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The argument in figures

The story in pictures

This is the site's argument as a run of figures, from what is measured today to what people forecast. Each one is taken from the page that holds its sources, its limits and its numbers.

Readings updated 2026-11-04

A person writes at a desk by a window at night beside a glowing pale device, and in the glass rows of the same desk and device repeat into the distance with nobody at them.
Illustration made with AI image generation; not evidence.
Act I

Now

The machine improves quickly; the buildings, habits, rules and balance sheets around it change slowly.

Stop 1 · The argument · Chart

What the best models can do is timed on a different clock from the firms that try them and the hours worked with them. Each line is one link of the chain, set against its own first reading, so the steepness is the data's.

How much each link of the chain has grownlog scale · each line divided by its own first reading
multiple of its first reading
Methods · 1.00× its first reading · 38.8 min on 2024-12-05Methods · 1.56× its first reading · 1.0 h on 2025-02-24Methods · 3.08× its first reading · 2.0 h on 2025-04-16Methods · 5.23× its first reading · 3.4 h on 2025-08-07Methods · 5.78× its first reading · 3.7 h on 2025-11-18Methods · 7.55× its first reading · 4.9 h on 2025-11-24Methods · 9.07× its first reading · 5.9 h on 2025-12-11Methods · 18.5× its first reading · 12.0 h on 2026-02-05Early adoption · 1.00× its first reading · 17.3% on 2025-11-16Early adoption · 0.99× its first reading · 17.2% on 2025-11-30Early adoption · 1.03× its first reading · 17.8% on 2025-12-14Early adoption · 1.02× its first reading · 17.7% on 2025-12-28Early adoption · 1.05× its first reading · 18.2% on 2026-01-11Early adoption · 1.09× its first reading · 18.9% on 2026-01-25Early adoption · 1.01× its first reading · 17.5% on 2026-02-08Early adoption · 1.05× its first reading · 18.2% on 2026-02-22Early adoption · 1.09× its first reading · 18.9% on 2026-03-08Early adoption · 1.10× its first reading · 19.1% on 2026-03-22Early adoption · 1.14× its first reading · 19.8% on 2026-04-05Early adoption · 1.14× its first reading · 19.8% on 2026-04-19Early adoption · 1.14× its first reading · 19.8% on 2026-05-03Early adoption · 1.13× its first reading · 19.5% on 2026-05-03Early adoption · 1.19× its first reading · 20.6% on 2026-05-17Early adoption · 1.19× its first reading · 20.6% on 2026-05-31Early adoption · 1.19× its first reading · 20.6% on 2026-06-14Early adoption · 1.25× its first reading · 21.7% on 2026-06-28Early adoption · 1.24× its first reading · 21.5% on 2026-07-12Early adoption · 1.26× its first reading · 21.8% on 2026-07-26Early adoption · 1.29× its first reading · 22.4% on 2026-08-09Early adoption · 1.34× its first reading · 23.2% on 2026-08-23Early adoption · 1.38× its first reading · 23.8% on 2026-09-06Early adoption · 1.38× its first reading · 23.8% on 2026-09-20Early adoption · 1.42× its first reading · 24.6% on 2026-10-04Adaptation · 1.00× its first reading · 4.1% on 2024-12-31Adaptation · 1.14× its first reading · 4.7% on 2025-03-31Adaptation · 1.20× its first reading · 4.9% on 2025-06-30Adaptation · 1.40× its first reading · 5.7% on 2025-09-30Adaptation · 1.36× its first reading · 5.6% on 2025-12-31Adaptation · 1.45× its first reading · 6.0% on 2026-03-31Adaptation · 1.53× its first reading · 6.3% on 2026-06-30Adaptation · 1.29× its first reading · 5.3% on 2026-09-30
measuredreported

The steep line is what models can do; the flatter ones are firms and working hours catching up. The methods line follows the best model so far, leaving out readings METR flags as beyond what its tests can measure. Too few readings to draw: Developer productivity uplift (METR RCTs).

Source: METR time horizons (v1.1); Census Business Trends and Outlook Survey; FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data). METR, Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Tasks (Horizon v1.1). U.S. Census Bureau, Business Trends and Outlook Survey. Bick, Blandin & Deming, Real-Time Population Survey, retrieved from FRED.

The numbers
linkas ofreadingmultiple
Methods2024-12-0538.8 min1.00×
Methods2025-02-241.0 h1.56×
Methods2025-04-162.0 h3.08×
Methods2025-08-073.4 h5.23×
Methods2025-11-183.7 h5.78×
Methods2025-11-244.9 h7.55×
Methods2025-12-115.9 h9.07×
Methods2026-02-0512.0 h18.5×
Early adoption2025-11-1617.3%1.00×
Early adoption2025-11-3017.2%0.99×
Early adoption2025-12-1417.8%1.03×
Early adoption2025-12-2817.7%1.02×
Early adoption2026-01-1118.2%1.05×
Early adoption2026-01-2518.9%1.09×
Early adoption2026-02-0817.5%1.01×
Early adoption2026-02-2218.2%1.05×
Early adoption2026-03-0818.9%1.09×
Early adoption2026-03-2219.1%1.10×
Early adoption2026-04-0519.8%1.14×
Early adoption2026-04-1919.8%1.14×
Early adoption2026-05-0319.8%1.14×
Early adoption2026-05-0319.5%1.13×
Early adoption2026-05-1720.6%1.19×
Early adoption2026-05-3120.6%1.19×
Early adoption2026-06-1420.6%1.19×
Early adoption2026-06-2821.7%1.25×
Early adoption2026-07-1221.5%1.24×
Early adoption2026-07-2621.8%1.26×
Early adoption2026-08-0922.4%1.29×
Early adoption2026-08-2323.2%1.34×
Early adoption2026-09-0623.8%1.38×
Early adoption2026-09-2023.8%1.38×
Early adoption2026-10-0424.6%1.42×
Adaptation2024-12-314.1%1.00×
Adaptation2025-03-314.7%1.14×
Adaptation2025-06-304.9%1.20×
Adaptation2025-09-305.7%1.40×
Adaptation2025-12-315.6%1.36×
Adaptation2026-03-316.0%1.45×
Adaptation2026-06-306.3%1.53×
Adaptation2026-09-305.3%1.29×

Read it with thisLog scale: each line is divided by its own first reading, so the lines show growth and not size. The methods line follows the best model so far and leaves out readings its tester flags as beyond what its tests can measure. A link of the chain with too few readings is left off, and the full figure names it. Some of these readings are measured and some are reported; the full figure stamps each.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 2 · How fast · A model, not a measurement

Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, computer scientists at Princeton who study what AI can and cannot do, argue that AI will spread the way electricity did, in stages, each waiting on the one before. The drawing shows the order of the stages and what holds each one back.

Why the stages arrive one after anotherA model, not a measurement
  1. 1Methods: Capabilities and methods — what the frontier can do on benchmarks and in the lab.What holds it back: None inherent; capability can move fast. The paper's claim is that this stock is not the bottleneck.
  2. 2Products: Reliable, integrated products built on those methods.What holds it back: Reliability, integration, evaluation and liability — the 50%→80% gap and the "last mile" of productisation.
  3. 3Early adoption: Individuals and firms using the products, at any depth.What holds it back: Human and organisational speed — training, procurement, trust, ROI measurement (electrification took decades).
  4. 4Adaptation: Workflows, institutions, labour markets and regulation reorganised around the technology.What holds it back: Complementary innovation, regulation, safety brakes and the pace of institutional change.
  5. 5Return arrow (feedback into methods): Deployment feedback flowing back into invention — data, RL environments, continual learning.Not drawn as a curve: it is the loop from the last stage back to the first. What holds it back: Whether the deployment→training channel is open and how far it substitutes for external bottlenecks.
how far a stage has gone, as time passesthe lag: the wait between a stage and the nexta numbered stage, named belowthe last stage: the loop back to the first, not drawn

A drawing of the argument made by Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, not of any data. The order of the stages and what holds each back are theirs, as this site's records word them. The even spacing, the gentler slope of each later curve and the equal heights are drawn for the eye and measure nothing: the drawing shows that each stage must wait for the last, not how long the wait is. The figures above and below show what is measured.

Read it with thisA drawing of Narayanan and Kapoor's argument, not of any data. The spacing, the slopes and the heights are drawn for the eye and measure nothing: the drawing shows that each stage waits for the last, not how long the wait is.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 2 · How fast · Chart

Each mark is one published gauge, read against a rule written down before the number came in. Read each row's word, and count the marks that say emerging: a gauge with no verdict yet is not a slow one.

Every gauge, stage by stage, and what it reads tonightChart
1. Methodsmixed
2 reads fast · 2 reads normal · 7 emerging (not yet scored) · 2 on who keeps the money
2. Productsconsistent with normal
3 reads normal · 2 emerging (not yet scored) · 1 on who keeps the money
3. Early adoptionconsistent with normal
3 reads normal · 6 emerging (not yet scored) · 1 on who keeps the money
4. Adaptationconsistent with normal
14 reads normal · 7 emerging (not yet scored) · 1 on who keeps the money
5. Return arrowemerging
7 emerging (not yet scored) · 1 on who keeps the money
reads fastreads normalreads slowemerging (not yet scored)reads who keeps the money, not speedoutlined: scored, but it shares a source with a gauge already counted, so it casts no vote of its own

One mark is one published gauge, and each links to its page. A gauge is what this site calls an indicator: a published series read against a rule written down in advance. A filled mark casts a vote toward its stage's status; gauges that read the same survey or tracker share a single vote, so the rest of them are outlined.

