below 50%.tonight's reading fits both sides
Verification and assuranceThis site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew KohChecking AI's work is sold as a category of its own.tonight's reading fits both sides
Verification and assuranceThis site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew KohInsurers write AI's mistakes out of their standard policies, so the cover has to be bought and priced on its own.tonight's reading fits both sides
Verification and assuranceByrne HobartFirms increasingly buy AI's work through a party with assets and a licence that can be held liable, such as an established service firm.can't be tested yet
Measuring the returnsDiane Coyle and John Lourenze PoquizOfficial output statistics miss most of AI's gains, which come as better quality and saved time that no price records.can't be tested yet
Work and payBrynjolfsson, Chandar and ChenIn the jobs most exposed to AI, workers in their early twenties fall behind workers over fifty, while in the least exposed jobs they do not.holding so far
Work and payAlex ImasCare, teaching, hospitality and other work where the person is part of what is bought take a rising share of spending and jobs as AI spreads.holding so far
Work and payPascual RestrepoLabour's share of income falls as AI takes on more tasks, even as wages rise.holding so far
Work and payBetsey StevensonWork in the jobs most exposed to AI grows more intense before it grows shorter.can't be tested yet
Work and payArvind Narayanan and Sayash KapoorAI does not wipe out software engineering jobs, and demand for engineers may rise as software gets cheaper to make.can't be tested yet
The information ecosystemJoseph Stiglitz and Màxim Ventura-BoletPublishers lose the visits that pay for what they produce.can't be tested yet

Inside the chain: Compute & physical

Critical minerals

Gallium, germanium, rare earths, copper and the other raw materials chips and power equipment are made from.

Why it is not scored: This site reads no series on how much of these minerals is mined or sold.

  • Capability / invention: Chips, power plants and the grid are built from them; a shortage slows how fast computing capacity can grow.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Electricity generation

The power stations, turbines, reactors and solar farms the electricity comes from.

What its score reads: Demand only: how fast the electricity that all AI chips sold so far would draw is growing. It says nothing about how much power can be supplied.

  • Capability / invention: Training a frontier model draws power for months; without the electricity, the computers cannot run.
  • Innovation: products and applications: Serving a product to everyone who uses it draws power every day, on top of training.

Read by: Growth in the power drawn by AI chips sold

Its row on the tightness scorecard
The grid and its hookups

Transformers, switchgear, transmission lines and the queue to be connected. The wire between a power station and a rack of chips.

Why it is not scored: The wait to connect a large new load, such as a data centre, is what scarcity here would show up in. Only one utility has stated its wait, and only through local press, so there is no series to read.

  • Capability / invention: A new site waits in line to be connected before it can draw power from the grid.
  • Innovation: products and applications: The same wait holds back the sites built to serve products.

Expected: This site: “Data-centre buildings and their power hookups are the bottleneck.” holding so far. Byrne Hobart: “Data centres arrive faster and with less warning than the grid's planners assume, so getting connected holds back new American sites.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Data-centre buildings

The shells, cooling and power hookups that racks of chips sit in.

What its score reads: The power Epoch expects at the large sites it tracks, against the power it counts as built there today.

  • Capability / invention: The buildings, cooling and hookups that house the chips take a long time to put up.
  • Innovation: products and applications: Serving capacity needs the same buildings.

Read by: Planned power against built power

Expected: This site: “Data-centre buildings and their power hookups are the bottleneck.” holding so far. David Cahn: “The cloud companies start storing new chips instead of installing them, the sign Cahn watches for that data centres are running late.” can't be tested yet. Byrne Hobart: “Too few electricians, welders and other tradespeople hold back the building of data centres, so the largest technology firms keep paying to train them.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Chip-making equipment

The machines that print, deposit, etch and inspect chips, made by a handful of firms such as ASML.

Why it is not scored: This site reads the equipment makers' filings, but their backlogs do not measure demand from AI: one of the largest files no backlog, and the others' backlogs fell while the AI build-out grew, following the wider chip cycle.

  • Capability / invention: A handful of firms make the machines that print advanced chips, and each new factory needs them.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Chip foundries

The factories, above all TSMC's, that make the most advanced logic chips.

What its score reads: How fast the supply of leading-edge logic wafers is growing, year on year.

  • Capability / invention: Almost all advanced AI chips come out of a few factories, so their capacity caps how many chips exist.
  • Innovation: products and applications: Chips for serving models come out of the same factories.

Read by: Growth in leading-edge logic supply; Growth TSMC states for its newest node

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Advanced chip packaging

The step that joins processor dies to stacks of fast memory on one base. Nearly all of it is TSMC's process, called CoWoS.

Why it is not scored: None of its gauges has a usable reading today: each is missing or older than its age limit.

What its score reads: How fast packaging supply is growing, and how much of it a few buyers take.

  • Capability / invention: The step that joins a chip to its memory has capped how many AI chips could ship.
  • Innovation: products and applications: Chips for serving pass through the same step.

Read by: Growth in packaging supply; How concentrated the buyers are

Expected: This site: “Memory and chip packaging are short.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Memory

The fast stacked memory, called high-bandwidth memory, that sits beside an AI chip, made by SK Hynix, Samsung and Micron.

Why it is not scored: None of its gauges has a usable reading today: each is missing or older than its age limit.

What its score reads: How fast the supply of high-bandwidth memory is growing. Epoch counts it in dollars, so a price rise looks the same as more memory.

  • Capability / invention: The fast memory stacked beside each AI chip comes from a few makers.
  • Innovation: products and applications: Serving large models is limited by memory as much as by arithmetic.

Read by: Growth in memory supply, in dollars

Expected: This site: “Memory and chip packaging are short.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
AI chips

The processors that train and run models, from NVIDIA, AMD, Google, Amazon and others.

What its score reads: How much of the chip supply one designer holds, and whether the cost of a unit of computing power is still falling.

  • Capability / invention: The chips that train models are the input labs compete for most directly.
  • Innovation: products and applications: The same chips serve the products.

Read by: How concentrated chip supply is by designer; Yearly change in the cost of computing power; Yearly change in the rent for NVIDIA's most-rented AI chip

Expected: This site: “NVIDIA and AMD take more than 50% of the gross profit they share with Microsoft's cloud arm and the estimates for OpenAI and Anthropic.” tonight's reading fits both sides.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Networking and optics

The switches, cables and optical links that join thousands of chips into one machine.

Why it is not scored: This site reads no series on networking gear for AI clusters.

  • Capability / invention: Training one model means wiring a building's worth of chips together.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Capital

The money behind all of it, above all the spending of the five largest builders of data centres.

What its score reads: How fast Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Oracle are raising their spending on buildings and equipment, over the past four quarters against the four before.

  • Capability / invention: Frontier training runs are paid for long before they earn anything.
  • Innovation: products and applications: Serving capacity is built ahead of the demand it is meant for.

Read by: Growth in the largest builders' spending

Expected: This site: “Money is not what is scarce.” holding so far. David Cahn: “The biggest cloud and platform companies spend more each year on buildings and equipment than AI earns in revenue.” tonight's reading fits both sides.

