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Capture / layer 2 · The value chain

Model

The labs that build AI models: the leaders such as OpenAI and Anthropic, newer labs founded since 2023, and labs that publish their models openly, many of them Chinese. Dependency tier 2.

Entry and exit bells

The entry bell rings when the labs start buying from the layers around them (data and training environments); the exit bell rings when they buy those companies outright.

How the economics move

The site's judgement of each part of this layer, read against the readings below and the theory on the value chain page: what is getting cheap and interchangeable, what stays scarce, and what would prove it wrong.

The readings that test commoditisation here: Open-weights gap to the closed frontier (ECI points) (unclear); Price per unit of capability (cheapest near-frontier model, Artificial Analysis) (emerging); Inference price at fixed capability (halving time) (emerging); Enterprise multi-model usage share (Menlo) (emerging). Each keeps its own status; none is combined into a score.

What the powers mean

Hamilton Helmer, a strategy consultant and investor who studied why some firms keep earning more than their investors could get elsewhere, found that an advantage lasts only when a benefit sits behind a barrier that stops rivals copying it, and named the kinds that recur:

a cornered resource
:
preferential access to something others need: a patent, a licence, a scarce input, a rare team
branding
:
buyers pay more for the same thing because of what they believe about who made it
counter-positioning
:
a newcomer's model the incumbent could copy only by damaging its own business
network economies
:
each user makes the product more valuable to the others, so the leader's lead feeds itself
process power
:
a way of working that improves cost or quality and takes a rival years to learn
scale economies
:
unit costs fall as volume grows, and a rival cannot match them without matching the volume
switching costs
:
a customer would lose money, time or work by moving to a rival
Holding

A frontier lab's lead earns a rent that open models chase within months; it lasts only where the lab is built into its customers' work

The frontier labs, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, xAI and Meta, train the most capable AI models: programs trained on huge amounts of text and data to write, reason and carry out tasks. They sell their use by the token (a fragment of a word) and through products such as chat apps and coding tools. David Ricardo, an English economist who asked in 1817 why landlords grew rich when bread grew dear, found that the owner of the scarcest input collects a rent: profit above what it takes to keep a business going, earned because something holds rivals off. Today the scarce input is the best model, and the lab that has it charges for it. This site judges that the rent on a lead is transitional, because open-weight models (whose trained settings, the weights, are published for anyone to run) arrive some months behind, and that it becomes durable only where a lab is woven into how its customers work or owns the place where users meet it.

Getting cheap and interchangeable
This site judges that answering a well-understood request, the kind a model from a year before could already handle, is a commodity: many labs and open models do it, and it is priced close to the cost of the chips and power that run it. William Nordhaus, an economist who measured how much of the value of new inventions their makers keep as profit, found that it is a small part; most goes to buyers as lower prices and better products. Kenneth Arrow, an economist who studied how markets handle knowledge, argued that information is hard to own because copying it is cheap; a model's behaviour can be observed and partly copied by a rival training on its answers.
Staying scarce
This site judges that the newest model at the frontier stays scarce for as long as it leads, and that training one costs so much in chips and money that only a handful of firms attempt it. Hamilton Helmer, a strategy consultant who studied why some firms keep earning more than their investors could expect elsewhere, found that a lasting advantage is a benefit behind a barrier; the one that clearly applies today is scale economies (the cost of training a model is fixed, so a lab with more users spreads it thinner, and a rival must match the users to match the cost). Switching costs (what a customer would lose by moving to a rival) are emerging, not proven: they exist where a lab's tools are built into a firm's systems, but this site cannot yet measure how often firms use several labs at once, so it does not count them in this group's powers.
What would make it last
Labs turn deployments into switching costs: their coding agents, business tools and staff inside customers become part of how firms work, so moving to a rival means rebuilding, not just repointing. Or a lab owns the place users meet AI, as a chat app with a habit behind it, which Helmer would call branding (a buyer pays more for the same thing because of its name) or network economies (the product grows more useful as more people use it). David Teece, an economist who studied why inventors often fail to keep the returns from what they invent, found that the firm holding the complementary assets (the distribution, sales and systems a product needs to reach buyers) often keeps the profit; Google and Meta already hold theirs, and OpenAI and Anthropic are buying theirs. The rent also lasts, without either, if open-ended uses where only the best model will do keep growing faster than bounded ones, the case Giovanni Cattani makes above. Rules could entrench it too: Sayash Kapoor and Arvind Narayanan, computer scientists at Princeton who study what AI can and cannot do, argued that licensing who may build models, combined with limits on sharing them, would leave only a handful of firms able to build the most capable ones; this site reads that as a route to a regulatory rent (a profit protected by a licence rivals cannot get), which would make the lead last.
What would prove this wrong
Labs keeping their price premium and their share of business spending on models that open ones already match, with no growth in deployments or products; or, the other way, business spending spreading across many labs and open models as freely as developers' routed tokens already do.
Powers here today
scale economies
Binds on (how tight)
Building frontier models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Running models (easing), Deployment platforms (no reading; a model judges it probably easing), Capital (slack)
Commoditising

A new lab earns a rent only where its specialty lies off the big labs' path; elsewhere its asset is its people

Neolabs are younger AI labs outside the big frontier group, most founded in the last few years and mostly funded by investors before they sell much: Mistral, which publishes the weights (the trained settings) of some of its models, Safe Superintelligence, Thinking Machines Lab, Reflection AI and Periodic Labs among the general and research labs; ElevenLabs, Black Forest Labs and others in voice, images and video; Physical Intelligence and Skild AI in robots. David Ricardo, an English economist who asked in 1817 why landlords grew rich when bread grew dear, found that the owner of the scarcest input collects a rent: profit above what it takes to keep a business going, earned because something holds rivals off. For a new lab the scarce input is its researchers and its bet on a route the big labs are not taking. This site judges that where that route leads somewhere the frontier labs are heading anyway, the new lab competes with them for chips and money on worse terms, and its people are worth more to a big lab than its business is to investors.