Emerging is this site's word for a gauge that has readings but no verdict yet: its number sits between the ranges or on the line between them, its margin of error reaches across both, it rests on a single source that is not a primary one, or its only evidence is a company describing itself. A mark here does not show how large any reading is; the figure of ranges further down the page does.

The numbers
StageStatusFastNormalSlowEmergingReads who keeps the moneyVotes cast
Methodsmixed220722
Productsconsistent with normal030213
Early adoptionconsistent with normal030613
Adaptationconsistent with normal01407111
Return arrowemerging000710

Read it with thisEmerging means a gauge has readings but no verdict yet, which is not the same as slow. An outlined mark shares a source with a gauge already counted and casts no vote of its own. A mark does not show how large a reading is.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 1 · The argument · Chart

These are the slow variables the site is named after, the measures that move slowly and decide what the headlines amount to: the upper rows are set against the range an ordinary technology would be in by now and the range that would mean something faster, and the lower rows are graded only by which way they moved. Where a mark hangs beneath its strip, it is a number the site has not scored.

An ordinary technology or a faster one: where the slow variables sit tonightChart; the ranges and the bands are this site's published rules

Graded against a range: how far has it spread, and has output moved?

Firms using AI24.6%consistent with normal

Held, not scored: the number falls in the ordinary range, but every reading comes from one source that is not an official one, and the site scores a status only on two independent sources or on one official one.

Output per hour2.2%consistent with normal

Graded by direction: where is the money going?

From 65.7% on 2025-06-30, the start of the window the rule compares. A rise reads as concentrating. Rests on an estimate.

From $116B on 2025-07-31, the start of the window the rule compares. A rise reads as dispersing. Rests on an estimate.

the range an ordinary technology would be in by nowbetween the ranges: not scoredthe range that would mean something fastertonight's number, scored in the range it sits inheld: the number falls in a range but is not scored there, so it hangs beneathwhere a number stood when the window (the stretch of time its rule compares) openedpurple here means gathering in one place, not fastera move this small does not counttonight's number, hatched where it rests on an estimate

Each strip has its own scale, starting at nothing, so compare a mark with its own ranges and not with the row above. The ranges are published in advance, set from how earlier technologies spread and from the long-run trend in output per hour; each variable's own page gives the reasoning. A number sits inside a range only when the site scores it there. A number hanging beneath its strip is one the site has not scored: the essay's sentence above reads where the number falls, and the site's own status does not yet confirm it. The lower rows have no range: the site grades them by whether the number rose or fell over a set window, and a rise can mean the profit gathering in one place or spreading out, never fast or slow.

It does not show how sure each reading is, how each got here over time, or the fast variables the essay sets these against. The chip makers' share is a share of the gross profit this site can measure, which includes an estimate for OpenAI and Anthropic; the value users keep is one survey's estimate.

This figure was drafted by Claude, a model made by Anthropic, and Anthropic is among the labs whose estimated profit sits inside the total the chip makers' share is measured against. Check it against the records it links to.

The numbers
Slow variableTonightAs ofGraded againstStatus on recordEvidence grade
Firms using AI24.6%2026-10-04ordinary up to 35%; faster from 50%consistent with normalA
Work hours done with AI5.3%2026-09-30ordinary up to 9%; faster from 20%emerging: held because every reading comes from one source that is not an official one, and the site scores a status only on two independent sources or on one official oneB
Output per hour2.2%2026-06-30ordinary up to 2.5%; faster from 3.5%consistent with normalA
Chips' share of the profit72.6%2026-06-30its own reading of 65.7% on 2025-06-30; a move within 2% of the whole does not countconcentratingA (rests on an estimate)
Value kept by users$172B2026-03-31its own reading of $116B on 2025-07-31; a move within $10.0B does not countdispersingC (rests on an estimate)

Read it with thisEach strip has its own scale, so compare a mark with its own ranges and not with the row above. The chip makers' share is a share of the gross profit the site can measure, which includes an estimate for OpenAI and Anthropic; the value users keep is one survey's estimate. A number hanging beneath a strip, where there is one, is a number the site has not scored, and a hatched mark rests on an estimate. The lower rows have no range and are graded by whether the number rose or fell, never as fast or slow.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 3 · How far · Chart

The strip is the whole knowledge payroll, the pay for knowledge work, that this site's census scored, and its darkest part is what passes the hand-over screen. The screen asks whether work could be handed over and checked, which is not the same as saying it has been or will be.

A small part of the knowledge payroll passes the screenChart
5.6%
passes the screen
$389B · all three $158B
11.8%
waits only on a check
$827B
20.0%
needs a body
$1.4T
62.7%
held for more than a missing check
$4.4T
to its left, all three models pass

The strip is the whole $7.0T of knowledge payroll scored. From the census (v3.2-2026-09-24), a screen scored by three AI models, not a claim about what AI can do and not a forecast. All three models pass $158B, which is 2.3% of the whole. The last part is everything else: mostly work with no existing check that is also slow to judge or costly when wrong; work whose most-given reason is a missing check but on which the models split over whether anything else holds it; and a small part that is a sign-off a person answers for.

The numbers
Part of the knowledge payrollPayrollShare
passes the screen$389B5.6%
waits only on a check$827B11.8%
needs a body$1.4T20.0%
held for more than a missing check$4.4T62.7%
Of what passes, all three models pass$158B2.3%

Read it with thisFrom the census: a screen scored by three AI models, not a claim about what AI can do and not a forecast. The white line marks the smaller part that all three models pass. The last part of the strip is everything else, which the full figure breaks down.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 3 · How far · Chart

For most of the work that does not pass, the reason the scoring models gave most often is that nothing which already exists would settle whether it was done right. The middle bars overlap, so they do not add up.

For most work that fails the screen, the reason given most often is that no existing check settles itChart
First, left out whatever the vote would say
Needs a body
$1.4T · 20.0%
A sign-off a person answers for
$133B · 1.9%
Then the vote on the other $5.5T: the reason given most often for the payroll that fails, as a share of all knowledge payroll
Can it be told within hours whether the work was done right?
$3.1T · 44.6%
Does a check that already exists settle it?
$4.8T · 69.3%
Is a single failure cheap?
$1.4T · 19.5%
What is left passes
Yes to all three questions, by two of the three models
$389B · 5.6% · all three $158B
left out before the votethe reason the models that voted no gave most oftenpasses the screento its left, all three models pass

Every bar is a share of the $7.0T of knowledge payroll scored. From the census (v3.2-2026-09-24), a screen scored by three AI models, not a claim about what AI can do and not a forecast. Each task that fails carries the reason the models that voted no gave most often, set by the census's own code; where reasons tie, the task counts under each, so the middle bars overlap and do not add up. A question a task also fails, but less often, is not counted, so each bar is a floor for that question.

The numbers
StepPayrollShare of knowledge payroll
Left out: Needs a body$1.4T20.0%
Left out: A sign-off a person answers for$133B1.9%
Goes to the vote$5.5T78.1%
Most often given: Can it be told within hours whether the work was done right?$3.1T44.6%
Most often given: Does a check that already exists settle it?$4.8T69.3%
Most often given: Is a single failure cheap?$1.4T19.5%
Passes the screen$389B5.6%
All three models pass$158B2.3%

Read it with thisFrom the census: a screen scored by three AI models, not a claim about what AI can do and not a forecast. Each middle bar is the reason given most often by the models that voted no, so the bars overlap and each is a floor for its question. Work left out before the vote, as physical or as a sign-off a person answers for, is drawn apart.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
People in hard hats study a paper plan weighted with stones on a hill above a building site with cranes, cooling towers, a river and a line of pylons at sunrise.
Illustration made with AI image generation; not evidence.
Act II

The money

The money arrives before the results, and who keeps it depends on what is scarce.

Stop 1 · The argument · A model, not a measurement

Carlota Perez, an economist who studies how technologies get paid for, found that each earlier surge of technology she studied was paid for in two parts: the first led by finance, the second by production, with a turning point between. The marker is placed by a published rule, and it says where the readings put us, not how the cycle ends.

Where the readings put us in Perez's cycleschematic, after Perez (2002) · not data
the turning pointwhere the published rule puts the readings

The marker is placed by a published rule, using spending on buildings and equipment at 4.38× the AI revenue we can measure, and $998B of commitments signed in four quarters in deals where the seller also funds the buyer. By that rule this is frenzy. The rule: Installation while Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Oracle spend at least a dollar on buildings and equipment for each dollar of AI revenue we can measure. Inside it, frenzy while deals in which a seller also funds its buyer are growing on a year before, irruption before any frenzy, and a turning point once a confirmed frenzy cools. Deployment once that spending falls below half a dollar per dollar and such deals are no more than a year before; synergy and maturity inside it wait for a revenue-growth reading the site does not yet hold. A turning point in between. A year-ago reading counts only when the ledger was searched for the whole year behind it, and the half is shown when the finer phase cannot be told apart. A change counts only after two quarters in a row agree, and the phase is untestable when either series has no reading.

Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL company facts; Epoch AI data hub — AI companies; Menlo Ventures, State of Generative AI in the Enterprise; SEC EDGAR filings (8-K, 6-K, 10-Q exhibits); NVIDIA Newsroom; Official Microsoft Blog; About Amazon company news; CNBC; SoftBank Group press releases. SEC EDGAR, XBRL company facts API. Epoch AI, 'Data on AI Companies' (CC BY 4.0), epoch.ai/data. Menlo Ventures, '2025: The State of Generative AI in the Enterprise'. SEC EDGAR archives. NVIDIA Newsroom. Official Microsoft Blog. About Amazon. CNBC. SoftBank Group.

The numbers
quarterthe rule readsphase shown
2026-09-30frenzyfrenzy
2026-06-30frenzyfrenzy
2026-03-31frenzyfrenzy
2025-12-31frenzyinstallation
2025-09-30installationinstallation
2025-06-30installationinstallation
2025-03-31installationinstallation
2024-12-31installationinstallation

Read it with thisSchematic, after Perez: the curve is her shape and not data. The marker is placed by this site's published rule from its own readings; it names a phase of the cycle and forecasts nothing.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 4 · Who profits · Chart

Each column is one quarter's gross profit, which is sales less the direct cost of what was sold, across the parts of the industry the site can measure. The hatched part at the top is an estimate for the labs, the companies that train the largest AI models, and the applications are left out because they publish nothing the site can use.

Who keeps the gross profit, quarter by quartershare of gross profit · each segment links to its record
ChipsCloudLabs (estimated)Apps publish no gross profit we can use, so they are left out rather than guessed.
estimate

Each column is one quarter's gross profit across the parts we can measure: NVIDIA and AMD at the bottom, Microsoft's cloud business above them, and an estimate for OpenAI and Anthropic, hatched, at the top.

Derived (gross_profit_share_by_layer) from: SEC EDGAR XBRL company facts; Epoch AI data hub — AI companies; SEC EDGAR 10-Q/10-K XBRL instances (segment data). SEC EDGAR, XBRL company facts API. Epoch AI, 'Data on AI Companies' (CC BY 4.0), epoch.ai/data. SEC EDGAR, inline XBRL filings (segment disclosures).

The numbers
quarterpartsharerecord
2026-06-30Chips72.6%derived row
2026-06-30Cloud20.8%derived row
2026-06-30Labs (estimated)6.6%derived row
2026-03-31Chips73.6%derived row
2026-03-31Cloud21.6%derived row
2026-03-31Labs (estimated)4.8%derived row
2025-12-31Chips71.8%derived row
2025-12-31Cloud24.5%derived row
2025-12-31Labs (estimated)3.7%derived row
2025-09-30Chips69.6%derived row
2025-09-30Cloud27.8%derived row
2025-09-30Labs (estimated)2.6%derived row
2025-06-30Chips65.7%derived row
2025-06-30Cloud32.1%derived row
2025-06-30Labs (estimated)2.2%derived row
2025-03-31Chips63.9%derived row
2025-03-31Cloud34.6%derived row
2025-03-31Labs (estimated)1.5%derived row

Read it with thisThe hatched part is an estimate for OpenAI and Anthropic, not a filed figure. Applications publish no gross profit the site can use, so they are left out, not guessed. Chips here means NVIDIA and AMD, and cloud means Microsoft's cloud business alone, the companies that publish a figure, so the shares are of the profit the site can measure, not of the whole industry's.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 4 · Who profits · Chart

For each lab with enough on record, the bars set a year of sales at the latest pace beside the money investors have paid in and the payments the lab has signed up to. The sales are run-rates, a recent month or quarter multiplied up to a year, as told to the press or stated by the lab, and the payments are the full amounts written in the deals.

What the largest AI labs sell in a year, beside what investors have put in and what the labs have signed up to pay suppliersChart · one dollar scale · each lab at the date of its own latest report
OpenAISeptember 2026: a press report, graded as likely by Epoch AIa year of sales at this pace is 0.27× the money raised
sells a year
$50.0B
has raised
$183B
signed up to pay
$730B
AnthropicJuly 2026: a press report, graded as likely by Epoch AIa year of sales at this pace is 0.47× the money raised
sells a year
$65.0B
has raised
$139B
signed up to pay
$194B
Mistral AISeptember 2026: stated by the company, graded as confident by Epoch AIa year of sales at this pace is 0.33× the money raiseda further $3.5B was raised after this date and is not in the bar
sells a yeartoo thin to draw on this scale$1.0B
has raisedtoo thin to draw on this scale$3.0B

Too little on record to compare

  • xAI: the latest figure on record, $428M a year, is from September 2025, too old to set beside the others. A further $20.0B was raised after that date.
  • DeepSeek: sells $1.0B a year as of September 2026 (a press report, graded as likely by Epoch AI). Only 1 funding round is on record, so no multiple is drawn.
  • MiniMax: sells $800M a year as of August 2026 (stated by the company, graded as likely by Epoch AI). Only 1 funding round is on record, so no multiple is drawn.
  • Zhipu AI: sells $1.6B a year as of August 2026 (stated by the company and reported by the press, graded as confident by Epoch AI). Only 1 funding round is on record, so no multiple is drawn.
  • Cohere and Moonshot AI: a run-rate is on record but no funding round, so nothing is drawn.
sales a year at the latest pace, from a press report that Epoch AI grades as likelythe same, as stated by the company itself; neither kind is auditedmoney investors had paid in by that date, from the rounds on recordpayments to suppliers the lab has signed up to, over many years, at the full amount written in the deal

What each bar rests on. Sales a year is a run-rate: a recent month or quarter of sales multiplied up to a year, or the yearly value of current subscriptions, as told to the press or stated by the lab and compiled by Epoch AI. It is not booked revenue, no auditor has checked it, labs differ on whether they count sales before or after a partner's cut, and this site marks every such figure as disputed. Each lab is drawn at the date of its own latest report, and those dates differ. Money raised is the sum of the funding rounds on record up to that date; it leaves out debt and any round this site does not hold, so it is a floor. Payments signed up to is the full written amount of the contracts and commitments on the financing ledger in which the lab is the buyer: they run over many years, amounts described as up to a ceiling are counted in full, some are press reports that the supplier has not confirmed, and none of it is money paid. It is a floor too: deals with no dollar figure are left out, and a lab's own statement of its total commitments is not used. A lab with no such bar has no priced deal on the ledger, which is not the same as having promised nothing.

Labs with only a round or two of funding on record, or whose latest figure is much older than the others, are listed beneath without a multiple. Meta and Google DeepMind have no run-rate on record, and Cohere and Moonshot AI have a run-rate but no funding round, so none of them has a row. This page is drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which is drawn here. Anthropic's sales figure is a press report, drawn hatched by the same rule as any other lab's press-reported figure, and the model has no figure of its own.

The numbers
LabRun-rateDatedWho said itPaid in by thenRounds on recordRaised after that dateRun-rate over money paid inSigned up to pay suppliersDeals
OpenAI$50.0BSeptember 2026a press report, graded as likely by Epoch AI$183B11—0.27×$730B8
Anthropic$65.0BJuly 2026a press report, graded as likely by Epoch AI$139B14—0.47×$194B4
xAI$428MSeptember 2025a press report, graded as likely by Epoch AI$17.0B3$20.0Bnot drawn: too little on recordno priced deal on the ledger—
DeepSeek$1.0BSeptember 2026a press report, graded as likely by Epoch AI$7.5B1$15.9Bnot drawn: too little on recordno priced deal on the ledger—
Mistral AI$1.0BSeptember 2026stated by the company, graded as confident by Epoch AI$3.0B5$3.5B0.33×no priced deal on the ledger—
MiniMax$800MAugust 2026stated by the company, graded as likely by Epoch AI$619M1—not drawn: too little on recordno priced deal on the ledger—
Zhipu AI$1.6BAugust 2026stated by the company and reported by the press, graded as confident by Epoch AI$558M1—not drawn: too little on recordno priced deal on the ledger—

Read it with thisSales are run-rates as reported: not booked revenue and not audited, and each lab is drawn at the date of its own latest report. Money raised and payments signed are floors, and a payment is the full amount written in a deal that runs for years, not money paid. A lab with too little on record is listed without a bar, and a lab with no payments bar has no priced deal on the ledger, which is not the same as having promised nothing. A sales figure from a press report is hatched and one stated by the lab is solid, by the same rule for every lab, the maker of the model that drafted this page included.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 4 · Who profits · Chart

The figure asks which of the companies that sell to the labs also own part of them or stand behind their debts. Each band is a tie between a supplier or investor and a lab, as thick as the full amount written in the deals between them.