Its row on the tightness scorecard

Inside the chain: Model

Systems software

The low-level programs, such as NVIDIA's CUDA, that let models run fast on a given chip.

Why it is not scored: The activity of the open-source projects is public, but this site does not read it, and more activity could mean either a shortage being fixed or none at all.

  • Capability / invention: The software that makes chips usable decides which chips a lab can switch to.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Training infrastructure

The software and know-how that keep tens of thousands of chips working on one training run without wasting them.

Why it is not scored: Epoch lists how fully some training runs used their chips, but almost none are the largest runs this input is about, since the labs running them publish nothing, and the figures are measured against different chip speeds, so the same skill can read as twice as tight.

  • Capability / invention: Running one training job across a whole building of chips without failing is its own skill.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Building frontier models

The labs that train the largest models, such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, xAI and Meta.

  • Capability / invention: A handful of teams know how to build a frontier model from scratch.

Read by: How fast the computing power behind frontier models doubles

Expected: Dan Sundheim: “Only a handful of labs stay at the frontier, because it costs too much capital for more.” holding so far.

Its row on the tightness scorecard

Inside the chain: Training input

Post-training

Everything done to a model after its first training to make it useful, including practice tasks with automatic graders and feedback from experts.

Why it is not scored: Nobody publishes what this work costs or how long buyers wait for it. This site counts the sellers and keeps a tally of disclosed deals, which says the business exists, not whether it is short.

  • Capability / invention: Turning a raw model into a useful one needs data, graders and practice tasks built by people.
  • Innovation: products and applications: A model is shaped for each kind of work in the same way.

Expected: This site: “Practice tasks with automatic graders, and the expert-written data they consume, are where the shortage goes next.” failing its test. Sean Cai: “Labs spend more each year with the firms that sell practice tasks, graders and expert data.” holding so far.

Both claims here turn on one hand-kept tally of the labs' disclosed deals with these sellers. This site holds its own prediction to that tally; a named writer's claim is not judged on it until every seller counted a year before has a deal on file for the latest year, because most such buying is never announced.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Continual learning

Getting a model to keep learning from its use after release without forgetting what it knew.

Why it is not scored: No public test measures whether a model keeps learning after release. This site tracks what vendors claim, which is not a measure of scarcity.

  • Capability / invention: Models do not yet learn on the job; each improvement waits for the next training run.
  • Innovation: products and applications: A product cannot get better from its own use without it.
  • Diffusion: early adoption: Firms adopt faster what adapts to them, and today's systems mostly do not.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Tests and evaluations

The benchmarks and testing firms that say what a model can do.

Why it is not scored: This site holds many benchmark scores, but none of them measures whether good testing is itself in short supply.

  • Capability / invention: Labs can only improve what they can test.
  • Innovation: products and applications: A product is shipped only once its builders can tell it works.
  • Diffusion: early adoption: Checking an AI system's work is a cost every buyer pays before trusting it.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Training data

Text written or checked by paid experts, generated data, and licensed archives.

Why it is not scored: Sellers' revenues, which this site tracks from press reports, show activity. Nobody publishes prices or waiting times, which are what scarcity would show up in.

  • Capability / invention: The stock of public text is running out, so new data increasingly has to be licensed, made or bought.

Expected: This site: “Practice tasks with automatic graders, and the expert-written data they consume, are where the shortage goes next.” failing its test. Dwarkesh Patel and Jerry Han: “Better data, more than better model designs, drives how much a model learns from its training, so progress comes to rest on finding new data.” can't be tested yet. Sean Cai: “Training for long work whose results are hard to check, in fields such as biology, security and matters of taste, comes to rest on records of real work inside firms, because tasks staged by contractors stop teaching models.” can't be tested yet. Sean Cai: “Labs buy more of their training data straight from leading app companies and specialists, squeezing the firms that sell general practice environments.” can't be tested yet. Sean Cai: “The market for training data stays split among many specialist sellers rather than gathering around one or two.” can't be tested yet. Sean Cai: “Firms outside the labs become large buyers of training data and practice tasks, so the labs stop being almost the only customers.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard

Inside the chain: Serving & orchestration

Running models

Serving a trained model to users, which the industry calls inference.

What its score reads: The price, in dollars for a million tokens of output, of the cheapest model among a named basket of flagship models on one marketplace. A token is a word or a piece of one. One vendor sets it.

  • Innovation: products and applications: Every answer a product gives costs computing time.
  • Diffusion: early adoption: What a firm pays per answer decides where using AI is worth it.

Read by: Cheapest model in the basket; Yearly change in the rent for NVIDIA's most-rented AI chip

Expected: Sean Cai: “With many agents working on a task at once, most valuable office work comes to turn on the cost of computing and the systems around it, not on whether models are good enough.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Routing between models

Services that send each request to whichever model is cheapest or best for it.

Why it is not scored: The spread of list prices is set almost entirely by one very expensive model, so it says nothing dependable about how much a router can save.

  • Innovation: products and applications: Picking the right model for each request is part of making a product cheap enough.
  • Diffusion: early adoption: A firm that can switch models easily pays less and risks less.
Its row on the tightness scorecard
Agents and tool use

Models that carry out tasks by using software tools, for minutes or hours at a time.

  • Innovation: products and applications: A system that acts for people needs tools, permissions and a record of what it did.
  • Diffusion: early adoption: Firms hand work to agents only as far as they can see and undo what the agents do.

Read by: How fast the length of task an agent can finish doubles

Expected: This site: “Proof of what an AI agent (a model that carries out tasks with software tools on a person's behalf) did, and who answers for it, becomes a bottleneck once agents handle money.” can't be tested yet. Byrne Hobart and Nikhil Davar; Soren Larson: “Large platforms move to keep outside agents off them more often than they let them in.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard
Deployment platforms

Companies that host and run models for other businesses.

Why it is not scored: No public series separates these platforms' capacity from the cost of running models, which the row for running models reads.

  • Innovation: products and applications: The platforms that host models for firms decide how quickly a product can reach them.
  • Diffusion: early adoption: Security reviews and contracts for those platforms set how fast firms can start.
Its row on the tightness scorecard

Inside the chain: Deployment & application

Applications

The products people and companies use, from coding assistants to legal and medical tools.

Why it is not scored: Most of these companies are private, and too few publish their finances to say how hard money is for them to raise.

  • Diffusion: early adoption: Many firms first use AI inside products they already buy, for tasks they already have.
  • Diffusion: adaptation: A firm changes how it works only once products fit its own processes.

Expected: Soren Larson: “Apps that resell the labs' models see their margins shrink as their use grows.” can't be tested yet. This site: “Companies selling AI products keep lower gross margins than classic software, because every use costs them the model's price.” holding so far. Byrne Hobart; Sean Cai: “Engineers who fit AI into each customer's own work stay scarce, so their pay rises or employers settle for weaker hires.” can't be tested yet.

Its row on the tightness scorecard

Outside the chain: Narayanan and Kapoor's families

From a working model to a product
  • Innovation: products and applications: Their own first stage, from a method that works in the lab to a product people can use.