Getting cheap and interchangeable
This site judges that a general model from a new lab is commoditising fastest of all: it competes with the frontier labs above it and the open-weight labs below it. Kenneth Arrow, an economist who studied how markets handle knowledge, argued that information is hard to own because copying it is cheap; a research idea, once published or seen in a product, spreads to labs with more chips. William Nordhaus, an economist who measured how much of the value of new inventions their makers keep as profit, found that it is a small part; most goes to buyers.
Staying scarce
This site judges that what stays scarce is the small number of researchers who can lead a frontier training run (the training of the most capable model of its time), and in the specialties, the data and tuning for one kind of work (a voice, a robot's movements, a laboratory's experiments) that general labs have not collected. Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright, economists who asked when learning from customers' data keeps rivals out, found it does so only when the data is proprietary, keeps its value and improves the product for every customer; a specialty that passes those tests may hold. Hamilton Helmer, a strategy consultant who studied why some firms keep earning more than their investors could expect elsewhere, found that a lasting advantage is a benefit behind a barrier; this site finds no such power proven in the neolabs today.
What would make it last
A specialist's product becomes the tool a trade works in, so switching costs (what a customer would lose by moving to a rival) hold customers after the general labs catch up; or its data from customers and experiments passes Hagiu and Wright's tests and becomes a cornered resource, Helmer's term for preferential access to something others need. A general neolab converts only if its different route (a new way to train, or a model that learns after it is released) proves both better and hard to copy.
What would prove this wrong
A lab founded since 2023 taking the lead on general models and holding it while charging for it; or the specialists' niches being matched by the frontier labs' general models, with the specialists' prices falling to the general labs' level.
Binds on (how tight)
Building frontier models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Continual learning (no reading; a model judges it probably tight), Training data (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Capital (slack)
Commoditising

Open-weight labs give the model away, so they keep little of its value but cap what the closed labs can charge

An open-weight lab publishes its model's weights, the trained settings that are the model, so anyone can run it on their own chips or rent it from a host. This site's open-weight labs include DeepSeek, Alibaba's Qwen team, Moonshot, MiniMax, Zhipu and StepFun, all of them Chinese; Meta's Llama models are open too, though this site counts Meta among the frontier labs and Mistral among the new labs. David Ricardo, an English economist who asked in 1817 why landlords grew rich when bread grew dear, found that the owner of the scarcest input collects a rent: profit above what it takes to keep a business going, earned because something holds rivals off. A model anyone can copy is not scarce, so the lab that publishes it collects little rent on it; this site judges that it earns instead through hosting its own model, selling a better closed version, or serving a parent company or state that wants the model to exist.

Getting cheap and interchangeable
The open model is a commodity by design: many hosts serve the same weights and compete on price, so the price of running it falls towards the cost of the chips and power. William Nordhaus, an economist who measured how much of the value of new inventions their makers keep as profit, found that it is a small part; most goes to buyers as lower prices and better products. This site judges open-weight labs are the clearest case of it in AI: the buyers and the hosts keep most of what the model is worth.
Staying scarce
This site judges that what stays scarce is the skill to train a model near the frontier on fewer chips, which some of these labs have shown, and the chips themselves, which export rules make harder for Chinese labs to buy. Hamilton Helmer, a strategy consultant who studied why some firms keep earning more than their investors could expect elsewhere, found that a lasting advantage is a benefit behind a barrier; this site finds none proven for the open-weight labs, because a skill that shows up in a published model can be studied and copied.
What would make it last
An open-weight lab's parent earns what the lab gives away: a cloud whose customers come for the free model and stay for the services, which David Teece, an economist who studied why inventors often fail to keep the returns from what they invent, would call owning the complementary assets (the hosting, sales and systems a product needs to reach buyers). Or giving the model away becomes counter-positioning in Helmer's sense, a model a closed lab cannot copy without cutting into its own paid business, with the parent collecting the reward.
What would prove this wrong
Closed labs keeping their prices on models that open ones already match, with open models' share of use falling; or an open-weight lab earning a lasting profit on the model itself rather than on hosting, services or a parent.
Binds on (how tight)
Building frontier models (easing), Running models (easing), AI chips (moderate)

The companies that matter here

Already worth over a trillion dollars

Alphabet Inc.

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Market
Alphabet sits in two parts of the chain. As a cloud, Google Cloud rents computing, storage and AI services, offering both graphics processors (GPUs) and its own tensor processing units (TPUs, chips Google designs for the maths AI models run on; the filing names Ironwood as its seventh generation), plus Vertex AI, a platform for building on its Gemini models and other companies' models, and Workspace office software. As a frontier lab (a company building the most capable AI models), it develops the Gemini models, which the filing says run across all of its largest consumer products, including Search through AI Overviews and AI Mode. The filing says the cost of developing its general AI models sits in Alphabet-wide costs rather than in the Google Cloud segment, and that margins on its revenue outside advertising, Google Cloud among it, are generally lower than advertising margins. It spent heavily on capital (buildings and equipment) in 2025 and said it expected to raise that spending significantly in 2026; in 2026 it also began selling new shares and mandatory convertible preferred stock, set up a programme to sell more shares over time, and borrowed heavily in several currencies. This site's filed figures show the Google Cloud operating margin (the share of sales left after running costs) rising sharply over the past year from the lowest among the big clouds. This site judges its market is both renting AI computing and selling AI inside its most widely used consumer products, and that owning chips, models and distribution together is rare.
Customers (diffuse)
Advertisers across the world pay for most of Alphabet's revenue, and the filing names no customer large enough to report separately. Google Cloud sells to businesses and developers; the filing says its remaining performance obligations (revenue contracted but not yet recognised) relate primarily to Google Cloud, and that it has a number of large, long-duration commercial agreements. It also says it has made debt and equity investments in companies with which it signed commercial arrangements at or near the same time, and that if such an investment were impaired it might have to reduce the related contracted revenue; the filing does not name those companies. Google invested again in Anthropic in April 2026 and promised more if Anthropic meets performance targets; Alphabet's quarterly filing records forward funding commitments of that kind, tied to milestones, on a strategic investment it does not name. Anthropic has also signed for Google's TPU capacity. Alphabet enters significant leases with outside data-centre operators, and has agreed to backstop payments on certain third-party data-centre leases (to cover them if the tenant defaults), with the right to take over the leases.
Powers
  • scale economies: One infrastructure serves Search, YouTube, Gemini and Google Cloud; this site judges the benefit is a lower cost for each unit of AI computing, and the barrier is the volume across its consumer products that a cloud-only rival does not have.
  • process power: Process power is a way of working that takes rivals years to learn. It has designed TPUs through generation after generation alongside its own models, and the filing says it focuses on driving efficiency in its data centres; this site judges that designing chips and models together drives part of that efficiency, that the benefit is AI computing that depends less on buying NVIDIA's chips, and that the barrier is the years of joint chip, software and model work a rival would have to repeat.
Under the site's rent rule
a monopoly-like profit, kept by the company itself. Depends on: AI chips (moderate), Chip foundries (moderate), Data-centre buildings (tight), Electricity generation (tight), Building frontier models (easing), Running models (easing), Capital (slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Gemini stays among the most capable models, so Alphabet does not have to pay another lab for the models that run its own products.
  • AI answers in Search keep earning at least what the old results page earned, so advertising keeps carrying most of the build-out; in 2026 Alphabet also began selling new shares and convertible preferred stock and borrowing heavily, so the build-out now leans on outside capital too.
  • TPUs stay competitive with NVIDIA's chips generation after generation, and outside customers keep choosing them, turning a cost advantage into a cloud business.
  • The Google Cloud margin keeps rising as the contracted backlog turns into revenue, even as the filing warns that margins outside advertising, cloud among them, are generally lower than advertising's.
  • Companies it invested in and also sells cloud services to stay solvent and pay, and the backstops it has given on data-centre leases are not called.
  • Its capital spending earns back before the equipment ages out; the filing warns that expected technology advances could change the period over which it benefits from these assets.