Which companies both fund the labs and sell to them, and which do only oneChart · the full amounts written in signed deals, not money paid · $1.4T in all
Amazon $317Bfunds and sellsOracle $300BMicrosoft $285Bfunds and sellsNVIDIA $145BSoftBank Group $60.0BCoreWeave $57.6BNscale $44.6BAlphabet $40.0BOther suppliers $68.9BNo frontier lab $107B
Amazon and OpenAI: a promise to buy, $138B written in the dealAmazon and OpenAI: a stake or a guarantee, $50.0B written in the dealAmazon and Anthropic: a promise to buy, $100B written in the dealAmazon and Anthropic: a stake or a guarantee, $29.0B written in the dealOracle and OpenAI: a promise to buy, $300B written in the deal, marked disputed on the ledgerMicrosoft and OpenAI: a promise to buy, $250B written in the dealMicrosoft and Anthropic: a promise to buy, $30.0B written in the dealMicrosoft and Anthropic: a stake or a guarantee, $5.0B written in the dealNVIDIA and OpenAI: a stake or a guarantee, $105B written in the dealNVIDIA and OpenAI: a stake or a guarantee, $30.0B written in the deal, marked disputed on the ledgerNVIDIA and Anthropic: a stake or a guarantee, $10.0B written in the dealSoftBank Group and OpenAI: a stake or a guarantee, $60.0B written in the dealCoreWeave and OpenAI: a promise to buy, $22.4B written in the dealCoreWeave and Meta: a promise to buy, $35.2B written in the dealNscale and Anthropic: a promise to buy, $44.6B written in the dealAlphabet and Anthropic: a stake or a guarantee, $40.0B written in the dealOther suppliers and OpenAI: a promise to buy, $20.0B written in the dealOther suppliers and Anthropic: a promise to buy, $19.0B written in the dealOther suppliers and Meta: a promise to buy, $29.9B written in the dealNo frontier lab and No frontier lab: a promise to buy, $90.0B written in the dealNo frontier lab and No frontier lab: a stake or a guarantee, $16.6B written in the deal
OpenAI $975BAnthropic $278BMeta $65.1BNo frontier lab $107B

Thickness is the full amount written in the deals, not money paid. OpenAI is a party to 68.5% of everything drawn. The ledger records no direction, so no arrow is drawn.

a promise to buy: a contract or a spending commitment, mostly the lab buying computinga stake or a guarantee: money or credit the supplier puts behind the other sidepaler with a broken edge: reported by the press and marked disputed on the ledger, because the supplier's own filings do not confirm itfunds and sellsa company with both a sale to a lab and a stake in that lab or a guarantee behind it

Each band joins a supplier or investor, on the left, to a lab, on the right, and its thickness is the full amount written in the signed deals between them on the financing ledger; the newest deal on it is dated September 2026. That is every signed deal the ledger holds since its first row, so it is larger than the gauge of circular financing, which counts only deals signed in the trailing year. Circular financing means a supplier funding the customer that then spends the money with that supplier. The ledger does not record which way money moves, so a band is a tie, not a flow: where a pair has a band of each colour, the same company has both a sale to the lab and a stake in it or a guarantee behind it.

A few very large deals make up most of the total, so a single cancelled or renegotiated deal would redraw the picture. These are promises, most of them running for many years: amounts described as up to a ceiling are counted in full, and nothing here says how much has been paid. A guarantee is a promise to pay only if the company it backs does not, so it may never be drawn on. Letters of intent and talks are on the ledger but not drawn. Suppliers beyond the largest are gathered into a single band, and deals with no frontier lab in them, such as a data-centre owner leasing to a cloud company, run along the bottom; labs outside the frontier group, such as Mistral, fall in the bottom band. Meta is on the right because this site files it with the frontier labs, though these deals serve its whole business; Alphabet, which owns a rival lab, is on the left because here it is the investor. The ledger holds what this site has found and read, so it is a floor.

Every pairing and the full amount written
Supplier or investorOther sideKindFull amount writtenDealsOf which press-reportedOf which disputed
OracleOpenAIa promise to buy$300B111
MicrosoftOpenAIa promise to buy$250B1——
AmazonOpenAIa promise to buy$138B2——
NVIDIAOpenAIa stake or a guarantee$135B211
AmazonAnthropica promise to buy$100B1——
SoftBank GroupOpenAIa stake or a guarantee$60.0B2——
AmazonOpenAIa stake or a guarantee$50.0B1——
NscaleAnthropica promise to buy$44.6B1——
AlphabetAnthropica stake or a guarantee$40.0B11—
CoreWeaveMetaa promise to buy$35.2B2——
MicrosoftAnthropica promise to buy$30.0B1——
NebiusMetaa promise to buy$29.9B3——
AmazonAnthropica stake or a guarantee$29.0B2——
CoreWeaveOpenAIa promise to buy$22.4B3——
CerebrasOpenAIa promise to buy$20.0B1——
TeraWulfAnthropica promise to buy$19.0B1——
MicrosoftNebiusa promise to buy$17.4B1——
TeraWulfFluidstacka promise to buy$16.2B3——
Applied DigitalCoreWeavea promise to buy$11.0B2——
NVIDIAAnthropica stake or a guarantee$10.0B1——
Core ScientificCoreWeavea promise to buy$9.9B5——
IRENMicrosofta promise to buy$9.7B1——
Hut 8Fluidstacka promise to buy$7.0B1——
CoreWeaveNVIDIAa stake or a guarantee$6.3B1——
Cipher MiningAmazona promise to buy$5.5B1——
MicrosoftAnthropica stake or a guarantee$5.0B1——
NVIDIASharon AIa promise to buy$4.9B1——
Cipher MiningFluidstacka promise to buy$3.8B2——
IRENNVIDIAa promise to buy$3.4B1——
NVIDIANscalea stake or a guarantee$2.6B3——
NVIDIAIRENa stake or a guarantee$2.1B1——
NVIDIANebiusa stake or a guarantee$2.0B1——
NVIDIACoreWeavea stake or a guarantee$2.0B1——
MicrosoftG42a stake or a guarantee$1.5B1——
NVIDIANscalea promise to buy$1.2B1——
MicrosoftMistral AIa stake or a guarantee$16.3M11—

Read it with thisThe full amounts written in signed deals, not money paid. The ledger records no direction, so a band is a tie, not a flow. Paler bands with a broken edge are disputed deals. A few very large deals make up most of the total, and the ledger holds only what this site has found, so it is a floor.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 4 · Who profits · Part chart, part judgement

The industry runs as a chain, from power and chips to the people who use the products. The bars count the companies the tracker follows at each step, and the marks beneath are this site's judgement of which way each part's profit is heading.

The chain in one picture: where the companies are, and which way this site judges each part's profit is headingChart for the counts, this site's judgement for the directions
  1. Compute & physical133
  2. Model121
    Holding, judgedFrontier labs
  3. Training input81
  4. Serving & orchestration132
    No judgement yetAgent security & identity
  5. Deployment & application379
    Commoditising, judgedCoding agents & dev tools
    No judgement yetTalent production / AI education & FDE trainingAutonomous services / AI-native service firms
  6. Adopters0
    Commoditising, judgedthe whole layer
  7. Labour & consumers0
    Holding, judgedthe whole layer
companies the tracker follows in the layer (a count)tightening, a judgement: getting scarcer, so whoever owns it can charge moreholding, a judgement: profit steady for nowcommoditising, a judgement: becoming cheap and interchangeable, so the gain passes to buyersa part with companies in it and no judgement on this page yet

The layers run in the order work flows, from power and chips to the people who use the products. The bars count each company on the market map below once, by the part of the chain the tracker files it under. The map sorts the same companies into its own finer layers and categories and lets a company sit in more than one, so its counts are larger and do not line up with these bars. The folded table lists the parts behind each bar. A bar is the tracker's reach, not the size of any market: a tall bar means many companies followed. The last layers hold none because the site reads them through surveys and statistics, not through companies.

Each direction is a judgement, not a measurement, drafted by Claude, a model made by Anthropic, whose own part of the chain (frontier labs) is among those judged: follow it to read the argument, the view against it and what would prove it wrong. 169 of the 849 companies sit in parts with no judgement yet, and 3 are on the map without a part of the chain. The parts with no judgement are ones the site has not yet written up, not ones it judged unimportant.

Short names are the tracker's own; each links to a plain statement of the judgement. RL is reinforcement learning, training by practice and grading; HBM is the fast memory stacked beside an AI chip; FDE is an engineer the seller places inside a customer; evals are tests of a model.

The numbers: companies followed and the judged direction, part by part
LayerPart of the chainCompanies followedDirection, judged
Compute & physicalSemiconductors & AI chip startups28Holding
Compute & physicalHyperscalers25Holding
Compute & physicalData-centre developers & power55Tightening
Compute & physicalMemory/HBM25Holding
Compute & physicalThe whole layer1331 tightening, 3 holding
ModelFrontier labs5Holding
ModelNeolabs (founded 2023+)108Commoditising
ModelOpen-weight & Chinese labs8Commoditising
ModelThe whole layer1211 holding, 2 commoditising
Training inputHuman/expert data & labelling22Holding
Training inputRL environments12Holding
Training inputRLaaS / post-training / continual-learning infra7Commoditising
Training inputSynthetic data & pipelines9Commoditising
Training inputPermissioned data markets & licensing12Holding
Training inputEvals19Commoditising
Training inputThe whole layer813 holding, 3 commoditising
Serving & orchestrationInference serving39Commoditising
Serving & orchestrationRouting12Commoditising
Serving & orchestrationAgent infrastructure42Commoditising
Serving & orchestrationAgent security & identity39no judgement yet
Serving & orchestrationThe whole layer1323 commoditising
Deployment & applicationDeployment / FDE / implementation services34Holding
Deployment & applicationTalent production / AI education & FDE training40no judgement yet
Deployment & applicationCoding agents & dev tools14Commoditising
Deployment & applicationVertical AI by domain40Holding
Deployment & applicationAutonomous services / AI-native service firms90no judgement yet
Deployment & applicationConsumer AI6Holding
Deployment & applicationAI-native rollups / buyout vehicles155Holding
Deployment & applicationThe whole layer3794 holding, 1 commoditising
AdoptersThe whole layer01 commoditising
Labour & consumersThe whole layer01 holding
On the map without a part of the chainApplied Materials, KLA, Lam Research3not filed under a part

Read it with thisA bar is the tracker's reach, the companies it follows, not the size of any market. Each direction is a judgement, not a measurement, drafted by Claude, a model made by Anthropic, whose own part of the chain is among those judged. A part with no mark has not been written up yet, which is not a judgement that it matters less. The last steps show no companies because the site reads them through surveys and statistics, and the short trade names in the drawing are explained on the full page.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 1 · The argument · Chart

This site argues that the scarcest input gets paid, so it scores how tight an input is, meaning how far short of what is wanted, wherever it has a gauge for one, on a single scale from slack to severe. A hollow mark is an input with no score, which has no place on the scale and is not the same as slack.