Read by: 50%/80% horizon ratio consistent with normal; Developer productivity uplift (METR RCTs) consistent with normal; Enterprise pilots with measurable P&L impact consistent with normal; Human interventions on 4–8 hour agent tasks (self-reported) emerging; METR 80% time horizon faster than normal; Price per unit of capability (cheapest METR-hour on OpenRouter) emerging

Expected: Rabanser, Kapoor and colleagues: “The agents Princeton's tracker tests grow more dependable far more slowly than they grow more accurate.” tonight's reading fits both sides.

Their barriers by domain: agents 4 14; general 1 2 3 5 6 9 13 17; law 10 11 16; medicine 12; software engineering 7 8 15

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
People taking up the products
  • Diffusion: early adoption: Their own second stage, people choosing to use the products.

Read by: Augmentation vs automation share (Anthropic Economic Index) emerging; Human interventions on 4–8 hour agent tasks (self-reported) emerging; Share of work hours assisted by generative AI emerging; US businesses paying for AI (Ramp AI Index) emerging; US firms using AI (Census BTOS) consistent with normal

Expected: Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor: “The share of American firms using AI stays within the pace this site calls normal, below 35%.” tonight's reading fits both sides.

Their barriers by domain: agents 26; general 18 19 20 21 22 24 27; software engineering 23 25

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
Firms reorganising around the tools
  • Diffusion: adaptation: Their own third stage, organisations changing how they work.

Read by: Developer productivity uplift (METR RCTs) consistent with normal; Enterprise pilots with measurable P&L impact consistent with normal; Entry-level employment shortfall in AI-exposed occupations emerging; Human interventions on 4–8 hour agent tasks (self-reported) emerging; Recent-graduate unemployment rate (NY Fed) consistent with normal; Share of work hours assisted by generative AI emerging; US firms using AI (Census BTOS) consistent with normal; US labour productivity, year on year consistent with normal; US total factor productivity, private nonfarm business consistent with normal

Their barriers by domain: agents 40; general 28 29 30 31 32 36 37 38 39 42; law 41; safety 34 35; software engineering 33

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
Law, regulation and institutions
  • Diffusion: early adoption: One of their own items: not knowing who is liable when AI errs deters firms from adopting it.
  • Diffusion: adaptation: They say these limits act across every stage; this site draws them where firms reorganise. Placed by this site.

Read by: FDA-authorised AI-enabled devices, growth consistent with normal; FDA-authorised devices built on a large language model consistent with normal; US state AI bills introduced (legislative year) emerging

Expected: Byrne Hobart: “AI grows more unpopular even as more people use it, giving politicians on both the left and the right reason to campaign against it.” can't be tested yet.

Their barriers by domain: agents 53; general 43 44 46 47 55; law 48 49 50 51 52; medicine 45; safety 54

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
The physical world's own speed
  • Diffusion: adaptation: They say these limits act across every stage; this site draws them where firms reorganise. Placed by this site.

Read by: Circular financing scale concentrating; Cloud backlog (remaining performance obligations) concentrating

Their barriers by domain: general 57 58 59 61 63; science 56 62; software engineering 60

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
Deliberate safety brakes
  • Diffusion: adaptation: They say these limits act across every stage; this site draws them where firms reorganise. Placed by this site.

Read by: 50%/80% horizon ratio consistent with normal; Human interventions on 4–8 hour agent tasks (self-reported) emerging

Expected: Byrne Hobart: “A formal pause looks unlikely; instead the biggest labs, loosely in step, slow the public release of their most powerful models.” can't be tested yet.

Their barriers by domain: agents 66 67 69; general 64 68; safety 65

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
Markets and prices
  • Diffusion: adaptation: They say these limits act across every stage; this site draws them where firms reorganise. Placed by this site.

Read by: Application layer's share of enterprise generative-AI spend (Menlo) emerging; Consumer surplus from generative AI (willingness to accept) dispersing; Lab concentration of routed tokens (OpenRouter, HHI) emerging; Lab recoupment ratio emerging; Price per unit of capability (cheapest METR-hour on OpenRouter) emerging; Semiconductors' share of stack operating income concentrating; US labour productivity, year on year consistent with normal; US total factor productivity, private nonfarm business consistent with normal; Public cloud software valuation multiples (Clouded Judgement) (not published)

Their barriers by domain: general 70 72 74 75; law 71 73; media 77; software engineering 76

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
How science itself moves
  • Diffusion: adaptation: They say these limits act across every stage; this site draws them where firms reorganise. Placed by this site.

Readings with no status: AI capability on science tasks, not the pace of science itself: best score on FrontierMath's hardest, research-level maths problems 100.0% (2026-09-29); best AI score on SciCode, code written to solve research problems across the sciences 66.9% (2026-09-22); best AI score on CritPt, unpublished research-level physics problems 36.0% (2026-10-28)

Their barriers by domain: science 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family
Limits on AI speeding up its own spread
  • Capability / invention: Their reasons AI cannot simply hurry its own spread; this site draws them where AI is made. Placed by this site.

Read by: Agent-workdays per human workday in frontier research (self-reported) emerging; Human interventions on 4–8 hour agent tasks (self-reported) emerging

Expected: Benjamin Jones: “Whole projects stay far behind single skills, with the best score on real freelance projects below 50%.” tonight's reading fits both sides.

Their barriers by domain: general 86 87 88 89

Narayanan and Kapoor's list for this family

Outside the chain: Added by the NBER volume

Verification and assurance

Someone has to check an AI system's work and answer for it when it is wrong.

  • Innovation: products and applications: A product that cannot be checked cannot be sold for work that matters.
  • Diffusion: early adoption: Firms adopt where checking the work costs less than doing it.

Read by: Agent reliability across repeated runs (tau-bench pass^k) emerging

Readings with no status: Checking AI's work sold as its own category, events in the latest twelve months: 4 (2026-08-27); ai evaluation market, events in the latest twelve months: 1 (2026-03-09); Insurers writing AI's mistakes out of standard policies, events in the latest twelve months: 4 (2026-07-20)

Expected: This site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew Koh: “Checking AI's work is sold as a category of its own.” tonight's reading fits both sides. This site, extending Gillian Hadfield and Andrew Koh: “Insurers write AI's mistakes out of their standard policies, so the cover has to be bought and priced on its own.” tonight's reading fits both sides. Byrne Hobart: “Firms increasingly buy AI's work through a party with assets and a licence that can be held liable, such as an established service firm.” can't be tested yet.

From The Economics of Transformative AI, a volume of the National Bureau of Economic Research (2026).
Measuring the returns

The statistics that count output miss much of what free and cheap AI tools do.

  • Diffusion: early adoption: Firms invest where they can see a return, and much of it goes unmeasured.
  • Diffusion: adaptation: Reorganisation shows up in the numbers late, if at all.

Read by: Executives reporting no AI impact on their own firm consistent with normal; Enterprise pilots with measurable P&L impact consistent with normal; Customer-support productivity uplift from a generative-AI assistant consistent with normal; Chatbot effect on earnings and hours in exposed occupations (Denmark) consistent with normal

Expected: Diane Coyle and John Lourenze Poquiz: “Official output statistics miss most of AI's gains, which come as better quality and saved time that no price records.” can't be tested yet.