What would show it failing

  • The Google Cloud operating margin in this site's filed figures turning down while capital spending keeps rising.
  • A payment under one of its data-centre lease backstops, or a cut to contracted revenue after an impaired investment.
  • Large TPU customers moving their next generation of work back to GPUs.
  • Search revenue falling while more answers are given by AI, showing the answers earn less than the links they replace.
  • Gemini falling well behind rival models for several model generations in a row.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from TechCrunch article, 24 Apr 2026 (opens in a new tab), Alphabet Inc. annual report (10-K), 5 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), Alphabet Inc. quarterly report (10-Q), 23 Jul 2026 (opens in a new tab), Alphabet Inc. filing (8-K), 4 Jun 2026 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Candidate to be worth a trillion dollars

OpenAI

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Market
OpenAI builds frontier models (the most capable AI systems of their time, trained on huge amounts of text and computing power) and sells them as products people and firms use directly, above all ChatGPT, its chat app, for which this site's records hold a very large weekly user count reported by OpenAI, and through an API (a connection that lets other companies' software send requests to the model and pay per use). Running a model to answer a request is called inference. OpenAI is now a public benefit corporation, or PBC (a for-profit company whose charter also commits it to a stated public purpose), and Microsoft, its long-standing investor, holds a large minority stake after the 2025 recapitalisation (a reorganisation of who owns the company). Its newer deals push toward selling whole systems to businesses: with Amazon it is building a runtime (the software layer an AI agent works inside, keeping memory of prior work and access to a firm's tools and data) for Amazon's cloud customers, and Amazon's cloud is the only outside cloud allowed to resell Frontier, its platform for running teams of AI agents inside a company. Microsoft may now pursue the most advanced AI on its own or with others, and OpenAI may now release open-weight models (models whose trained settings are published so anyone can run them) that meet capability criteria the agreement sets. This site's recorded revenue run-rate (the latest month's revenue scaled up to a full year) for OpenAI has grown steeply but in mid-2026 sat below Anthropic's. Run-rate figures are self-reported: the labs publish them or are the source behind press reports of them, and this profile rests on company and partner announcements, not audited filings. How big the market becomes depends on whether businesses pay for systems built around a model or only for the cheapest model that is good enough.
Customers (moderate)
Consumers, most directly through ChatGPT, businesses and developers, plus other large companies that build on its models: Amazon will tailor OpenAI models for its own customer-facing apps. Microsoft keeps a licence to OpenAI's models and products into the 2030s, now non-exclusive. Under the April 2026 amendment OpenAI pays Microsoft a share of its revenue through 2030, whatever its technical progress, up to a total cap, and Microsoft no longer pays a share to OpenAI. Azure stays OpenAI's primary cloud and gets its products first, but OpenAI may now serve all its products on any cloud. The sources name no revenue share by customer; this site judges the base is broad, with a direct line to consumers through ChatGPT, but that Microsoft and Amazon stand between OpenAI and many business buyers.
Powers
  • scale economies: Emerging, not proven. This site judges that the cost of training a frontier model is spread over every customer, and the site's venture data show only a few labs raising enough to keep training at the frontier; the barrier holds against newcomers but not against the other frontier labs, and it thins as open-weight models trail by months, not years.
  • switching costs: Emerging, not proven. Its agent platform and the runtime with Amazon are built to hold a company's context, tools and permissions, which a customer would have to rebuild to move; this site has no measure yet of customers staying for that reason.
Under the site's rent rule
a thin profit, kept by platforms. Depends on: AI chips (moderate), Data-centre buildings (tight), Electricity generation (tight), Building frontier models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Running models (easing), Deployment platforms (no reading; a model judges it probably easing), Capital (slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Revenue grows into its compute commitments (contracts to buy computing power for years ahead): it has contracted for a large further block of Azure services from Microsoft; agreed to deploy AMD's chips across several generations, receiving a warrant (a right to buy AMD shares) tied to those purchases; expanded its multi-year Amazon agreement to cover gigawatts of Amazon's own Trainium chips (Amazon's in-house AI chips; a gigawatt is a very large amount of electric power, about what a big power station produces); and signed multi-year contracts with CoreWeave (a neocloud, a newer firm that rents out AI chips). This site's records also hold a press-reported agreement to buy computing from Oracle, and NVIDIA's quarterly filing shows it guaranteeing parts of the lease payments on a data-centre campus in Ohio that SB Energy is building and leasing to OpenAI, with an option to extend that support as the site grows. Revenue must rise at least as fast as these bills fall due.
  • Its prices and margins hold even though open-weight models trail the best closed models by months; this site's estimate of OpenAI's gross margin (revenue left after the direct cost of serving it) fell between 2024 and 2025.
  • Businesses that build agents on Frontier or the Amazon runtime find it costly to move them, so the deployment, not the model, keeps the customer.
  • OpenAI, rather than Microsoft or Amazon, owns the relationship with business customers, even though Microsoft keeps a non-exclusive licence to its models and a capped revenue share through 2030, and Amazon resells its platform.
  • Its direct reach to consumers through ChatGPT, which OpenAI reports and this site cannot check, lasts and turns into paying use; a rival that matches ChatGPT reaches those users directly.
  • It can keep raising money without leaning further on the cloud and chip suppliers that are also its investors, Microsoft, Amazon and NVIDIA among them, because this site's record shows its revenue run-rate still below the equity (money investors paid for shares) it has raised. Amazon's filing shows it paid the full equity commitment it made to OpenAI in early 2026 within months.