Every input on one scale, and the ones that cannot be placed on itChart
  • Data-centre buildings78 · tight
    78 · tight
  • AI chips58 · moderate
    58 · moderate
  • Running models28 · easing
    28 · easing
  • Building frontier models25 · easing
    25 · easing
  • Agents and tool use20 · easing
    20 · easing
  • Capital14 · slack
    14 · slack
Low confidence: a stand-in, kept out of the ranking
  • Electricity generation79 · tight
    79 · tight
  • Chip foundries55 · moderate
    55 · moderate
severetightmoderateeasingslacklow confidenceno score

Each solid mark is an input's tightness score from the scorecard below, tightest first. A hatched mark is a score this site holds with low confidence because its gauge is a stand-in for the thing itself; it is drawn apart and is not ranked with the rest. A hollow mark is an input with no score: it has no place on the scale, so it is drawn beside it, never in the middle. Inputs that sit close together are not in a meaningful order. Each mark links to its row in the scorecard, where the gauges and their sources are.

The scores
InputTightnessReads asConfidence
Data-centre buildings78tight60
AI chips58moderate77
Running models28easing78
Building frontier models25easing69
Agents and tool use20easing50
Capital14slack76
Electricity generation79tight40 (low, not ranked)
Chip foundries55moderate44 (low, not ranked)
Critical mineralsno score
The grid and its hookupsno score
Chip-making equipmentno score
Advanced chip packagingno score
Memoryno score
Networking and opticsno score
Systems softwareno score
Training infrastructureno score
Post-trainingno score
Continual learningno score
Routing between modelsno score
Tests and evaluationsno score
Training datano score
Deployment platformsno score
Applicationsno score

Read it with thisA hatched mark is a score held with low confidence; it is drawn apart and not ranked with the rest. A hollow mark has no score and no place on the scale. Inputs that sit close together are in no meaningful order. Some of the readings behind these scores are close to the age at which they stop counting.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 6 · Who owns what · A model, not a measurement

This is the site's own picture of where firms are heading: people who answer for the work, a layer that checks it, a working base, and a line between what is rented and what is owned. It is a model joined from arguments, and no reading tests it whole.

The anatomy of an AI-run firmA model, not a measurement
The people who answerSet the task, sign the work, hold the licence, face the customer, and pay when it is wrong. Few, senior, and named.
The checking layerTests, reviewers and records that settle whether work was done right. Where no check exists, a person's judgement stands in, and this is where most work waits.
The working baseAgents now; agents that keep context next; robots later. Wide, cheap, and not employed.
RentedThe models themselves, bought by the unit of text processed and, in this site's view, from whoever sells them cheapest.
OwnedWhat cannot be bought: customers, the firm's records and context, its licences, its sensors and sites.

This site's picture of where the kinds of firm on this page are heading. It is a model of an idea, joined from the arguments on the page before; no reading tests it whole.

Read it with thisThis site's own picture, drafted by a model: a judgement about where firms are heading, not a measurement of any firm. It is joined from arguments made on other pages, and no reading tests it whole.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
A crowd fills a cobbled market square where a child and a slender robot handle a rope by a fountain while other robots carry baskets among the stalls.
Illustration made with AI image generation; not evidence.

An imagined scene. It is not a forecast, and this site does not say this is what comes next.

Act III

Next

What happens from here is disputed, and a dispute can be read only where someone has written down a test.

Stop 7a · What people expect · Chart

Each mark is one dispute: a position a named writer holds, set against a rival writer's or against one this site wrote itself. A hollow mark is a dispute on which nothing has been read yet, and a dark mark means a reading met a claim's line, not that either side has the better of the argument.

Which disputes tonight's readings reach, question by questionChart
Can AI do whole jobs, reliably?
6 of 9 where no claim has a test
Who checks the work?
3 of 6 where no claim has a test
Is adoption slow, or just hard to see?
4 of 7 where no claim has a test
Does work reorganise fast enough to show up in output?
12 of 14 where no claim has a test
Who keeps the money?
16 of 23 where no claim has a test
a claim on it met its line tonight and carries a test of what the rival expectsa claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is righta claim on it missed its line tonight, and none met oneread tonight, but only readings both sides expectno reading tests any claim on either side

One mark is one dispute from the first figure: a pair of rival positions, or a position that argues against one drawn elsewhere; it links to the position. Its fill is how much this site could read on it tonight, taking the claim that got furthest on either side, in this order: a reading that met a claim's line, then a reading that missed one, then a reading both sides expect, then a test written and waiting, then no test at all. In 41 of the 59 disputes no claim on either side has a test, so nothing this site reads bears on them yet. A dark mark does not mean either side has the better of the argument. A single claim that met its line is enough to fill it, and in only 2 of the 10 dark disputes, the ringed marks, does that claim carry a test of what the rival expects; in the rest this site has not written down what the rival would expect of the same reading. An orange mark is a dispute where a claim missed its line and none met one, which does not hand the argument to the other side either. Across the page, 9 of the 11 claims that are holding have no test for the rival. These figures were drafted by Claude, an AI model made by Anthropic. Several of these positions are about that lab's business, and among the writers drawn here are advisers to it, a writer at its institute and the founder of a firm that holds a stake in it; each writer's ties are given with their source at the foot of the page. Every count and mark comes from the ledger and its nightly tests, not from the model.

The numbers, and which dispute each mark is
QuestionMet a line, with a test for the rivalMet a line, no test for the rivalMissed a lineOnly shared readingsTest waitingNo test yetDisputes
Can AI do whole jobs, reliably?0102069
Who checks the work?1101036
Is adoption slow, or just hard to see?1101047
Does work reorganise fast enough to show up in output?010101214
Who keeps the money?041201623
All281704159

Which dispute each mark is, in the order drawn

Can AI do whole jobs, reliably?

  1. AI speeds up its own research, and the gains compound, against Research moves at the pace of its slowest step · read tonight, but only readings both sides expect · claims with a test: 3 of 4
  2. Getting a task right is not getting it right every time, against AI speeds up its own research, and the gains compound · read tonight, but only readings both sides expect · claims with a test: 1 of 1
  3. The missing steps can be bought, against AI speeds up its own research, and the gains compound · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  4. Self-improvement leaks, against AI speeds up its own research, and the gains compound · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  5. Bigger models alone will not get there, against AI speeds up its own research, and the gains compound · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  6. Training data comes from real work inside firms, against Checked practice work is the next shortage · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  7. Cost, not ability, becomes the limit, against Getting a task right is not getting it right every time · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  8. Chinese labs do not take the lead, against Tokens become a commodity where a model is not the best tool · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 1 of 1
  9. The grid and tradespeople set the pace of building, against The build-out runs late while use keeps rising · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2

Who checks the work?

  1. Checking AI's work becomes a business of its own, against Checking stays a free feature of the big platforms · read tonight, but only readings both sides expect · claims with a test: 2 of 5
  2. Apps that resell the labs' models get squeezed, against Apps keep their margin through what they build around the model · a claim on it met its line tonight and carries a test of what the rival expects · claims with a test: 1 of 3
  3. Big platforms fence out agents that are not their own, against Platforms let outside agents in, on terms they set · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  4. Checked practice work is the next shortage, against Models make their own practice · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 1 of 1
  5. Tuning open models for firms becomes one business, against General models overtake models built for one field · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 3
  6. Labs hold back their strongest models, against The best models go to everyone at once · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1

Is adoption slow, or just hard to see?

  1. Adoption is slow because the frictions are real, against Adoption is not slow; it is hard to see · read tonight, but only readings both sides expect · claims with a test: 1 of 3
  2. Junior hiring shows it first, against Young workers' troubles have causes other than AI · a claim on it met its line tonight and carries a test of what the rival expects · claims with a test: 1 of 1
  3. Agents arrive first where wants are simple and agents already work, against Asking reveals what you want, so firms keep work inside · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  4. What goes first is set by the cost of checking, not the cost of doing, against Adoption is slow because the frictions are real · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  5. Engineers who fit AI to each firm are the scarce ingredient, against Adoption is slow because the frictions are real · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  6. AI's work is bought through firms that can be sued, against Firms buy AI straight from the start-ups that build it · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  7. Whoever must answer for the work ends up owning the operation, against Insurance and contract carry the liability, so nobody needs to own the operation · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 2 of 3

Does work reorganise fast enough to show up in output?