From The Economics of Transformative AI, a volume of the National Bureau of Economic Research (2026).
Work and pay

Who does the work, and how the income from it is split between workers and owners.

  • Diffusion: adaptation: Jobs and pay change slowly, through hiring, training and contracts.

Read by: US labour share of income, year on year emerging; Employment in AI-exposed occupations, year on year consistent with normal

Expected: Brynjolfsson, Chandar and Chen: “In the jobs most exposed to AI, workers in their early twenties fall behind workers over fifty, while in the least exposed jobs they do not.” holding so far. Betsey Stevenson: “Work in the jobs most exposed to AI grows more intense before it grows shorter.” can't be tested yet. Alex Imas: “Care, teaching, hospitality and other work where the person is part of what is bought take a rising share of spending and jobs as AI spreads.” holding so far. Pascual Restrepo: “Labour's share of income falls as AI takes on more tasks, even as wages rise.” holding so far. Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor: “AI does not wipe out software engineering jobs, and demand for engineers may rise as software gets cheaper to make.” can't be tested yet.

From The Economics of Transformative AI, a volume of the National Bureau of Economic Research (2026).
The information ecosystem

The web that AI learns from, and the traffic that pays for it.

  • Diffusion: adaptation: If answers replace visits, the sites that produce new information lose the income that funds it.

Readings with no status: AI training's share of crawler requests (Cloudflare) 52.0% (2026-06-30); pages Anthropic's crawler takes for each visitor it sends back (Cloudflare) 50,000× (2025-08-07); pages OpenAI's crawler takes for each visitor it sends back (Cloudflare) 887× (2025-08-07)

Expected: Joseph Stiglitz and Màxim Ventura-Bolet: “Publishers lose the visits that pay for what they produce.” can't be tested yet.

From The Economics of Transformative AI, a volume of the National Bureau of Economic Research (2026).

Where startup money is going

Money startups raised by selling new shares, in each sub-layer the chain's inputs sit in (a sub-layer is a group of companies doing the same job within a layer of the chain). Startup money only: the physical build-out is paid for with big companies' capital spending and debt, which the figure below misses; the map's capital row reads the builders' spending. Each firm is counted once, in its main sub-layer, for both its count and its money.

Where startup money went, sub-layer by sub-layerChart
Data-centre developers & power65 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Electricity generation, The grid and its hookups, Data-centre buildings
Semiconductors & AI chip startups27 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Chip-making equipment, Chip foundries, Advanced chip packaging, AI chips
Memory/HBM23 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Memory
no round on file: not placed on the scale
Frontier labs5 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Building frontier models
RLaaS / post-training / continual-learning infra7 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Post-training, Continual learning
no round on file: not placed on the scale
RL environments15 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Post-training
no round on file: not placed on the scale
Human/expert data & labelling22 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Post-training
Evals19 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Tests and evaluations
no round on file: not placed on the scale
Permissioned data markets & licensing12 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Training data
no round on file: not placed on the scale
Inference serving39 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Running models
Routing12 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Routing between models
Agent infrastructure42 firms tracked · the map's inputs here: Agents and tool use
no round on file: not placed on the scale

money raised in the year, in US dollars; each labelled step to the right multiplies the amount by the same factor, except the last line, which only closes the scale

money startups in the sub-layer raised by selling new shares, over the latest year on file, to 2026-09-30no round on file in that year; the sub-layer is left off the scale, which is not the same as nothing raised

The scale multiplies as it goes: each labelled line is the same multiple of the one before, apart from the last, which only closes the scale. Equal distances are therefore equal multiples, not equal amounts, and the gap between the frontier labs and every other sub-layer is far wider than it looks. Each firm is counted once, in its main sub-layer.

Startup money only. The physical build-out is paid for with big companies' capital spending and debt, which this figure misses; the map's capital row reads that spending. Money arriving does not show that an input is short, and none arriving does not show that it is plentiful.

The numbers: firms tracked and money raised, by sub-layer
Sub-layerInputs it holdsFirms trackedRaised in the four quarters to 2026-09-30
Data-centre developers & powerElectricity generation, The grid and its hookups, Data-centre buildings65$465M
Semiconductors & AI chip startupsChip-making equipment, Chip foundries, Advanced chip packaging, AI chips27$2.0B
Memory/HBMMemory23none on file
Frontier labsBuilding frontier models5$271B
RLaaS / post-training / continual-learning infraPost-training, Continual learning7none on file
RL environmentsPost-training15none on file
Human/expert data & labellingPost-training22$330M
EvalsTests and evaluations19none on file
Permissioned data markets & licensingTraining data12none on file
Inference servingRunning models39$1.5B
RoutingRouting between models12$113M
Agent infrastructureAgents and tool use42none on file
Narayanan and Kapoor's barriers by family: which an indicator reads, and what a model judges of the restChart · hatched is a model's judgement, not a reading
a barrier that an indicator on this site is tied tono indicator; a model's judgement: probably still bindsno indicator; a model's judgement: probably easingno indicator; a model's judgement: probably largely lifted

One square is one barrier named in Narayanan and Kapoor's essays, grouped by the family the map gives a row to; press a square for the barrier in the folded list below. A dark square says an indicator is tied to that barrier, not what the indicator reads; its status is beside the barrier in the list.

Every hatched square is one AI model's opinion, not evidence: most of this figure is hatched, and most of the hatching says ‘probably still binds’, which is that model's view and has not been checked against any series. A hatched square is a judgement, not a reading, and its grey says which word the model chose, never how tight anything measures. The model (Anthropic's claude-opus-5-5) wrote each in words on 2026-10-05, from this site's readings where it had any and otherwise from its own general knowledge. The only review on record is by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which changed some words and reasons and withdrew some judgements; no person reviewed each one. Put plainly, a model checked a model, and no person has checked every judgement.

A family's row on the map can also be read by an indicator, or by a plain figure with no status, that is tied to the family as a whole and to none of its barriers; so a family with no dark square here can still show as measured on the map.

The numbers
FamilyTied to an indicatorA model judges: probably still bindsA model judges: probably easingA model judges: probably largely liftedAll
From a working model to a product835117
People taking up the products532010
Firms reorganising around the tools771015
Law, regulation and institutions0121013
The physical world's own speed17008
Deliberate safety brakes15006
Markets and prices43108
How science itself moves08008
Limits on AI speeding up its own spread13004

Narayanan and Kapoor's barriers, all of them

The computer scientists Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor argue that AI will spread like other general-purpose technologies, slowly, because of barriers outside the models. These are the barriers they name across their essays, by family; the map above places each family at its stage.