What would show it failing

  • OpenAI cutting, delaying or renegotiating its compute commitments, or a supplier paying out under a guarantee it gave for OpenAI's leases; NVIDIA has already guaranteed parts of the lease payments on one data-centre campus leased to OpenAI. This site's record holds a report, from anonymous sources, of OpenAI telling investors a lower compute-spending target than its chief executive had cited months before; this site notes the two figures are not strictly comparable.
  • Its best models' prices falling toward open-weight prices while its share of business use also falls.
  • Business customers of Frontier or the Amazon runtime moving their agents to rival models inside the same cloud at little cost.
  • This site's gross-margin estimate for OpenAI falling again, or its recoupment ratio (a year's run-rate over the equity raised) falling while commitments rise.
  • Microsoft's or Amazon's filings showing their return on OpenAI coming mainly from cloud spending OpenAI owes them rather than from OpenAI's own profit.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from Advanced Micro Devices annual report (10-K), 4 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), Amazon.com Inc. quarterly report (10-Q), 31 Jul 2026 (opens in a new tab), CoreWeave Inc. annual report (10-K), 2 Mar 2026 (opens in a new tab), Microsoft Corp annual report (10-K), 29 Jul 2026 (opens in a new tab), NVIDIA Corp quarterly report (10-Q), 26 Aug 2026 (opens in a new tab), OpenAI filing (8-K), 27 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), PPC Land article, 27 Apr 2026 (opens in a new tab), OpenAI announcement, 28 Oct 2025 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Candidate to be worth a trillion dollars

Anthropic

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Market
Anthropic builds frontier models (the most capable AI systems of their time), the Claude family, and sells them to businesses and developers through an API (a connection other software uses to send requests and pay per use), through its own apps, and through work tools: Claude Code, which writes and edits software, and Cowork, which brings Claude Code's abilities to other office work. Running a model to answer a request is called inference. It is a public benefit corporation, or PBC (a for-profit company whose charter also commits it to a stated public purpose). It calls itself the market leader in enterprise AI and coding; that is its own description. It says Claude is sold on the largest clouds, Amazon's, Google's and Microsoft's, and runs on Amazon's Trainium chips (Amazon's in-house AI chips), Google's TPUs (Google's in-house AI chips) and NVIDIA's GPUs (graphics processing units, the chips most AI runs on). This site's recorded revenue run-rate (the latest month's revenue scaled up to a full year) for Anthropic has grown steeply and in mid-2026 sat above OpenAI's. Run-rate figures are self-reported: the labs publish them or are the source behind press reports of them, and Anthropic confidentially submitted a draft registration statement for a stock-market listing in June 2026; until that filing is public, this profile rests on company and partner announcements, not audited filings. How big the market becomes depends on whether businesses keep paying a premium for its models once cheaper ones are good enough for the same work.
Customers (moderate)
Mostly businesses and developers. It says most of the very largest US companies by revenue are customers, that the count of customers spending heavily with it has grown sharply, that firms which start with one use tend to widen it, and that enterprise use makes up most of Claude Code's revenue. It says Claude is sold through the three largest clouds. Those clouds also offer rival models, including Amazon's own Nova models and Alphabet's Gemini; this site judges that part of its business arrives that way. The sources name no revenue share by customer; this site judges the base is moderately concentrated in large firms and in coding.
Powers
  • scale economies: Emerging, not proven. This site judges that the cost of training a frontier model is spread over every customer, and the site's venture data show only a few labs raising enough to keep training at the frontier; the barrier holds against newcomers but not against the other frontier labs, and it thins as open-weight models trail by months, not years.
  • switching costs: Emerging, not proven. It says businesses widen their use across the firm once Claude is built into their work and coding tools, which a customer would have to rebuild to move; but the same clouds offer rival models one setting away, and this site has no measure yet of customers staying for that reason.
Under the site's rent rule
a thin profit, kept by platforms. Depends on: AI chips (moderate), Data-centre buildings (tight), Electricity generation (tight), Memory (no reading), Building frontier models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Running models (easing), Deployment platforms (no reading; a model judges it probably easing), Capital (slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Revenue grows into its compute commitments (contracts to buy computing power for years ahead): in 2026 it signed for gigawatts of new capacity from Amazon and of TPU capacity from Google and Broadcom (a gigawatt is a very large amount of electric power, about what a big power station produces), and for GPU capacity from SpaceX; in November 2025 it chose Fluidstack (a neocloud, a newer firm that rents out AI computing) to build custom data centres for it. This site's records also hold its commitment to buy Azure computing from Microsoft and its commitment to spend on AWS over the next decade. Revenue must rise at least as fast as these bills fall due.
  • Its prices and margins hold even though open-weight models (models whose trained settings are published so anyone can run them) trail the best closed models by months; this site's gross-margin estimate for Anthropic (revenue left after the direct cost of serving it) sits at about the same level as OpenAI's, which this site judges is well below a typical software firm's.
  • Businesses that build Claude into their coding and daily work find it costly to move, even though the clouds that resell Claude sell rival models through the same menu.
  • Anthropic, rather than Amazon, Google or Microsoft, owns the relationship with business customers, even though Amazon is its main cloud and training partner and a large investor.
  • Its lead in business use, which it claims for itself and which Ramp's data on how many businesses pay for each lab show as a narrow lead (Ramp does not measure coding separately), lasts; its revenue leans on those uses, so a rival that matches it there reaches its core customers directly.
  • It can keep raising money without leaning further on the cloud and chip suppliers that are also its investors, Amazon, Google, Microsoft and NVIDIA among them, because this site's record shows its revenue run-rate still below the equity (money investors paid for shares) it has raised. It already leans on them: in 2026 Amazon invested again and set up a loan facility that opens up as Amazon delivers computing to Anthropic, taking Anthropic notes, or shares after a listing, for what is drawn; Google invested again and promised more if Anthropic meets performance targets; and the memory makers Micron, Samsung and SK hynix joined its latest round.

What would show it failing

  • Anthropic cutting, delaying or renegotiating its capacity agreements, or a supplier's filing showing it carrying Anthropic's obligations.
  • Its best models' prices falling toward open-weight prices while its share of business use also falls.
  • Large coding or enterprise customers moving their work to another lab's model within the same cloud at little cost.
  • This site's recoupment ratio for Anthropic (a year's run-rate over the equity raised) falling while its commitments rise; the latest reading is below the one before it.
  • Amazon's filings showing its return on Anthropic coming mainly from cloud spending Anthropic owes it, including spending paid for by drawing on Amazon's own loan facility, or from marking up its stake at new funding rounds, rather than from Anthropic's own profit.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from Amazon.com Inc. annual report (10-K), 6 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), Amazon.com Inc. quarterly report (10-Q), 31 Jul 2026 (opens in a new tab), TechCrunch article, 24 Apr 2026 (opens in a new tab), Ramp company page, 31 Aug 2026 (opens in a new tab), Anthropic announcement, 1 Jun 2026 (opens in a new tab), Anthropic announcement, 12 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), Anthropic announcement, 28 May 2026 (opens in a new tab), Fluidstack announcement, 12 Nov 2025 (opens in a new tab), Alphabet Inc. annual report (10-K), 5 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), OpenAI filing (8-K), 27 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Candidate to be worth a trillion dollars