  1. Growth rises, but does not explode, against AI compresses a century of progress into a decade · read tonight, but only readings both sides expect · claims with a test: 2 of 2
  2. Work gets more intense before it frees time, against Machines buy people time · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  3. Work built on people dealing with people gains, against Wages follow a jagged path, and the displaced can lose again · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 2 of 3
  4. Decisions move to the centre, against Knowledge on the spot keeps decisions there · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  5. Answers replace visits, and the web that trained AI loses its income, against AI companies pay for what they read · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  6. AI grows unpopular, and its rules come late, against AI's rules are settled quietly · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  7. Some workers turn into trainers of their replacements, against Work built on people dealing with people gains · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  8. Cheap AI fills niches no one served, against AI compresses a century of progress into a decade · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  9. Versatile workers pull ahead of specialists, against Wages follow a jagged path, and the displaced can lose again · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  10. Big at the base, small at the top, against Decisions move to the centre · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  11. The conglomerate comes back, against Big at the base, small at the top · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  12. Cheap agents move the firm's boundary; they do not remove it, against With dealing nearly free, most work is bought in and firms shrink towards nothing · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  13. AI empties the pyramid from the bottom, against The middle goes, and the firm flattens · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  14. A firm keeps people where someone has to answer, against A firm needs no person to run it · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1

Who keeps the money?

  1. Tokens become a commodity where a model is not the best tool, against Labs charge for their lead and let buyers go · read tonight, but only readings both sides expect · claims with a test: 2 of 4
  2. Labs escape by moving up the stack, and lock their customers in, against Tokens become a commodity where a model is not the best tool · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 2 of 5
  3. The biggest platforms win with models that are good enough, against Labs escape by moving up the stack, and lock their customers in · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 0
  4. Routers gain power, against A router works itself out of a job · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 0
  5. Whoever holds the scarcest input collects, against Labs escape by moving up the stack, and lock their customers in · a claim on it missed its line tonight, and none met one · claims with a test: 2 of 3
  6. The spending runs ahead of the revenue, and investors take the loss, against The labs are durable businesses with high margins · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 2 of 2
  7. The build-out runs late while use keeps rising, against The spending runs ahead of the revenue, and investors take the loss · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  8. Consumers keep most of the value, against Labs charge for their lead and let buyers go · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  9. AI's everyday work moves onto people's own devices, against The cloud keeps the thinking · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  10. Governments decide which countries and firms may use which models, against Open models cross borders, so access cannot be fenced · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  11. Labs may pull apart by industry, on the records they buy, against Tokens become a commodity where a model is not the best tool · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 2
  12. The data market stays split among specialists, against A few large sellers take most of the data market · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  13. Labs cannot lock their customers in, against Labs escape by moving up the stack, and lock their customers in · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  14. Models stay different, not interchangeable, against Tokens become a commodity where a model is not the best tool · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  15. Computing cannot flood the market overnight, against Some link in the chip chain proves easier to expand · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 1 of 2
  16. The lead among labs keeps changing hands, against The labs are durable businesses with high margins · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  17. Firms' AI bills keep rising as prices fall, against Firms' AI spending levels off as prices fall · a claim on it met its line tonight; this does not say which side is right · claims with a test: 1 of 2
  18. NVIDIA finances its customers, against Whoever holds the scarcest input collects · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  19. The builders overbuild and rent out the rest, against The spending runs ahead of the revenue, and investors take the loss · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  20. Advertising pays for free AI, against Consumers keep most of the value · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  21. The software that keeps the records gains, against Labs escape by moving up the stack, and lock their customers in · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  22. Deployment staff pull the labs' margins down, against The labs are durable businesses with high margins · no reading tests any claim on either side · claims with a test: 0 of 1
  23. Most firms should rent intelligence and own something else, against A firm that rents its thinking teaches its supplier its business · read tonight, but only readings both sides expect · claims with a test: 1 of 2

Read it with thisA dark mark does not mean either side has the better of the argument: a single claim that met its line fills it, whether or not the rival expected the same reading. In most disputes no claim on either side has a test, so nothing the site reads bears on them yet. An orange mark is a dispute where a claim missed its line and none met one, which does not hand the argument to the other side either. Some of the writers drawn have ties to Anthropic, the maker of the model that drafted these figures; each tie is given with its source on the full page.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 7b · Who is right so far · Chart

The site keeps a board of forecasts, made by the labs, by named writers and by the site itself, and gives each a word every night. A bar shows shares, so a short section and a long one look alike.

How many forecasts in each section are happening, not happening, or still too early to tellChart
Every forecast221
Capability / invention92
Innovation: products and applications14
Diffusion: early adoption17
Diffusion: adaptation42
Value capture56
happeningnot happeningslower than saidboth sides expect thistoo early to tell

Each bar is every forecast in that section, split by tonight's word; the count beside a name is how many forecasts the bar holds. A bar shows shares, so a short section and a long one look alike: read the counts in the table. The words are this site's reading on 2026-11-04, not a final verdict.

The numbers
SectionHappeningNot happeningSlower than saidBoth sides expect thisToo early to tellAll
Every forecast3051113162221
Capability / invention110837092
Innovation: products and applications11021014
Diffusion: early adoption41021017
Diffusion: adaptation31313442
Value capture112053856

Read it with thisA bar shows shares; the counts are in the table on the full page. The words are this site's reading tonight, not a final verdict. A dated forecast by someone else has no word for wrong: one scored behind reads as slower than said. Most forecasts on the board are still too early to tell.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 7b · Who is right so far · Part chart, part judgement

Where a forecast is too early to tell, a model was asked which way it leans. Every bar is hatched because it draws a judgement and not a reading, and a lean changes no word on the board.

Which way a model leans on the forecasts that are too early to tellA model's judgements, not readings; the model is Anthropic's
Every forecast147
70
69
Capability / invention70
29
36
Innovation: products and applications10
4
6
Diffusion: early adoption7
5
2
Diffusion: adaptation27
11
13
Value capture33
21
12
likely trueleans truetoss-upleans falselikely falsethe centre: true to its left, false to its right

Every bar here is hatched because it draws a judgement, not a reading. The judge is claude-opus-5-5, a model made by Anthropic; some of these forecasts are about Anthropic and its rivals, and no person reviewed each lean, so treat the leans on those forecasts with extra care. It gave each lean on 2026-10-05, and a lean changes no word above. A bar is the shares of that section's leaned-on forecasts; the numbers at its ends count the forecasts leaning true and leaning false, and the count beside a name is how many the bar holds. Bars are shares, so a section with few leans can draw the longest bar: read the counts. Forecasts with no lean are in the table, not drawn.

The numbers
Sectionlikely trueleans truetoss-upleans falselikely falseno lean givenwith a lean
Every forecast17538472215147
Capability / invention92052214070
Innovation: products and applications04060010
Diffusion: early adoption1402037
Diffusion: adaptation29385727
Value capture516093533

Read it with thisA model's judgements, not readings, and every bar is hatched to say so. The judge is a model made by Anthropic; some of these forecasts are about Anthropic and its rivals, so treat the leans on those forecasts with extra care, and no person reviewed each lean. Bars are shares, so a section with few leans can draw the longest bar.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 8 · The long run · Chart

Each row is a milestone and each mark is the year a forecaster gave for it. Read across a row to see how far apart the years are, and remember they are not the same kind of year: some are deadlines, some a most likely year, some the end of a range.

When each forecaster expected each milestonea mark sits at the year forecast, a bar spans a stated range; hover for who said it, tap to open it
A machine that out-codes the best programmers
AI that does AI research
Explosive growth
Loss of control
Robots in the physical world
Minds, uploads and longer lives
Imagined, not forecast
HappeningSlower than saidToo early to tellthe range statedset in a story, not a forecastlighter: a step toward the milestone, not a date for it

The scale is not even: the half century from 1950 and the half century from 2050 are squeezed so the years around now get most of the width (dashed lines mark where it changes). A call that gives odds, or bets against a date, without naming a year is listed under the chart. A forecast is placed at the start of its year, so one due by the end of this year sits left of today while its window is still open. Shaded: the years still to come.