Stage 1: Methods → products (the model-to-product gap) · acts on Products

  1. #1Application development effort does not vanish. The "bitter lesson" applies to methods, not products. Real applications still need hand-built business logic, frontends, integrations, and evaluation. [general] ANT, Slowing, Pivot
  2. #2Proof-of-concept to product gap. A demo that works 90% of the time is a capability, not a product. Executives see quick prototypes and miss the 90% of work needed to finish them. [general] Pivot, SWE, Slowing
  3. #3Capability-reliability gap. Accuracy has risen sharply while reliability has moved only a few points. A model that is right 70% of the time but fails unpredictably cannot remove the human from the loop, and reliability fixes are application-specific. [general] ANT, Slowing, Left, OWE
    50%/80% horizon ratio consistent with normalMETR 80% time horizon faster than normal
  4. #4Compounding unreliability in agents. An agent making dozens of LLM calls with even a 2% error rate per step becomes useless end to end. [agents] AgentsMatter
  5. #5Users expect software-like determinism. People expect AI products to behave like software. Stochastic outputs violate that expectation, and it is unclear whether determinism can be engineered in. [general] Pivot, AGI
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Structured outputs, tool calls and automatic checks make products behave more predictably, and users have grown used to answers that vary. In regulated or audited work the lack of repeatable behaviour is still a reason given for not deploying, which is the strongest point against calling it easing.
  6. #6Missing interface paradigms. Current AI products are like PCs before the GUI. Higher-bandwidth interfaces that let users supervise without constant interruption have not been invented. [general] Slowing, Pivot
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Background agents that work for long stretches, show a plan and ask for approval only at set points are a real step beyond the chat box, and they spread quickly in coding during 2025 and 2026. Outside software, most people still supervise through a chat window, so the new paradigm is far from general.
  7. #7Domain-specific product design. General capabilities have to be made useful one domain at a time, which requires deep domain knowledge to find the adoption hurdles (Cursor's code-verification UI is their example). [software engineering] AGI
  8. #8AI companies neglected product engineering. Labs assumed generality exempted them from UX and software engineering, and are rediscovering that both are hard. [software engineering] Slowing
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably largely lifted. The large labs now run big product and engineering teams and ship coding agents, browsers, connectors and workplace tools at a steady pace. The belief that generality excused them from product work has gone. The strongest point the other way is that products outside coding remain rough and reliability complaints are common.
  9. #9Cost of inference. Cost, not capability, blocks many applications, especially agentic workflows that call models hundreds of times. Cost also sets accuracy, since retries improve success. [general] Scaling, Pivot, AgentsMatter, OWE
  10. #10Judgment tasks resist evaluation. The tasks whose automation would most transform a profession (legal filings, research) have no single correct answer, so they are the hardest to evaluate and improve. [law] ANT, Legal
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Legal drafting, research and similar judgement work still have no agreed measure of quality, so improvement relies on slow expert grading. Paid expert rubrics have grown into a large business, which helps at the margin, but it is costly and disputed and does not turn judgement into a score.
  11. #11No verifiers in open domains. AI became superhuman at chess because of fast, accurate feedback. Law, medicine, and science have no such verifier, so progress is limited to automatically checkable tasks. [law] Moravec, Agents26
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Progress remains fastest where an automatic check exists, such as code that passes tests or mathematics that a proof checker accepts. Law, medicine and most science still lack any quick, accurate verifier. Expert-built graders and practice environments are the strongest counter, but they approximate a verifier and do not supply one.
  12. #12Real-world knowledge caps reasoning. AI reasoning in medicine is limited by the medical knowledge that exists, the same limit humans face. [medicine] Moravec
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. A model cannot reason its way past what medicine has actually established, and new medical knowledge still comes from experiments and trials. Models are better at combining what is known and suggesting hypotheses, which is the strongest point the other way, but that does not raise the ceiling itself.
  13. #13Brittleness outside closed domains. Systems that excel in narrow demos go off the rails in open-ended settings. [general] Moravec, OWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Agents now carry out long, messy tasks in real codebases and on real websites far more dependably than in 2025, and the length of task they can finish has kept growing. They still fail in odd ways in unfamiliar settings, and unsupervised use in open-ended work remains unusual.
  14. #14Agents lack judgment for open-ended work. In their shadow evaluations, frontier agents given real research questions lacked judgment, creativity, and the ability to backtrack or respond to feedback. [agents] Agents26, OWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Newer agents plan, backtrack and respond to feedback noticeably better, and some have produced real results in mathematics and coding research with light supervision. Reports from scientists still describe weak taste in choosing what is worth doing, so the barrier has loosened and not gone.
  15. #15Non-functional requirements go unmet. Agent-built software sacrifices quality, maintainability, and security, and successes often rest on human-built test suites, thousands of lines of prompt, or memorized training data. [software engineering] OWE, Google
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Agent-written code is now merged at scale in serious projects, and models are better at tests, security checks and following a codebase's conventions. Studies and practitioners still report hidden upkeep costs and security holes in unreviewed agent code, which is the strongest point against.
  16. #16Benchmarks lack construct validity. Benchmarks overweight what models are good at, miss contextual reasoning, and encourage agents that score well without being useful. Vendor claims cannot be independently checked. [law] Legal, AgentsMatter, Google
    Developer productivity uplift (METR RCTs) consistent with normal50%/80% horizon ratio consistent with normal
  17. #17Real-world messiness cannot be simulated. Whether a system can automate a job is only knowable after diffusion, because no lab environment captures the world's complexity. [general] AGI, OWE

Stage 2: Product → individual adoption · acts on Early adoption

  1. #18Deployment is not diffusion. Instant availability to hundreds of millions says nothing about how many people use a capability, for how long, or for what. [general] Guide, ANT
  2. #19Low intensity of use. Most users use generative AI infrequently. Nearly a year after release, under 1% of ChatGPT users touched thinking models on a given day. [general] ANT, Guide
  3. #20Human learning curves. Taking advantage of AI requires continual learning of new workflows and topics. The curve is steep and time-consuming, and it moves at human speed. [general] Guide, Left, AGI
  4. #21Workflow and habit change. The hard part of adoption is users adapting their workflows, which cannot even start in the first months after a launch. [general] ANT, Guide, Legal
  5. #22Most adoption decisions are "no.". Because deployment is instant, people constantly face adoption choices, and the vast majority of the time they decline, for rational and irrational reasons. [general] Guide
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Use of AI assistants by individuals and at work rose strongly through 2025 and 2026, so many earlier refusals have turned into regular use. Most possible uses in most jobs are still declined or untried, and the point about constant small refusals remains true.
  6. #23Cost of supervising agents. Agentic work requires constant human supervision, which is time-consuming and mentally exhausting, so realized productivity lags. [software engineering] SWE, OWE
  7. #24Skill erosion and the dependence spiral. Using AI for tasks one has not mastered erodes skill and control, so responsible users limit offloading. Vendor-specific skills replace unaided ones. [general] Left, Stack
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Evidence that heavy reliance weakens unaided skill has accumulated, and careful professionals and educators limit offloading for that reason. The strongest point the other way is that many users offload regardless, so as a brake on adoption it may be weaker than the authors thought.
  8. #25Skilled judgment gates "democratization.". Past waves of no-code failed because the barrier is not syntax but the judgment and accountability needed to make good decisions. [software engineering] SWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Non-programmers can now build working software by describing it, which is the strongest case for easing. What they build still tends to fail on security, upkeep and accountability once it matters, so the judgement that gates serious use remains the limit.
  9. #26Verification needs domain expertise. Checking whether an agent actually succeeded at an open-ended task takes deep expertise and time, and long logs cannot be fully reviewed. [agents] OWE, Left
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. As agents run for longer, the record of what they did grows beyond what a person can review, and judging whether an open-ended task was truly done still needs someone who knows the field. Automatic reviewers and summaries help, but they shift trust to another model without removing the need for expertise.
  10. #27Privacy resistance. Useful assistants need access to sensitive personal and organizational data, which triggers outcry and regulatory limits on data sharing. [general] Pivot, ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. People and firms now routinely connect mailboxes, files and company systems to assistants, and enterprise terms that bar training on customer data have calmed many buyers. Regulators, especially in Europe, and periodic public outcry over features that watch the screen still restrain the most invasive uses.