xAI

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Market
xAI builds Grok, a frontier model (one of the most capable AI systems of its time), and since February 2026 has been part of SpaceX, where it forms the AI segment (a separately reported business line). That segment sells advertising on X, the social network xAI absorbed in 2025; subscriptions to X and Grok; data licences; API access (a connection other software uses to send requests to Grok and pay per use); and, since 2026, cloud services, renting its own computing power to other firms. Its 10-Q (the quarterly report US companies file with their regulator) says the segment's revenue rose sharply in the latest quarter mainly because it began selling that computing capacity, while advertising fell during a move to a new ad system. The segment still runs at an operating loss (costs above revenue). It runs its own Colossus data centres, measuring their installed power draw in gigawatts (a gigawatt is a very large amount of electric power, about what a big power station produces), though the 10-Q also cites rising cloud computing costs, and it is buying Cursor, a coding-tool company. How big the market becomes depends on whether it earns its return from Grok or from renting out the machines built to train it.
Customers (concentrated)
Consumers on X and the Grok apps, advertisers, developers using the API, and a few large buyers of its computing capacity. The 10-Q says a significant part of that infrastructure revenue comes from a small number of customers, names one unnamed AI-segment customer among SpaceX's largest, and says these cloud contracts can be ended by either side on short notice after the ramp-up period. Anthropic's own announcement says it signed for GPU capacity (graphics processing units, the chips most AI runs on) in SpaceX's Colossus data centres; the filing does not name its customers.
Powers
  • scale economies: Emerging, not proven. This site judges that the cost of training a frontier model is spread over every customer, and the site's venture data show only a few labs raising enough to keep training at the frontier; the barrier holds against newcomers but not against the other frontier labs, and it thins as open-weight models trail by months, not years.
  • a cornered resource: Emerging, not proven. A cornered resource is preferential access to something others need. It owns X, a large real-time stream of posts and an audience that Grok can reach directly; the benefit is data and distribution, and the barrier is that no rival owns X. But the segment also sells X's data to others under data licences, advertising on X fell in the latest quarter, and the audience figure is xAI's own, so this site does not count the barrier as proven.
Under the site's rent rule
a thin profit, kept by the company itself. Depends on: AI chips (moderate), Data-centre buildings (tight), Electricity generation (tight), The grid and its hookups (no reading; a model judges it probably tight), Building frontier models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Running models (easing), Capital (slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Revenue from Grok itself, not only from renting out computing power, grows into the cost of its data centres; today research and development is the segment's largest cost, which the 10-Q says rose with infrastructure and cloud computing costs from its data-centre expansion, and the segment runs at a loss.
  • Its prices and margins hold even though open-weight models (models whose trained settings are published so anyone can run them) trail the best closed models by months; this site's last recoupment reading for xAI (a year's run-rate over the equity raised), which predates its merger into SpaceX, was lower than OpenAI's or Anthropic's.
  • The customers renting its computing capacity renew rather than leave, although the contracts let either side end them on short notice.
  • Owning X and the Grok apps keeps giving it a direct line to users, and it turns that reach into paying use.
  • Its legal cases do not curb its products or its power supply: the 10-Q lists suits over Grok's image tools and a suit claiming the gas turbines powering one Colossus site lack proper air permits.

What would show it failing

  • The AI segment's operating loss widening while its revenue growth comes mainly from renting out capacity rather than from Grok subscriptions and API use.
  • A large capacity customer ending its contract, or infrastructure revenue falling back after the ramp-up.
  • Grok's prices falling toward open-weight prices without a matching rise in paying users.
  • A court order limiting the turbines at its Colossus site, or limiting Grok's image features.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from Anthropic announcement, 28 May 2026 (opens in a new tab), xAI announcement, 6 Jan 2026 (opens in a new tab), SpaceX quarterly report (10-Q), 4 Aug 2026 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Candidate to be worth a trillion dollars

Periodic Labs

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Market
Periodic Labs builds AI models together with autonomous laboratories (labs where robots run experiments and software decides what to try next), starting with materials science: new superconductors (materials that carry electricity with no loss) and magnets. Its bet is that experiments produce data no one else has, which trains better scientific AI, which picks better experiments. In 2026 it released Neon, a large model it built by mid-training (further broad training on a chosen body of material) and then reinforcement learning (training by rewarding good answers) on its own lab data; it says Neon beats leading general models from OpenAI and Anthropic at one analysis task, reading X-ray diffraction results (patterns that show a material's crystal structure), with relatively little compute (computing power). It also sells to industry, for instance training agents for a chip maker working on heat problems. It is private and early; its backers include Andreessen Horowitz and NVIDIA's venture arm. How big the market becomes depends on whether it makes materials others will pay for, and on who keeps the profit when it does.
Customers (concentrated)
Industrial research teams; its launch post names one example, an unnamed semiconductor maker. The sources give no revenue. This site judges that its customers today are few.
Powers
  • a cornered resource: Emerging, not proven. Its high-throughput labs produce experimental data, including failed results that are rarely published, that it says exists nowhere else; the barrier is that more experiments need more power, equipment and engineering and each can take days, so a rival cannot simply rent more computers to catch up.
Under the site's rent rule
a thin profit, kept by incumbent firms. Depends on: Training data (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), AI chips (moderate), Electricity generation (tight), Capital (slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Its labs discover materials, such as better superconductors, that manufacturers will pay for, and not only faster analysis of experiments.
  • Data from its own experiments keeps beating what general frontier models learn from published text and simulation, so its models stay ahead on the tasks it cares about.
  • It keeps a share of the value of a discovery, through patents or licences, rather than being paid once for a service while the manufacturers that make the material keep the profit.
  • The large labs, which it says it also uses when their models are good enough, do not build autonomous labs of their own at greater scale; Alphabet, for one, runs Isomorphic Labs, which applies AI to drug discovery, and Anthropic has announced a life-sciences research group and laboratory.
  • It can fund labs whose output grows slowly, since each experiment takes real time, power and equipment.