Every forecast placed on the chart
MilestoneWhoSaidYears forecastTonight
A machine that out-codes the best programmersAjeya Cotra2026by 2026Happening
A machine that out-codes the best programmersAI Futures Project20252027Too early to tell
A machine that out-codes the best programmersAI Futures Project (Kokotajlo, Lifland, Jurkovic et al.)2025by 2027Happening
A machine that out-codes the best programmersDaniel Kokotajlo20262027Too early to tell
A machine that out-codes the best programmersEli Lifland20262030Too early to tell
AI that does AI researchAI Futures Project2025by 2026Slower than said
AI that does AI researchSam Altman2025by 2026Too early to tell
AI that does AI researchLeopold Aschenbrenner2024by 2027Too early to tell
AI that does AI researchAI Futures Project2025by 2027Too early to tell
AI that does AI researchOpenAI2026by 2028Too early to tell
AI that does AI researchWilliam MacAskill and Fin Moorhouse20252035–2045Too early to tell
General or transformative AIRay Solomonoff19851994–2023Slower than said
General or transformative AISam Altman2026by 2026Too early to tell
General or transformative AIAI Futures Project2025by 2027Too early to tell
General or transformative AIMustafa Suleyman20232026–2028Too early to tell
General or transformative AILeopold Aschenbrenner20242027–2028Too early to tell
General or transformative AIDario Amodei20262027–2028Too early to tell
General or transformative AIDaniel Kokotajlo20262028Too early to tell
General or transformative AIRay Kurzweil2002by 2029Too early to tell
General or transformative AIDemis Hassabis20262029–2031, most likely 2030Too early to tell
General or transformative AIEli Lifland20262032Too early to tell
General or transformative AIDario Amodei2026by 2036Too early to tell
General or transformative AITamay Besiroglu20252040Too early to tell
General or transformative AITom Davidson20232030–2070, most likely 2043Too early to tell
General or transformative AIEge Erdil20252045Too early to tell
General or transformative AIAjeya Cotra20202040–2080, most likely 2050Too early to tell
General or transformative AIHolden Karnofsky20212036–2100, most likely 2060Too early to tell
General or transformative AIJoe Carlsmith2022by 2070Too early to tell
General or transformative AIDavid Chalmers20102040–2100Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceI. J. Good1965by 2000Slower than said
SuperintelligenceAI Futures Project2025by 2027Slower than said
SuperintelligenceDaniel Kokotajlo20262029Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceVernor Vinge19932005–2030Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceLeopold Aschenbrenner2024by 2030Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceNick Bostrom2008by 2033Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceEli Lifland20262033Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceEliezer Yudkowsky1996by 2035Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceSam Altman20242030–2035Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceRay Kurzweil20052045Too early to tell
SuperintelligenceStuart Russell2019by 2100Too early to tell
Explosive growthRobin Hanson20012025Slower than said
Loss of controlAndrew Critch20242030–2050Too early to tell
Robots in the physical worldSam Altman2025by 2027Too early to tell
Robots in the physical worldAI Futures Project20252028–2030Too early to tell
Robots in the physical worldHans Moravec1998by 2048Too early to tell
The build-outRay Kurzweil2001by 2023Slower than said
The build-outAI Futures Project2025by 2025Happening
The build-outDaniel Kokotajlo2021by 2026Happening
The build-outLeopold Aschenbrenner2024by 2026Happening
The build-outLeopold Aschenbrenner2024by 2027Happening
The build-outLeopold Aschenbrenner2024by 2028Too early to tell
The build-outHans Moravec19982020–2029Happening
The build-outRay Kurzweil2001by 2030Slower than said
The build-outLeopold Aschenbrenner2024by 2030Too early to tell
The build-outYafah Edelman and Anson Ho20252035Too early to tell
Minds, uploads and longer livesRay Kurzweil2001by 2030Slower than said
Minds, uploads and longer livesRay Kurzweil2024by 2030Slower than said
Minds, uploads and longer livesRay Kurzweil20242030–2039Too early to tell
Minds, uploads and longer livesAnders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom2008by 2050Too early to tell
Minds, uploads and longer livesRobin Hanson2016by 2116Too early to tell

Read it with thisThe scale is not even: the years around now get most of the width. A forecast is placed at the start of its year, so one due by the end of this year sits left of today while its window is still open. A row counts forecasts, not people, and mixes claims that do not mean the same thing. The heads of Anthropic and of rival labs are among the forecasters, each placed by the same rule from its own record.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 8 · The long run · Chart

Each mark sets the year a forecast was made against the year it named. The marks fall toward the lower right because different people made different claims in different years, not because anyone here changed a date.

When each forecast was made, against the year it gaveChart
the year forecast ↑
this yearI. J. Good, said 1965: Superintelligence, by 2000. Slower than said.Ray Solomonoff, said 1985: General or transformative AI, 1994–2023. Slower than said.Vernor Vinge, said 1993: Superintelligence, 2005–2030. Too early to tell.Eliezer Yudkowsky, said 1996: Superintelligence, by 2035. Too early to tell.Ray Kurzweil, said 2002: General or transformative AI, by 2029. Too early to tell.Ray Kurzweil, said 2005: Superintelligence, 2045. Too early to tell.Nick Bostrom, said 2008: Superintelligence, by 2033. Too early to tell.David Chalmers, said 2010: General or transformative AI, 2040–2100. Too early to tell.Stuart Russell, said 2019: Superintelligence, by 2100. Too early to tell.Ajeya Cotra, said 2020: General or transformative AI, 2040–2080, most likely 2050. Too early to tell.Holden Karnofsky, said 2021: General or transformative AI, 2036–2100, most likely 2060. Too early to tell.Joe Carlsmith, said 2022: General or transformative AI, by 2070. Too early to tell.Tom Davidson, said 2023: General or transformative AI, 2030–2070, most likely 2043. Too early to tell.Mustafa Suleyman, said 2023: General or transformative AI, 2026–2028. Too early to tell.Leopold Aschenbrenner, said 2024: AI that does AI research, by 2027. Too early to tell.Leopold Aschenbrenner, said 2024: General or transformative AI, 2027–2028. Too early to tell.Leopold Aschenbrenner, said 2024: Superintelligence, by 2030. Too early to tell.Sam Altman, said 2024: Superintelligence, 2030–2035. Too early to tell.William MacAskill and Fin Moorhouse, said 2025: AI that does AI research, 2035–2045. Too early to tell.AI Futures Project, said 2025: Superintelligence, by 2027. Slower than said.AI Futures Project, said 2025: General or transformative AI, by 2027. Too early to tell. Set aside: made at the far end of its line.AI Futures Project, said 2025: A machine that out-codes the best programmers, 2027. Too early to tell. Set aside: made at the far end of its line.AI Futures Project, said 2025: AI that does AI research, by 2027. Too early to tell. Set aside: made at the far end of its line.Tamay Besiroglu, said 2025: General or transformative AI, 2040. Too early to tell.Ege Erdil, said 2025: General or transformative AI, 2045. Too early to tell. Set aside: made at the far end of its line.Sam Altman, said 2025: AI that does AI research, by 2026. Too early to tell.Dario Amodei, said 2026: General or transformative AI, by 2036. Too early to tell.Dario Amodei, said 2026: General or transformative AI, 2027–2028. Too early to tell.Demis Hassabis, said 2026: General or transformative AI, 2029–2031, most likely 2030. Too early to tell.Daniel Kokotajlo, said 2026: A machine that out-codes the best programmers, 2027. Too early to tell.Daniel Kokotajlo, said 2026: General or transformative AI, 2028. Too early to tell. Set aside: made at the far end of its line.Daniel Kokotajlo, said 2026: Superintelligence, 2029. Too early to tell.Eli Lifland, said 2026: A machine that out-codes the best programmers, 2030. Too early to tell. Set aside: made at the far end of its line.Eli Lifland, said 2026: General or transformative AI, 2032. Too early to tell.Eli Lifland, said 2026: Superintelligence, 2033. Too early to tell.Sam Altman, said 2026: General or transformative AI, by 2026. Too early to tell.OpenAI, said 2026: AI that does AI research, by 2028. Too early to tell. Set aside: made at the far end of its line.
A machine that out-codes the best programmersAI that does AI researchGeneral or transformative AISuperintelligencethe range of years stateda mark set aside, tied back to the date it was madethe year the forecast was madethis year

One mark is one dated forecast of the milestones in the forecaster table: 37 in all, each linked to its record. The dashed steps are the year a forecast was made, so a mark higher above them looked further ahead. Because the scale up the side is not even, equal heights are not equal numbers of years: the table gives each forecast's years. A mark under the line marked this year names a year that has already passed; a mark on it names this year, which is not over. Neither scale is even: the years before 2020 are squeezed along the bottom, and the years before 2020 and after 2040 up the side (dashed lines mark where each scale changes).

Where one mark would cover another, the later is set beside it, to the right or the left, and tied back by a short line to the date it was made: 7 marks are set aside this way, some by several months, and no mark is set right of today. Read such a mark's date from the far end of its line, or from the table. No mark is named in the drawing: the table lists every forecast in the order drawn, left to right, with its writer. Not drawn: 3 steps toward a milestone and 14 forecasts that give odds or doubt a date without naming a year.

The marks fall toward the lower right because this site's list holds different people making different claims in different years, not because anyone here changed a date: no forecaster's earlier and later date for the same claim is on record, so the figure cannot show a forecast being brought forward and is not evidence that forecasts are converging. Where one writer has more than one mark on a milestone they are different claims, at different odds or on different conditions; each links to its record. A mark is the year the timeline places a forecast at, which may be a deadline, a most likely year or a year given only some odds, and a range bar may be a spread of odds or a plain "give or take". No trend line is fitted. This figure was drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, and the heads of Anthropic and of rival labs are among the forecasters it draws; each is placed by the same rule, from its own record in this site's ledger of forecasts, and no placing was adjusted for anyone.