Stage 3: Organizational and structural adaptation · acts on Adaptation

  1. #28Organizational change is slower than individual change. For past general-purpose technologies this stage took decades. It has barely begun even in software engineering. [general] ANT, Guide, Left, Pivot
  2. #29Drop-in replacement fails. Like electrification, benefits only arrive once work is reorganized: new layouts, processes, hiring, and training. The restructuring is discovered by experimentation, not designed in advance. [general] ANT, Left
  3. #30Tacit organizational knowledge. Much of what organizations know is unwritten and not in training data. It has to be made available to models gradually through adoption, sector by sector. [general] ANT, Left, SWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Most of what a firm knows is still unwritten, and getting it in front of a model happens one deployment at a time. Memory features and connectors to company documents help with what is recorded, which is the strongest counter, but they do not reach what nobody has put down.
  4. #31Integration into existing systems. Models must be wired into the many systems organizations already run, a downstream task no model release solves. Enterprise data is locked in Salesforce, Workday, and SAP. [general] Left, Stack
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. A common standard for connecting models to outside tools was adopted across the industry in 2025, and the large business-software vendors now offer connectors and their own agents. Messy permissions, old systems and vendors restricting access to their data mean real integration is still slow work.
  5. #32Task specification is human labor. Unambiguously saying what is wanted is a large share of the work. Brooks's "essential complexity" of specification is untouched by AI. [general] ANT, SWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Saying precisely what is wanted remains human work, and agents that run longer make a vague brief more costly, not less. Models have got better at asking clarifying questions and drafting specifications, which trims the effort without removing it.
  6. #33The "decide" and "deliver" layers do not compress. Understanding requirements and taking accountability for what ships remain human. Once a decision is delegable it stops being a competitive advantage, so human judgment migrates upward. [software engineering] SWE, Left
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Deciding what to build and answering for what ships are still done by people, and firms using coding agents report that review and decision-making have become the constraint. The strongest point the other way is that agents now draft requirements and review code, nibbling at both layers.
  7. #34Staged trust. Organizations grant AI access to consequential decisions only after it proves reliable in less critical contexts. [safety] ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Organisations still widen an AI system's authority step by step, starting with low-stakes work. The steps are being climbed quickly in software and customer service, which is the case for easing, but in finance, health and public decisions trust is still at an early stage.
  8. #35Human-in-the-loop erodes benefits. Requiring approval of every action mostly destroys the value of automation, so it degrades into rubber-stamping or is outcompeted. [safety] ANT
  9. #36Collective action and sclerotic institutions. Structural change requires solving coordination problems or reforming institutions, which is far less predictable than user behavior (air traffic control is their example). [general] Guide, AGI
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Reforming institutions and solving coordination problems is no faster than it was, and nothing about better models changes that. There is no strong sign the other way beyond scattered government modernisation efforts.
  10. #37Underinvestment in complements. Diffusion depends on public goods the private sector underprovides: AI literacy, workforce training, digitization, open data. [general] ANT, AGI
  11. #38National diffusion capacity. Following Jeffrey Ding, countries differ enormously in their ability to spread innovations through the economy, and this, not who reaches a milestone first, sets economic outcomes. [general] ANT, AGI
    US firms using AI (Census BTOS) consistent with normal
  12. #39Bespoke deployment. Transforming workplaces requires forward-deployed engineers and consulting partnerships, labor-intensive work outside the product. [general] Stack, Guide
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. The labs and their rivals have built large teams of engineers who sit with customers, and consulting firms have made AI deployment a major line of work, which confirms the barrier. Better general agents and ready-made connectors reduce the bespoke effort for simpler uses.
  13. #40Enterprise resistance to lock-in. Embedded "digital workers" create extreme lock-in and target labor budgets, so enterprises resist, withhold data for training, and demand portability. [agents] Stack
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Large buyers continue to spread work across model vendors, refuse to let their data train shared models and press for open standards. The strongest point the other way is that spending on agent products has grown fast despite these worries, so resistance slows deals more than it stops them.
  14. #41Deskilling breaks the talent pipeline. Automating entry-level tasks removes the experiences through which juniors build expertise, a cost that emerges only over time. [law] Legal, SWE
  15. #42Millions of small adaptations. Impact arrives through countless mundane process and policy tweaks, not a single leap. [general] AGI, ANT
    US labour productivity, year on year consistent with normal