What would show it failing

  • Years passing without a material from its labs being licensed or made at scale.
  • A general frontier model matching Neon on its own analysis tasks without lab data.
  • Its revenue coming mainly from consulting-style work for industry rather than from discoveries.
  • A frontier lab or a large chemical or chip company opening autonomous labs of similar throughput.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from Anthropic announcement, 28 May 2026 (opens in a new tab), Alphabet Inc. annual report (10-K), 5 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), Periodic Labs announcement, 30 Sep 2025 (opens in a new tab), Periodic Labs announcement, 15 Sep 2026 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Candidate to be worth a trillion dollars

ElevenLabs

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Market
ElevenLabs builds AI voice models (software that turns text into natural speech, transcribes speech, dubs it into other languages, and makes sound effects and music) and sells them in products: ElevenAgents, for businesses to run voice and chat agents that answer customers; ElevenCreative, for creators and brands to make and translate audio; and ElevenAPI, a connection developers use to build its voices into their own products. Its annual recurring revenue, or ARR (the yearly value of its subscriptions and contracts at the current pace, a figure the company reports), rose steeply from the end of 2025 to April 2026 in this site's records, and more slowly from April to September 2026; its valuation rose sharply in its 2026 funding round. It says growth comes from enterprises putting voice agents into support, sales, hiring and marketing. Its site lists a May 2026 post saying it lowered its API and agent prices and introduced pay-as-you-go billing. How big the market becomes depends on whether voice stays a specialist's product or becomes a feature the frontier labs (the firms building the most capable general AI models) give away.
Customers (diffuse)
Enterprises, governments, developers and creators. It names Deutsche Telekom, Square, Revolut and the Ukrainian government as agent users; Meta, Epic Games, Salesforce, MasterClass and Harvey as API users; and Duolingo, NVIDIA and TIME as creative users. It says many of the largest companies building with it now invest in it too; NVIDIA, Santander and Deutsche Telekom are among those investors. This site judges the base is broad.
Powers
  • switching costs: Emerging, not proven. Its agent platform comes with integrations, testing and monitoring for large customer-service operations, and a brand's chosen voice lives on it; the benefit is repeat business, and the barrier is the work a firm would redo to rebuild its agents and voice elsewhere. This site judges the barrier is modest while voice quality converges, its lower prices and pay-as-you-go billing make leaving easier, and this site has no measure yet of customers staying for that reason.
Under the site's rent rule
a thin profit, kept by platforms. Depends on: Running models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Deployment platforms (no reading; a model judges it probably easing), Applications (no reading; a model judges it probably slack), Capital (slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Its voices stay clearly better than those the frontier labs bundle into their own products; xAI, for one, already offers a voice agent through its API.
  • Businesses buy a whole agent platform from it, not just voice by the minute, so that price cuts on voice do not cut its revenue.
  • The telecoms, software and cloud firms that resell or build on its voices, several of them investors, do not replace it with their own or a lab's models.
  • Revenue keeps growing faster than its prices fall.

What would show it failing

  • Large customers moving their agents to a frontier lab's voice model at little cost.
  • Further price cuts without a matching rise in use, showing voice being priced as a commodity.
  • Its growth in this site's ARR records, which slowed after April 2026, slowing further while enterprise voice agents keep spreading.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from ElevenLabs announcement, 5 May 2026 (opens in a new tab), ElevenLabs announcement, 4 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab), xAI announcement, 6 Jan 2026 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Already worth over a trillion dollars

Meta Platforms

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Meta runs Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp and Threads, and its 10-K (the annual report US companies file with their regulator) says it earns substantially all its revenue from advertising on Facebook and Instagram. Its AI work sits on both sides of that business. It builds its own models. It released the Llama family openly, but its newest flagship, Muse Spark, released in April 2026, is its first frontier model without open weights; the 10-K says it expects to train a mix of open and closed models from here (an open model is one whose trained settings are published so anyone can run it). It offers Meta AI, an assistant available inside its apps, as a stand-alone app, on its AI glasses and on the web. And it uses AI to choose which posts and ads each person sees, which the 10-K credits with better ad targeting and measurement. It states a goal of building superintelligence, which it defines as AI that surpasses human intelligence. To pay for this it spends heavily on data centres: this site's records from its filings show its capital spending (money spent on buildings and machines) growing much faster than its revenue in 2025 and again so far in 2026, and its 10-K lists large commitments, mostly for data centres and for computing capacity rented from other firms. In October 2025 it entered an arrangement to co-develop a data-centre campus in Louisiana, in which it holds a minority interest. In June 2025 it bought a non-voting minority stake in Scale AI, a seller of training data made by people; its filings say it has no significant influence over Scale's operations, and Scale's founder joined Meta to work on its AI. This site's records also hold Meta agreeing to buy Manus and buying Limitless in December 2025 and Stilla in September 2026, and buying or hiring teams from other small AI firms in March 2026. Manus, maker of a general-purpose AI agent (software that carries out tasks such as research and building things for its user, rather than only answering), announced in December 2025 that it was joining Meta, but in April 2026 China's top economic planner, which reviews foreign investment, blocked the deal and ordered it withdrawn. In September 2026 Meta launched Muse, a personal agent that Meta says runs in its own walled-off computer in Meta's cloud with its own web browser, books travel, fills in forms and buys things after checking with the user, pays through Link, a checkout service built by Stripe, is free for most uses with paid plans for more, and does not share users' conversations with Muse, or the data in their Muse workspace, with Meta's ad systems. The question is whether AI adds to or eats into the advertising business that pays for it.
Customers (diffuse)
Advertisers pay for substantially all of it, the 10-K says. It also says most of its revenue comes from marketers advertising on Facebook and Instagram, that they make no long-term commitments, and that the loss of marketers or cuts in their spending could seriously harm the business. It names no large customer. The users it reaches are counted in billions of daily visitors, a figure Meta measures itself and warns may be inaccurate. Meta AI earns no direct revenue that the 10-K reports; in September 2026 Meta began selling its models and agents to businesses and developers through a new line, Meta Enterprise Platform. This site judges the paying base is diffuse, spread across many advertisers.
Powers
  • network economies: Hamilton Helmer, a strategy consultant who studied why some firms keep earning more than their rivals, found that a lasting advantage needs both a benefit and a barrier to copying. In Meta's social apps the benefit is that each user makes the apps more useful to friends and more valuable to advertisers; the barrier is that a rival must assemble a comparable audience first. The 10-K shows the audience still growing in 2025, with more ads shown and a higher average price per ad, so this site counts the power proven in its social apps. It finds no evidence yet that the power extends to Meta AI itself, where one person's chat does not improve another's.
  • scale economies: Emerging, not proven. This site judges that the cost of training models and building ad-ranking systems is spread over Meta's very large audience and ad sales, so each user costs it less than a smaller rival; but the barrier holds only against newcomers, not against Google or the frontier labs (the firms building the most capable AI systems), which spend at similar scale and are its main AI rivals.
  • counter-positioning: Emerging, not proven, and weakening. Counter-positioning is a newcomer's model the incumbent could copy only by damaging its own business. The benefit is that Meta can give AI away inside its apps and let advertising pay; the barrier is that a lab living on subscriptions and paid access to its models would give up that revenue by doing the same. But the labs can add advertising too, and in September 2026 Meta itself began selling its models and agents to businesses and developers through Meta Enterprise Platform, on top of paid Muse plans, the same paid access a lab lives on; so this site does not count the barrier as proven.
Under the site's rent rule
a fat profit, kept by the company itself. Depends on: AI chips (moderate), Data-centre buildings (tight), Electricity generation (tight), Building frontier models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Running models (easing), Applications (no reading; a model judges it probably slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Advertising keeps paying for the AI build-out. The 10-K says its AI work will need more spending on infrastructure and staff, and this site's records show capital spending rising far faster than revenue; ad revenue must keep growing fast enough to carry those costs and the losses of Reality Labs, its glasses and headsets division, which the 10-K says depends on profits earned elsewhere. In the second quarter of 2026 its operating income fell from a year earlier even as ad revenue grew.
  • AI keeps making its ads work better, so advertisers keep paying more per ad; the 10-K reports more ads shown and a higher average price per ad in 2025, and credits its AI with better targeting and measurement.
  • People keep turning to Meta AI inside apps they already use rather than moving their questions, shopping and time to assistants from OpenAI or Google. William Nordhaus, an economist who measured how much of the value of new inventions their makers keep, found that most goes to users; this site judges a free assistant only pays Meta if the attention it holds can be sold to advertisers.
  • Its own models stay close enough to the best to power its products, so it need not pay rival labs for the capability; the 10-K lists competitors whose AI may be better or cheaper among its risks, and its latest 10-Q already lists rising third-party AI token costs, spending on other providers' models, among the reasons its costs grew.
  • Regulators let it keep showing personalised ads. The 10-K says the European Commission ruled in April 2025 that its offer of a paid subscription with no ads did not comply with EU rules, a decision it has appealed.
  • Its minority stake in Scale AI, which carries no vote, and its purchases of small AI firms add skills and products without drawing new limits from competition authorities, whose past scrutiny of its acquisitions the 10-K describes.
  • People let Muse act for them, booking and buying rather than only chatting, and Meta earns from that work through subscriptions or a share of what Muse buys, since Meta says Muse keeps users' conversations with it, and the data in their Muse workspace, out of its ad systems; for now, the source suggests, that leaves subscriptions and purchases rather than advertising. This site judges that an agent shopping for its user could draw spending away from the ads that pay Meta today, so the agent must earn at least what it displaces.
  • Meta's own agents do not depend on buying agent makers that regulators can block; China blocked its purchase of Manus, the agent maker it agreed to buy in December 2025, and ordered the deal withdrawn.