Every forecast drawn
MadeWhoMilestoneYears forecastTonight
1965-01I. J. GoodSuperintelligenceby 2000Slower than said
1985-01Ray SolomonoffGeneral or transformative AI1994–2023Slower than said
1993-03Vernor VingeSuperintelligence2005–2030Too early to tell
1996-11Eliezer YudkowskySuperintelligenceby 2035Too early to tell
2002-04Ray KurzweilGeneral or transformative AIby 2029Too early to tell
2005-09Ray KurzweilSuperintelligence2045Too early to tell
2008-03Nick BostromSuperintelligenceby 2033Too early to tell
2010-01David ChalmersGeneral or transformative AI2040–2100Too early to tell
2019-10Stuart RussellSuperintelligenceby 2100Too early to tell
2020-09Ajeya CotraGeneral or transformative AI2040–2080, most likely 2050Too early to tell
2021-09Holden KarnofskyGeneral or transformative AI2036–2100, most likely 2060Too early to tell
2022-06Joe CarlsmithGeneral or transformative AIby 2070Too early to tell
2023-06Tom DavidsonGeneral or transformative AI2030–2070, most likely 2043Too early to tell
2023-09Mustafa SuleymanGeneral or transformative AI2026–2028Too early to tell
2024-06Leopold AschenbrennerAI that does AI researchby 2027Too early to tell
2024-06Leopold AschenbrennerGeneral or transformative AI2027–2028Too early to tell
2024-06Leopold AschenbrennerSuperintelligenceby 2030Too early to tell
2024-09Sam AltmanSuperintelligence2030–2035Too early to tell
2025-03William MacAskill and Fin MoorhouseAI that does AI research2035–2045Too early to tell
2025-04AI Futures ProjectSuperintelligenceby 2027Slower than said
2025-04AI Futures ProjectGeneral or transformative AIby 2027Too early to tell
2025-04AI Futures ProjectA machine that out-codes the best programmers2027Too early to tell
2025-04AI Futures ProjectAI that does AI researchby 2027Too early to tell
2025-04Tamay BesirogluGeneral or transformative AI2040Too early to tell
2025-04Ege ErdilGeneral or transformative AI2045Too early to tell
2025-06Sam AltmanAI that does AI researchby 2026Too early to tell
2026-02Dario AmodeiGeneral or transformative AIby 2036Too early to tell
2026-06Dario AmodeiGeneral or transformative AI2027–2028Too early to tell
2026-06Demis HassabisGeneral or transformative AI2029–2031, most likely 2030Too early to tell
2026-08Daniel KokotajloA machine that out-codes the best programmers2027Too early to tell
2026-08Daniel KokotajloGeneral or transformative AI2028Too early to tell
2026-08Daniel KokotajloSuperintelligence2029Too early to tell
2026-08Eli LiflandA machine that out-codes the best programmers2030Too early to tell
2026-08Eli LiflandGeneral or transformative AI2032Too early to tell
2026-08Eli LiflandSuperintelligence2033Too early to tell
2026-08Sam AltmanGeneral or transformative AIby 2026Too early to tell
2026-09OpenAIAI that does AI researchby 2028Too early to tell

Read it with thisNo forecaster's earlier and later date for the same claim is on record, so the shape is not evidence that forecasts are converging. Neither scale is even, so height is not distance, and no trend line is fitted. A mark set beside another is tied back by a short line to the date it was made. On a narrow screen the plot scrolls sideways, and the lower right is at its far end. The heads of Anthropic and of rival labs are among the forecasters drawn, each placed by the same rule from its own record.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →
Stop 8 · The long run · A model, not a measurement

The site keeps several worlds, its name for the ways the coming years could go, open and crowns none. A world reads consistent until a signpost, a claim tested each night, fails in one of its cells, so consistent here means not ruled out.

Where each world sits on the scenario grid, and how its signposts read tonightA model, not a measurement; the glyphs are tonight's readings
The rules stay unsettled
Courts and insurers price the risk
Oversight comes first
Capability stalls
The brake◑ both sides expect this◑ both sides expect this
The money stalls
The brake◑ both sides expect this
Steady progress
Long diffusion◑ both sides expect this◑ both sides expect this
Long diffusion◑ both sides expect this◑ both sides expect this
Long diffusionno signpost
AI automates research
Control slips○ can't be tested yet◑ both sides expect this○ can't be tested yet
Managed explosion○ can't be tested yet
Control slips away
Control slipsno signpost
a cell a world is drawn over, named in the cella signpost: both sides expect thisa signpost: can't be tested yetno source on the outlook argues this cell

The grid is the outlook page's: how far capability goes, down, and how the rules settle, across. Each world is drawn over the cells this site gives it; the placing is this site's, a drawing of an idea, and no world is crowned. A glyph is one signpost: a claim the outlook tests each night, listed in the table.

A world reads consistent until a signpost in one of its cells fails. On 2026-11-04, of the signposts on the grid, counting one that sits in more than one cell each time, 8 are expected by both sides of the argument, 3 cannot be tested yet, 0 hold and 0 fail, and 2 cells have no signpost at all. So consistent here means not ruled out: it is no evidence that a world is on its way.

Each world's count, and every signpost
WorldCellsStill openSignposts: holding so farSignposts: failing its testSignposts: both sides expect thisSignposts: can't be tested yetCells with no signpostThe page's word
A managed explosion1100010consistent
A long diffusion3300401consistent
Control slips away2200121consistent
The brake2200300consistent
  • Capability stalls · The rules stay unsettled (The brake)
    • Whole projects stay far behind single skills, with the best score on real freelance projects below 50%. (both sides expect this)
    • The agents Princeton's tracker tests grow more dependable far more slowly than they grow more accurate. (both sides expect this)
  • The money stalls · The rules stay unsettled (The brake)
    • The biggest cloud and platform companies spend more each year on buildings and equipment than AI earns in revenue. (both sides expect this)
  • Steady progress · The rules stay unsettled (A long diffusion)
    • In no quarter before 2034 does American real output per person stand 15% or more above the highest level it had reached a year or more before. (both sides expect this)
    • The share of American firms using AI stays within the pace this site calls normal, below 35%. (both sides expect this)
  • Steady progress · Courts and insurers price the risk (A long diffusion)
    • Insurers write AI's mistakes out of their standard policies, so the cover has to be bought and priced on its own. (both sides expect this)
    • Checking AI's work is sold as a category of its own. (both sides expect this)
  • Steady progress · Oversight comes first (A long diffusion): no signpost yet
  • AI automates research · The rules stay unsettled (Control slips away)
    • As the scenario is written, AI completes most real, paid freelance projects end to end by the end of 2027. (can't be tested yet)
    • The length of the software tasks AI can finish keeps doubling at least as fast as the scenario assumes, every 122 days or less. (both sides expect this)
    • In some quarter before 2034, output per person stands 15% or more above the highest level it had reached a year or more before, which wins the bet's fast side. (can't be tested yet)
  • AI automates research · Oversight comes first (A managed explosion)
    • As the scenario is written, AI completes most real, paid freelance projects end to end by the end of 2027. (can't be tested yet)
  • Control slips away · The rules stay unsettled (Control slips away): no signpost yet

Read it with thisConsistent means not ruled out, and nothing more. No signpost on the grid holds or fails tonight, so the grid is no evidence that any world is on its way. The placing of each world is this site's, a drawing of an idea.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →

Imagined, not forecast

Stop 8 · The long run · Chart

Stories are not forecasts, and nothing in this last figure is evidence for any date above. Of the imagined inventions that were later built, it counts the wait between the story and the thing, and most ideas in the idea bank it draws from are not marked built at all.

Ideas from fiction that were later built: how many decades passed between the story and the thingChart
the same decade
89
1 decade later
93
2 decades later
94
3 decades later
117 · the middle of the built ideas
4 decades later
81
5 decades later
74
6 decades later
53
7 decades later
35
8 decades later
31
9 decades later
20
10 or more decades later
33
ideas the idea bank marks as built, by the decades betweenAain heavier type: the row the middle built idea falls in

This is the fiction lane: stories, not forecasts, and not evidence for any date on this page. It draws a different list from the works above: the Futures idea bank, 3746 inventions from novels and stories (Technovelgy: Science Fiction Timeline of Inventions (Bill Christensen); Not Boring: Sci-Fi Idea Bank (Packy McCormick)). Whether and when an idea was built is the bank's own mark, not this site's finding.

720 ideas are marked built with a date and are drawn. 2780 are not marked built and have no bar, so the figure shows how long the built ones took, not how long an idea takes: the ones still waiting would stretch it. Nor is it a guide to how long a story written today will wait. An idea from a recent story can only be here if it was built quickly, most ideas in the bank are not marked built at all, and nothing in the count says which of today's will be. The heavier row is where the middle of the built ideas falls, not a typical wait. Also left out: 126 built at a date the bank does not give, and 120 that existed before the story. Most of the bank's dates are decades, so the wait is counted in calendar decades, and an idea built a year after its story can fall in the next one.

The numbers
BuiltIdeas
the same decade89
1 decade later93
2 decades later94
3 decades later117
4 decades later81
5 decades later74
6 decades later53
7 decades later35
8 decades later31
9 decades later20
10 or more decades later33
All drawn720

Read it with thisThe fiction lane: stories, not forecasts, and not evidence for any date. It counts only ideas the idea bank marks as built, so it shows how long the built ones took and is no guide to how long a story written today will wait. Whether and when an idea was built is the bank's own mark, not this site's finding. The row in heavier type is where the middle of the built ideas falls, not a typical wait.

The full figure, what it leaves out, and its numbers →

A few ideas from stories, drawn as if they had been built. They come from the Futures idea bank and are evidence of nothing.

Illustration of Food Tablet: A single tablet delivering a complete day's nutrition without eating regular food.
Food Tablet · Harry Stephen Keeler, 1915
A single tablet delivering a complete day's nutrition without eating regular food.
Illustration of Tight-Beam: Sends messages along a tightly focused energy beam so only the intended receiver picks them up.
Tight-Beam · E.E. 'Doc' Smith, 1930
Sends messages along a tightly focused energy beam so only the intended receiver picks them up.
Illustration of Power Planet: An orbiting station that generates electricity and delivers it down to consumers on Earth.
Power Planet · Murray Leinster, 1931
An orbiting station that generates electricity and delivers it down to consumers on Earth.
Illustration made with AI image generation; not evidence.The gallery, and the idea bank behind it →

That is the argument as it stands tonight: some of it measured, some of it judged, and some of it not yet readable by anyone. The site also keeps a written list of what would prove it wrong and tests it every night; that list, and how each test reads tonight, is on the argument page. Every panel links to the page that holds its records.

What would prove the site wrong, on the argument page →