Regulatory, legal, and institutional limits · acts on Adaptation

  1. #43Regulation in high-consequence domains. FDA, EU AI Act, and sector rules make deployment slow by design, and regulation often outright prohibits current AI use in productive settings. [general] ANT, Left, SWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Medical-device rules, financial supervision and Europe's AI law still make high-stakes deployment slow by design. The United States has moved to lighten federal rules and Europe has moved to delay and simplify parts of its law, which is the strongest point the other way. Those moves mostly soften rules that had yet to bite, and the sector rules that slow deployment today are largely unchanged.
  2. #44Liability uncertainty. Unclear application of liability law deters adoption. Clear rules (FAA drone rules in 2016) spur it. [general] ANT, SWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. No major jurisdiction has settled who pays when an AI system causes harm, and cases are only starting to work through the courts. Insurers have begun writing exclusions as well as cover, which shows the uncertainty. Contractual indemnities from vendors are the main thing cutting the other way.
  3. #45Professional guardrails. Malpractice liability, professional codes, and device regulation keep doctors from delegating decisions to chatbots. [medicine] Guide
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Doctors remain personally answerable for decisions, and tools that decide and not merely assist need device approval. Note-taking and paperwork tools have spread fast in clinics, and many clinicians consult chatbots informally, but beyond a few narrow, supervised pilots the decision itself is still not delegated.
  4. #46Regulation that freezes categories. Rules insensitive to experimentation reify business models and organizational forms prematurely, and binary automated/not-automated rules discourage new oversight designs. [general] ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Rules written around fixed categories, such as fully automated versus human-made decisions, are still on the books and new ones follow the same pattern. Sandboxes and a lighter federal stance in the United States cut the other way; how much this barrier actually bites is hard to observe.
  5. #47Misplaced burdens on model developers. Regulation blind to the developer/deployer split saddles general-purpose model makers with context-specific obligations. [general] ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Europe's rules for general-purpose models ended up with comparatively light duties through a voluntary code, American federal policy turned against broad obligations on model makers, and state laws that passed were narrowed to transparency. State-level bills keep appearing, so the risk has shrunk without vanishing.
  6. #48Unauthorized practice of law. UPL rules and their state-by-state vagueness deter new entrants, and bar associations cite model unreliability as grounds for caution. [law] Legal
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Rules against non-lawyers practising law remain in force and vague across American states, and bar bodies remain cautious. A few states have experimented and consumers use chatbots for legal questions anyway, which weakens the barrier in practice for simple matters only.
  7. #49Law firm ownership rules. Restrictions on who can own or share fees with law firms block outside capital and scaled business models. [law] Legal
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Almost all American states still bar non-lawyers from owning or sharing fees with law firms. A small number of states allow exceptions and some AI-native firms have used them or other workarounds, but the general rule is unchanged.
  8. #50Incumbent resistance to reform. Lawyers and commerce groups lobby to narrow regulatory sandboxes despite scant evidence of harm. [law] Legal
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. The organised bar has continued to press for narrow sandboxes, and reform has stalled or been trimmed in places that tried it. Evidence on this since 2025 is thin, so the call rests mainly on the absence of any reported change.
  9. #51Human adjudication time. The speed of human judges, lawyers, and clients caps how fast legal processes can move. Adding judges is politically fraught, and Article III likely requires human judges. [law] Legal
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Courts move at the pace of human judges, lawyers and clients, and nothing has changed the number of judges or the requirement that they be human. Some courts use AI for clerical work and private arbitration bodies have tried AI-assisted decisions, which helps only at the edges.
  10. #52Courts may restrict access. Flooded courts respond by tightening doctrines to keep litigants out or by banning AI, counteracting the gains. [law] Legal
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Courts have responded to fabricated citations and machine-written filings with sanctions, disclosure rules and standing orders, which fits the prediction. Outright bans or tightened doctrines to keep litigants out are not yet widespread, so this is more a live risk than a proven brake.
  11. #53Policy-mandated human steps. Platform policies require developer accounts, 2FA dialogs that block synthetic input, and a human pressing publish. [agents] OWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Sign-in checks, tests designed to block automated input and a required human approval still stop agents partway through many tasks, and some large sites actively block them. Early standards for agent identity and agent payments point towards easing, but they are not yet widely honoured.
  12. #54State capacity sclerosis. Veto points and proceduralism hobble governments' ability to deploy AI, coordinate resilience, or even provide services they could. [safety] Gov, ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Governments still buy and deploy technology slowly through procurement rules and many veto points. Chatbot access for civil servants has been rolled out in several countries, which is real but shallow next to changing how services are delivered.
  13. #55Policy backlash. Self-driving cars took 15+ years to deploy and now face bans because policymakers failed to prepare. Public anxiety and backlash from rushed deployments are headwinds. [general] Moravec, ANT, Left, Pivot
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Public unease has grown, with local opposition to data centres, worries about jobs and children, and a steady flow of state bills. Driverless taxis, the authors' example, have expanded to many more cities, which cuts the other way for that one case.

External-world and physical speed limits · acts on Adaptation

  1. #56Clinical trials and real-world experiments. Treatments need trials with thousands of people over 10 to 15 years. Progress needs data from real experiments that faster AI cannot speed up, and society will not let AI run large-scale experiments on people. [science] Left, AGI, Agents26
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Trials in people take as long as they did and regulators still require them. AI helps choose candidates, design trials and recruit patients, and regulators have opened the door to less animal testing, which shortens the early steps without touching the long human ones.
  2. #57Costly, unsimulable errors. Where mistakes are expensive and the world cannot be simulated (driving), safety throttles each iteration of the improvement loop. [general] ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Where errors are costly and cannot be rehearsed, each improvement still has to be proven slowly in the real world. Driving, the authors' example, has sped up as fleets grow and simulation improves, so this could fairly be read as easing in that field.
  3. #58AI targets non-bottleneck steps. In an already technological, regulated world, the workflow parts AI improves were optimized by earlier waves. The true bottlenecks resist for external reasons. [general] Guide
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. The biggest measured gains are still in writing, coding and search-like work, while the slow parts of regulated processes such as approvals, sign-offs and physical steps are unchanged. The strongest counter is software itself, where writing code was a true bottleneck and has shifted.
  4. #59Physical and social task bundles. Jobs bundle inspection, loading, paperwork, and negotiation with the "core" task. Bio-harm still depends on materials, equipment, and tacit know-how. [general] ANT, Gov
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Most jobs still mix physical, social and paperwork tasks, and AI handles mainly the last. Robot demonstrations have improved a good deal, which is the strongest point the other way, but general-purpose robots are not yet doing bundled work at scale.
  5. #60Slow external review. Deployment depends on systems the developer does not control. An app took 45 minutes to build and ten days to pass App Store review. [software engineering] OWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. App-store review, security audits, procurement and compliance sign-off still run on other parties' timetables, and faster building has lengthened some queues. Some reviewers have started using AI to speed their side, with modest effect so far.
  6. #61Infrastructure, energy, and compute. Grid capacity constrains training and inference. Token supply is scarce today. Breakthroughs deploy slowly when supporting infrastructure does not exist yet (steam to electric took 40 years). [general] ANT, Stack, Agents26, Moravec
  7. #62Inherent limits on prediction. Many tasks resemble long-range weather forecasting, where mathematical limits are already reached. Forecasting and persuasion have high irreducible error. [science] Left, ANT, SciTool
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Limits set by chaos and by how unpredictable people are do not move with model quality. AI weather models have improved accuracy and speed within the predictable range, which is a real gain, but they do not push past the mathematical horizon.
  8. #63Unrecognized latent bottlenecks and Amdahl's law. Constraints like RL environments or energy only become visible once they bind, and if many hard steps remain, a hundredfold speedup on the AI-amenable parts yields a small overall gain. [general] Agents26
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Events since 2025 bear this out: electricity and practice environments, the authors' own examples, became visible constraints as the build-out grew. The barrier is a general principle and nothing suggests the last hidden bottleneck has been found.

Safety speed limits (deliberate brakes) · acts on Adaptation

  1. #64Safety limits in high-consequence tasks. They predict slow diffusion will remain the norm where errors matter, enforced by regulators and by organizations' own caution. [general] ANT, AGI
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. In health, finance, aviation and critical infrastructure, deployment is still slow, with regulators and firms' own risk teams holding it back. The lighter regulatory mood in the United States cuts the other way, but organisations' caution has not followed it far.
  2. #65Business incentives against unsupervised deployment. Poorly controlled AI is bad business. Unrecoverable failures like deleting production data make companies pull back from hasty automation. [safety] ANT, AGI, Left, Science
  3. #66The general-purpose / high-stakes / automated trilemma. For now an agent can be only two of the three, which keeps AI a collaboration technology rather than an automation one. [agents] Left
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Agents that act alone do so in low-stakes or narrow settings, and general agents in high-stakes work still have a person approving the result. Long unattended coding runs on production systems are stretching this, so it may be starting to ease.
  4. #67Legibility and control. Removing humans from task boundaries to let AI run end to end reduces oversight, so autonomy is checked by the need to keep systems legible. [agents] ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Firms still keep people at the handover points of a workflow because that is where they can see and stop what an agent is doing. Better logging and monitoring tools help, but longer autonomous runs make oversight harder at the same pace.
  5. #68Society's choice to keep humans accountable. Liability law and sector regulation are speed controls society can strengthen deliberately, regardless of capability. [general] SWE, Left
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. The option to keep humans answerable through liability and sector rules is intact, and professional and financial regulators continue to use it. The strongest point the other way is that American federal policy has leaned towards loosening and not strengthening such controls.
  6. #69Security risks of capable scaffolds. Prompt injection, data leakage, and agent worms must be solved before assistants get broad access; scaffolds capable enough to test the frontier carry risks that may prevent use. [agents] Pivot, OWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Hidden instructions planted in web pages or documents can still hijack an agent, and no general fix exists; security teams cite this when refusing broad access. Vendors have shipped agents with wide access anyway, behind permission prompts and sandboxes, so the risk slows adoption more than it prevents it.