What would show it failing

  • Capital spending rising while advertising revenue growth slows for several quarters in a row.
  • Meta AI's use growing without any rise in ad prices, ads shown or time spent in its apps.
  • Meta licensing another lab's model to run its main products, a sign its own models fell behind.
  • A regulator's order forcing it to show much less personalised ads across Europe or the United States.
  • Its data-centre venture partners or cloud suppliers renegotiating terms because Meta cut its capacity plans.
  • People using Muse to shop and book while time spent and ads shown in Meta's apps fall, with no subscription or purchase revenue from Muse making up the gap.
  • A regulator blocking another of its AI purchases, a sign that buying agent makers cannot fill gaps in Meta's own agents.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from Meta Platforms announcement, 29 Dec 2025 (opens in a new tab), Meta Platforms annual report (10-K), 29 Jan 2026 (opens in a new tab), Meta Platforms quarterly report (10-Q), 30 Jul 2026 (opens in a new tab), Meta Platforms announcement, 28 Sep 2026 (opens in a new tab), TechCrunch article, 27 Apr 2026 (opens in a new tab), Meta Platforms announcement, 8 Sep 2026 (opens in a new tab), The Decoder article, 8 Apr 2026 (opens in a new tab), Meta Platforms quarterly report (10-Q), 31 Jul 2025 (opens in a new tab), Scale AI announcement, 12 Jun 2025 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Candidate to be worth a trillion dollars

Chai Discovery

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Market
Chai Discovery, founded in 2024 and based in San Francisco, builds AI models for pre-clinical drug discovery (the laboratory stage before a medicine is tested in people). Its models predict how molecules such as proteins, DNA and drugs fit together, and design new molecules from scratch, especially antibodies (proteins the immune system uses to latch onto a target). In September 2024 it released a model for predicting molecular structure, free to use through a web page, including for commercial drug discovery, and published its weights (the trained settings) and code under an open licence that lets anyone use and change them; it said the model scored slightly above AlphaFold, another structure-prediction model, on one published test; that is its own comparison. Its later models reach scientists at drug companies through its software platform; the sources do not say their weights are published. It says the model it released in 2025 was the first of its kind to reach high success rates in laboratory tests when designing antibodies from scratch, which it calls a step change over earlier computational methods, and that its latest model improves on it; both claims are self-reported. In July 2026 it announced a large Series C round (a later stage of venture funding) led by Index Ventures with Kleiner Perkins, Sequoia Capital and Dimension; OpenAI, which Chai's 2024 release thanks among its early backers, joined this round as an existing investor. How big the market becomes depends on whether designed molecules become medicines, and on who keeps the profit when they do.
Customers (concentrated)
Large drug companies. The Series C release names Eli Lilly and Pfizer as partners whose scientists use its platform, and investors quoted in it say its models are already used at some of the world's largest drug makers. The sources give no revenue and no contract terms. This site judges its customers today are few and large. David Teece, an economist who studied why the firm that invents something often fails to keep the returns, called the inputs a product needs to reach its buyers complementary assets, and found that whoever holds them often keeps the profit; here they are the laboratories, clinical trials, regulatory approvals and sales forces that turn a designed molecule into a sold medicine, and this site judges they belong to the drug companies it sells to.
Powers
None that passes the test of a benefit behind a barrier today.
Under the site's rent rule
a thin profit, kept by incumbent firms. Depends on: Building frontier models (easing), Post-training (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), Training data (no reading; a model judges it probably moderate), AI chips (moderate), Capital (slack).