Market and economic limits · acts on Adaptation

  1. #70Automation devalues the automated task. Once a task is automated its value collapses and humans move to unautomated tasks, so the AGI goalpost keeps moving. [general] ANT, AGI
  2. #71Competitive arms races dissipate gains. In law and science, competition is so intense that productivity gains fuel escalation rather than societal value. [law] Guide, Legal
  3. #72Credence goods. Buyers cannot verify the quality of legal work or judgment-heavy AI output even in hindsight, so they rely on prestige and trust, and normal price competition fails. [general] Legal, Stack
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Buyers of legal and other judgement-heavy work still cannot tell good from bad even afterwards, so reputation continues to decide who gets hired. Nothing in AI output changes this, and unverifiable machine-written work arguably makes it worse.
  4. #73Input-based incentives. Billable hours reward more hours and more output regardless of outcome, absorbing efficiency gains. [law] Legal
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Most large law firms still bill by the hour, and productivity gains have so far shown up as more output and higher rates and not lower bills. Client pressure for fixed fees and AI-native firms charging flat prices are growing, so easing is plausible.
  5. #74Growth is capped by the slowest sector. AI's uneven sectoral effects mean long-run growth is bottlenecked by wherever it diffuses least. [general] AGI
  6. #75Commodity trap and recoupment. Undifferentiated models push inference to marginal cost, outcomes are hard to measure so value pricing stalls, and incumbents own distribution. This limits how far labs can fund diffusion. [general] Stack
  7. #76Fixed consumer attention. More apps do not increase usage, capping AI's impact on consumer software. [software engineering] SWE
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Hours in the day have not grown, and there is no sign that the flood of new apps has raised total time spent. Chat assistants have themselves won a noticeable share of consumer attention, which shows AI can take a share without lifting the cap.
  8. #77Publisher distrust. Media organizations' justified wariness and inability to bargain collectively limit the use of journalistic content. [media] ANT
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably easing. Many large publishers have signed licensing deals with AI companies, and collective licensing schemes and pay-to-crawl tools have appeared. Distrust remains strong, lawsuits continue and publishers blame AI search summaries for lost readers, so this is easing and not settled.

Science-specific bottlenecks · acts on Adaptation

  1. #78Production of findings is not the bottleneck. Cheap generation of results will not unlock progress because producing findings is not what limits science. [science] AGI, Science
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. AI systems now generate hypotheses, analyses and whole draft papers cheaply, yet there is no sign that the rate of important discoveries has jumped. Mathematics, where results can be checked mechanically, is the strongest counter-example.
  2. #79Overproduction drowns novel work. Attention is finite. As volume explodes, novel work is lost and AI search concentrates attention on already-famous papers. [science] Science
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Submissions to journals and conferences have swollen, partly with machine-written papers, and reviewers are overloaded. AI tools for literature search could in principle surface overlooked work, but there is little evidence they do so in practice.
  3. #80Publish-or-perish incentives. Institutions reward measurable production, making researchers risk-averse and making AI a tool for chasing metrics. Reform is blocked by inertia and Goodhart's law. [science] Science
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Hiring, promotion and funding still reward counts of papers and citations, and AI has made those numbers cheaper to inflate. A few funders have tried reforms, with no visible shift in incentives.
  4. #81Scientists lack software engineering practice. Most AI-for-science is software work, but fields have not adopted testing, version control, or code review, so leakage and other errors affect hundreds of papers. [science] Science, SciTool
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Research code in most fields is still untested and unreviewed. Coding agents now write tests and catch errors for scientists who ask, which may be raising the floor, but they also let more people produce code they cannot check.
  5. #82Science does not self-correct. Code and data go unshared, reviewers do not check code, retractions are near zero, and there is no incentive to debunk. [science] Science, SciTool
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Sharing of code and data, checking by reviewers and retraction rates have not materially changed. Projects using AI to scan published papers for errors are the strongest sign of movement, but journals and authors have little reason to act on what they find.
  6. #83Prediction without understanding. AI improves predictive accuracy without explanation, like epicycles, so wrong theories can persist and human understanding, which is the point of science, erodes. [science] Science, Left, SciTool
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. The most celebrated scientific uses of AI are still predictors whose inner workings are not understood. Models that explain their reasoning in words and work on interpreting scientific models help somewhat, but an explanation produced on request is not the same as a tested theory.
  7. #84Epistemology change exceeds field capacity. Adopting AI requires re-litigating validity per field and model type, which no field can do in a couple of years. [science] SciTool
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Fields are still arguing over when a model's output counts as evidence, and those debates run on the timescale of journals and conferences. Only a little over a year has passed since the claim was made, which is too short for any field to have settled it.
  8. #85Misdirected tools and funding. AI-for-science tools chase headlines rather than real bottlenecks like error detection, and are evaluated on time saved, not on understanding. [science] Science, SciTool
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Most funding and publicity still go to systems that promise automated discovery. Tools for reviewing papers and finding errors have appeared from labs and startups since 2025, so this may be starting to ease.

Upstream: why AI cannot simply accelerate its own diffusion · acts on Return arrow

  1. #86External bottlenecks are immune to self-improvement. Limits on AI's power sit in deployment, not in the system's design, so improving the design cannot overcome them. [general] Guide, ANT
  2. #87Herding, compute, and declining openness in methods research. Research herds around fashionable ideas, compute and cost constrain new paradigms, and the industry's culture of open sharing is fading. The AI community may be unusually bad at finding new paradigms. [general] ANT, Guide
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Research remains crowded around large language models and agents, the biggest labs publish less of their methods, and compute costs keep newcomers out. Well-funded new labs pursuing other approaches, and strong open models from China, cut the other way.
  3. #88Data exhaustion. Readily available data is spent, and more data costs ever more in money, licensing, and reputational risk. Continued scaling is a business decision, not a technical given. [general] Scaling, Slowing
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. The easy data is still spent, and each further gain costs more: expert-written data, practice environments, generated data and licensing deals have become large lines of spending. Labs chose to pay, which has kept progress going and is the strongest case for calling this easing. But that is the authors' own point, that scaling is now a business decision with a climbing bill, so the barrier holds as they stated it.
  4. #89Evaluation does not scale. Every capability increase creates new demand for domain-specific evaluation, which resists automation and absorbs human effort. [general] Left
    A model's judgement, not a reading: probably still binds. Each gain in capability has outrun the tests built for the last one, and building trustworthy tests for long, specialised tasks still takes many expert hours. Using models as graders is the main counter, but their grades need checking by people in turn.

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