What would have to hold by 2035

  • Molecules designed with its models succeed in the laboratory and then in clinical trials; so far the sources report laboratory success rates and partnerships, not medicines.
  • It is paid in a way that shares in a medicine's value, such as licence fees, payments when a drug passes a milestone, or royalties (a share of each sale), rather than only fees for using its software; the sources give no terms.
  • Its lead lasts long enough to become a power in the sense of Hamilton Helmer, a strategy consultant who found that a lasting advantage needs both a benefit and a barrier to copying. This site finds none proven today: its first model is published for anyone to build on, Alphabet's 10-K says its Isomorphic Labs applies AI to drug discovery, and the general frontier labs (the firms building the most capable AI systems), among them OpenAI, one of its own investors, could turn to the same problem.
  • Results from partners' experiments improve its models for every customer, the test that Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright, economists who asked when customer data keeps rivals out, set for a data advantage; the sources do not say whether its contracts allow this.
  • Drug companies keep buying from it rather than building their own AI teams, and it can keep funding the computing and research each new model needs.

What would show it failing

  • Years passing without a molecule designed with its models entering clinical trials.
  • Eli Lilly, Pfizer or another named partner ending its work with Chai or bringing the work in-house.
  • Isomorphic Labs, a frontier lab or an open project publishing a model that matches its design success rates.
  • Its deals turning out to be fees for software use with no share in the medicines.

Drafted by claude-opus-5.5 from Chai Discovery announcement, 9 Sep 2024 (opens in a new tab), Chai Discovery article, 14 Jul 2026 (opens in a new tab), Alphabet Inc. annual report (10-K), 5 Feb 2026 (opens in a new tab); reviewed by separate reviewing runs of the same model, which checked its claims against the sources it cites; no person reviewed it. Drafted by a Claude model, made by Anthropic, which competes with, sells to or buys from companies in this layer.

Indicators

Frontier-lab revenue run-rates
concentrating
$50.0Bas of 2026-09-30
Lab recoupment ratio
emerging
0.27×as of 2026-09-30
Open-weights gap to the closed frontier (ECI points)
unclearEvaluator reads stable since 2026-10-31; reason pending
10.2 indexas of 2026-10-17
METR 50% time horizon
faster than normal
17.4 has of 2026-04-07
METR 80% time horizon
faster than normal
3.1 has of 2026-04-07
50%/80% horizon ratio
consistent with normalstale since 2026-03-05
6.34×as of 2026-03-05
ARC-AGI-2 best score
emerging
95.0%as of 2026-09-03
Internal-to-public deployment gap at the frontier
consistent with normal
4 monthsas of 2026-06-30

Sub-layers and venture flow

  1. 5. Frontier labs

    Frontier labs: primary-round equity by quartereach segment links to its first round's record
    Form D filingsEpoch's compiled rounds

    Derived (venture_dollars_by_source) from: Epoch AI data hub — AI companies; SEC EDGAR Form D (private offerings). Epoch AI, 'Data on AI Companies' (CC BY 4.0), epoch.ai/data. SEC EDGAR Form D data sets.

    The numbers
    quartersourcekinddollarsrecord
    Q2 2026Epoch's compiled roundsequity$80.0Bestimate
    Q1 2026Epoch's compiled roundsequity$152Breported
    Q4 2025Epoch's compiled roundsequity$22.5Bestimate
    Q4 2025Form D filingsequity$16.6Breported
    Q3 2025Epoch's compiled roundsequity$21.3Bestimate
    Q2 2025Form D filingsequity$5.3Breported
    Q1 2025Epoch's compiled roundsequity$14.5Bestimate
    Q1 2025Form D filingsequity$27.7Mreported
    Q4 2024Epoch's compiled roundsequity$10.6Bestimate
    Q4 2024Form D filingsequity$6.0Breported
    Q2 2024Form D filingsequity$5.0Breported
    Q1 2024Epoch's compiled roundsequity$4.8Bestimate
    Q4 2023Epoch's compiled roundsequity$2.0Bestimate
    Q4 2023Form D filingsequity$135Mreported
    Q2 2023Epoch's compiled roundsequity$750Mestimate
    Q1 2023Epoch's compiled roundsequity$10.0Bestimate
  2. 6. Neolabs (founded 2023+)

    Neolabs (founded 2023+): primary-round equity by quartereach segment links to its first round's record
    Form D filingsEpoch's compiled rounds

    Derived (venture_dollars_by_source) from: Epoch AI data hub — AI companies; SEC EDGAR Form D (private offerings). Epoch AI, 'Data on AI Companies' (CC BY 4.0), epoch.ai/data. SEC EDGAR Form D data sets.

    The numbers
    quartersourcekinddollarsrecord
    Q3 2026Epoch's compiled roundsequity$3.5Breported
    Q2 2026Form D filingsequity$82.5Mreported
    Q1 2026Form D filingsequity$230Mreported
    Q4 2025Form D filingsequity$839Mreported
    Q3 2025Epoch's compiled roundsequity$2.0Breported
    Q2 2025Form D filingsequity$52.0Mreported
    Q1 2025Form D filingsequity$231Mreported
    Q2 2024Epoch's compiled roundsequity$500Mreported
    Q1 2024Epoch's compiled roundsequity$16.3Mestimate
    Q1 2024Form D filingsequity$1.1Breported
    Q4 2023Epoch's compiled roundsequity$415Mestimate
    Q4 2023Form D filingsequity$31.9Mreported
    Q2 2023Epoch's compiled roundsequity$113Mreported
    Q1 2023Form D filingsequity$35.5Mreported
  3. 7. Open-weight & Chinese labs

    Open-weight & Chinese labs: primary-round equity by quartereach segment links to its first round's record
    Epoch's compiled rounds

    Derived (venture_dollars_by_source) from: Epoch AI data hub — AI companies. Epoch AI, 'Data on AI Companies' (CC BY 4.0), epoch.ai/data.

    The numbers
    quartersourcekinddollarsrecord
    Q2 2026Epoch's compiled roundsequity$7.5Bestimate
    Q1 2026Epoch's compiled roundsequity$1.2Breported

Primary-round dollars per calendar quarter for each sub-layer, each strip on its own scale: Form D amounts sold where the entity files, Epoch's press-compiled rounds otherwise.

Crosswalk to the diffusion lens

  • Methods (same valve) — Capability growth is the model layer's product; inference price at fixed capability ⇄ price-per-token pass-through; open-weights lag ⇄ open-vs-closed gap.
  • Return arrow (return arrow) — Inside the labs: agent work on the labs' own research and lab recoupment are deployment feeding back into invention.
  • Adaptation (input to) — Backlash, safety brakes and paused runs are adaptation acting back on the model layer.
  • Products (same valve) — Reliability, calibration and the gap between internal and external deployment decide what the model layer can productise.
  • Early adoption (same valve) — Buyers spreading work across several labs is adoption breadth read from the model layer.